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Abstract 
Banking is different from the provision of other goods and services and of pivotal im- 
portance to economic growth and financial development. Against the background of 
continuing merger activity in the US and European banking sectors, this thesis (i) com- 
pares the performance implications of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) for bid- 
ding banks in both geographic regions and (ii) seeks to explain reported differences. Re- 
search on European bank M&A has received relatively little academic interest in the ex- 
tant literature. To date, conclusions about the performance implications of acquisition 
activities are almost exclusively derived from a US market context. However, the case 
for investigating the performance effects of M&A outside the US seems compelling 
given significant structural, legal and regulatory differences between the US and many 
European banking sectors. 
The results reported in this thesis show marked differences for both market valua- 
tion effects and post-merger financial performance between bank mergers in Europe 
and the US. On the whole, the performance outcomes for European bidding banks ap- 
pear to be more positive compared with those of US institutions. Thus, European bid- 
ding banks realise positive abnormal returns over the announcement period and small 
increases in post-merger performance in the years following a merger. It is particularly 
interesting that performance improvements for European banks are most pronounced 
I 
for cross-border and product diversifying M&A-two types of M&A about whose per- 
formance effects the US-based literature is most sceptical. By contrast, shareholders in 
US bidding banks experience wealth losses and there are no gains in post-merger ac- 
counting performance. 
The thesis also reports findings regarding the dominant motivation behind M&A 
in Europe and the US. It appears that European banks pursue a cost-cutting strategy 
when they increase cost efficiency levels and decrease post-merger lending vis-a-vis 
non-merging banks following a deal. US banks, on the other hand, expand both on- and 
off-balance sheet activities in the post-merger period, but simultaneously appear to suf- 
fer from deteriorating post-merger efficiency levels. 
Finally, novel findings that link laws and regulations (prevalent in the country of 
the bidder and the target) to merger performance are presented. As regards laws appli- 
cable to targets, the results reported in this thesis are consistent with the view that the 
level of investor protection enjoyed by target bank shareholders partly explains why 
mergers attract different market reactions across countries. Evidence is proffered that 
shows an inverse relationship between the level of investor protection prevalent in the 
target country and abnormal returns that bidders realise during the announcement pe- 
riod. Accordingly, bidding banks realise higher returns when targeting low protection 
economies (most European economies) than bidders targeting institutions which oper- 
ate under a high investor protection regime (the US). The explanation put forward for 
this is that bidding bank shareholders need to be compensated for an increased risk of 
expropriation by insiders which they face in a low protection environment where take- 
over markets are illiquid and there are high private benefits of control. As regards regu- 
lation in the country of the bidder, this thesis examines whether the stringency of bank 
regulation has an impact on the effectiveness of corporate governance at bidding banks. 
IV 
The bidder's governance effectiveness is measured as the extent to which board charac- 
teristics improve bank merger outcomes in Europe and the US. Essentially, this allows 
the following question to be examined: Is regulation a substitute or a complement to 
governance? If regulation and governance are substitutes, one may expect that, to the 
extent that monitoring by shareholders restricts managerial discretion and its potentially 
negative effects on shareholder wealth, stricter regulation is associated with less effective 
governance. However, the results reported in this thesis suggest that board characteris- 
tics such as independence, diversity and board leadership structure play a role in im- 
proving bank M&A in the US, but not in Europe. Given that the US, by most standards, 
exhibits the stricter regulatory regime, the results point to a complementary role be- 
tween bank regulation and governance. 
V 
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1 
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
The banking industry has undergone dynamic and structural changes on a scale experi- 
enced by very few industries in modern times. Competition from non-bank financial 
institutions has eroded banks' traditional role as intermediaries between depositors (sur- 
plus units) and borrowers (deficit units). In most countries, the growth of financial mar- 
kets has been facilitated by deregulation, advances in communication technologies, as 
well as by demand from savers wishing to deploy assets more efficiently, partly to meet 
the retirement provisions of ageing populations in the developed world. Collectively, 
these trends have reduced banks' ability to engage in consumption smoothing based on 
nominal deposits and have brought about a transformation to increasingly market-based 
systems where financial assets are valued at market prices. This transformation has had 
profound implications for the way risks are borne by individuals and shared amongst 
them across time. It is encapsulated in the growing importance of non-depository finan- 
cial institutions (e. g. pension funds, mutual funds, and investment trusts) and the grow- 
ing share of non-interest income on the balance sheets of commercial banks that diver- 
sify into areas such as insurance, brokerage, and asset management (Allen and San- 
tomero, 1997,2001). 
(haliter 1: Itit n ). luctiun 
Figure 1-1 Value of Worldwide M&A Activities by Economic Sector ($ trn), 1985-2004 
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Berger et al. (1999) argue that M&A arc the strategic answer of banks to changes 
in their industry environment. AV-orld,, vide, the banking industry has outpaced all other 
sectors in terms of the value of completed MI&A. The value of completed financial sec- 
tor Nl&A deals exceeds $6.85 trillion between 1984 - 20()4 (see Figure 1-1), and banking 
firms accounted for 53`%) of this sum during the period 1990 - 20)0 (Amel et al., 2004). 
While bank mergers are a worldwide phenomenon, bank merger studies arc almost ex- 
clusively confined to the US market. Despite its position as the second most active 
Nl&A market, Europe has received relatively little academic attention. This is unfortu- 
nate, given that differences in financial systems, bank regulation, and governance prac- 
tices across the two regions may have implications for both the type of bank mergers 
that occur and the performance implications of Nl&zA in huro>pe and the US. For exam- 
ple, a comparison of bank NI&A in the two regions could offer important insights into 
regulatory and corporate governance aspects of the performance of banks. In addition, 
there arc political pressures from the I "luro )pean Union (F. U) for a more integrated 
European banking sector that may have positive implications for the effectiveness of 
monetary, policy across the huroý area (by reducing interest rate pass-through times in 
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retail financial services) and would substantially reduce the fees associated with cross- 
border banking transactions (Goddard et al., 2007). Hence, it is timely to study Euro- 
pean M&A more closely against the backdrop of US activity. 
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organised as follows. The next sec- 
tion provides a brief overview of the merger performance literature. This is followed by 
a discussion of why banks' M&A activities warrant a separate discussion from that of 
non-financial firms. There is then a consideration of why M&A activity may be moti- 
vated by a non-value maximising agenda. Finally, the main contributions that this thesis 
makes to the debate about the motivations and performance implications of merger ac- 
tivities in the banking industry are presented. 
1.2 Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A): The Stylised Facts 
Research into the performance implications of merger activities in a multi-industry set- 
ting has a long tradition, especially in the fields of strategic management and financial 
economics. This subsection introduces the main findings of this vast and still expanding 
literature. Many of the stylised facts about the performance effects of merger activities 
in the non-financial sector discussed in this section will be useful in later chapters when 
formulating expectations about merger oitcomes in the banking sector. 
M&A activities across all economic sectors reached record highs in 1999 (see 
Figure 1-2). However, despite managers' apparent enthusiasm for acquisitive growth 
strategies, the extant empirical literature remains highly sceptical about the viability of 
these activities (King et al., 2004; Datta et al., 1992; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000). Most of 
the numerous studies undertaken on the post-acquisition performance of firms estimate 
a failure rate between 45% and 55% (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; Porter, 1987; 
Montgomery and Wilson, 1986). At the very best, the discrepancy between the cont- 
3 
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inued popularity of mergers, on one hand, and realised outcomes, on the other, indicates 
that knowledge about the performance implications of mergers remains incomplete. 
Ravcnscraft and Scherer (1989) analyse the accuunnng performance of 
three-quarters of all mergers in the US manufacturing industry between 1975 - 77. Tor 
2,700 acquisitions, the results show that the target's profitability suffers for a period of 
up to 8 years foil owing an accluisitio>n compared with pre-merger levels. Only for the 
case of `mergers of equals', the authors report increases in post-merger pro>titabilit\. 
Similar results are reported by Ghosh (2(101) -who finds no evidence consistent with 
1&A improving ccuniýmic performance for his sample ()f'315 US multi-industry merg- 
crs during 1981 -- 1995. l'Or I': urm pc, AlOrOsini et al. (1998) examine 52 large cress- 
border mergers between 1987 and 1992 and show that mergers do not increase sales 
over a two-year period. By contrast, I Icaly et al. (1992) and Linn and Switzer (2U111) Lind 
slight gains in cash t1 w profitability for ncvvly-merged firms. The former analyse a sam- 
pie of 50 large US mergers in the period 1984 - 1997, while the latter examine a sample 
of 413 LIS mergers which wcrc . inno unccd between 1967 and 1987. 
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Empirical investigations into the market reaction to M&A show that merger an- 
nouncements, at best, are value-neutral for the merged entity. For bidding shareholders, 
on the other hand, merger announcements are almost certain to lead to negative returns. 
In an analysis of the value effects of merger announcements between 1998 and 2001, 
Moeller et al. (2005) find that bidding shareholders, on average, realise wealth losses 
around merger announcements that correspond to 12% of a deal's total value. In a 
meta-analysis, Datta et al. (1992) find that cash-financed acquisitions create more share- 
holder wealth for acquirers than equity-financed transactions. Given that acquirers 
choose the method of payment that is most beneficial to them-i. e., they will choose 
equity if it is overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003)-the use of equity as acquisition 
currency is believed to signal to investors that the proposed transaction is less desirable 
at the financial terms offered (King et al., 2004). Further, related acquisitions were re- 
peatedly found to generate abnormal returns for acquirers (Capon et al., 1988; Doukas 
and Kan, 2006). Lubatkin (1983) argues that related acquisitions create more value than 
product diversification as synergetic benefits can be realised from combinations of simi- 
lar activities. Further, multiple bids for a single target increase target returns at the ex- 
pense of the abnormal returns that bidders realise in the announcement period. Jensen 
and Ruback (1983) argue that competition in the market for corporate control spurs an 
auction-type bidding process among acquirers that lets them bid away merger-related 
gains. Finally, Hitt et al. (2001) find a positive relationship between acquisition experi- 
ence and post-acquisition performance. They interpret their finding as consistent with 
experienced acquirers being better suited to overcome challenges associated with identi- 
fying and screening suitable targets as well as with integrating the resources of the target 
into the context of the acquiring firm. 
In order to gain a more finely-grained analysis of what drives merger outcomes, 
studies in strategic management have employed subjective measures of performance 
5 
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based on interviews or questionnaires. By and large, the results of these studies point to 
the post-merger integration process as crucial to realising potential synergetic benefits 
from mergers. For example, Capron (1999) surveys 253 target firm managers and finds 
target firm managers are likely to refuse cooperation with the acquiring firm's manage- 
ment team over any steps that lead to a decline of their status within the merged entity. 
Consequently, meaningful cost efficiency improvements in the post-merger period are 
most likely to be brought about by the divestiture of bidder assets. Similarly, Very and 
Schweiger (2001) identify management's propensity to listen to local advisors, and the 
target's senior management team, as having a positive performance effect. The finding is 
based on a series of interviews conducted with the senior management of 26 companies 
in France, Germany, Italy, and the US that had recently completed a cross-border 
merger. Finally, Brouthers et al. (1998) survey a sample of Dutch firms and show that 
managers have multiple motives when engaging in acquisitions. The authors compare 
merger motives to outcomes (both reported by managers) and find a high degree of 
congruence between the two. For instance, mergers that were initiated to raise the ac- 
quirer's market power, tended to achieve this. For 12 out of the 17 motives surveyed, 
mergers were successful when measured against the motives reported by management. 
Perhaps overconfidently in the face of self-reported data, Brouthers et al. (1998) con- 
clude that `managers are right, mergers are successful' (p. 352). 
In summary, there are few general conclusions emerging from the vast body of 
M&A studies. King et al. (2004) attribute contradictory findings in the extant literature 
to the small degree of overlap between the numerous studies published over the last 
thirty years. `New effects have characteristically been sought over replication of known 
effects, so knowledge accumulation has been slower than might be expected given the 
high level of research activity in the M&A area' (p. 188). Further, the generalisability of 
many previous findings is limited on the grounds that they examine (i) different eco- 
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nomic sectors, (u) different time periods, and (iii) employ different metrics of post- 
acquisition performance. The thesis may remedy one of these issues by concentrating on 
a single industry. The next section discusses why banking provides a particularly suitable 
case for a single-industry analysis of M&A. 
1.3 Are Banks Special? 
Banking is different from the provision of other goods and services. The functioning of 
a country's banking system is directly linked to investment, employment and to eco- 
nomic growth (Levine, 1997). Banks play a pivotal role in the allocation of resources 
between surplus and deficit units, in mitigating against the effects of information asym- 
metries and in the provision of governance advice to firms which borrow from them 
(especially in economies with poorly developed capital markets). Hagendorff et al. 
(2007b) argue that while none of these functions are unique to banks-some are also 
performed by non-depository institutions-bank activities are subject to special qualities 
that mark them out from non-bank firms and, thus, justify a related but separate discus- 
sion of banking firms in the context of M&A. 
(i) An important part of the raison d'titre of banks (and indeed other financial in- 
stitutions) are the advantages they have in overcoming information asymme- 
tries as well as in conducting effective screening and monitoring to access 
privileged information on clients which may not be readily available to the 
market (Diamond, 1984; Collins and Baker, 2003, pp. 47-56). By definition, 
this makes some important activities of banks more opaque than those of 
non-financial firms and, consequently, more difficult to monitor for outsid- 
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ers. ' The opacity of bank operations may cause I&A among banks to have 
different performance implications than M&A involving industrial firms if, 
say, pre-merger diligence is more difficult to carry out for the acquirer. 
(ü) Banking is a regulated industry. Interference by monetary authorities is evi- 
dent in stipulations on capital and liquidity adequacy, implicit and explicit de- 
posit insurance schemes, and the operation of any implicit or explicit bank 
bail-out policy. Regulators monitor and restrict managerial discretion and may, 
thus, limit the extent to which managers' actions affect shareholder wealth 
and marginalise, or possibly even substitute for, monitoring by shareholders 
(Booth et al., 2002; John and Senbet, 1998). As shareholders and other stake- 
holders (e. g. depositors, debtholders) are disincentivised to monitor manage- 
ment effectively, non-value maximising motives behind M&A (e. g. empire- 
building) may become more frequent in banking than in unregulated indus- 
tries (Adams and Mehran, 2003). 
(iii) Bank ownership is severely restricted in most countries. In some countries, 
governments either act as owners of large parts of the domestic retail banking 
industry (such as in large parts of Asia and Africa, but also, until recently, in 
France) or restrict the ability of outsiders to purchase a substantial interest in 
certain banks (e. g. in Germany and Italy). These practices-predicated on the 
widespread belief that regulators ought to put concerns about systemic stabil- 
ity before any concerns about managerial inefficiencies and their potentially 
adverse impact upon shareholder returns-are also common in economies 
I Morgan (2002) provides some evidence for the opaqueness of banking activities by showing that ana- 
lysts disagree more often over how to rate bonds issued by banks than bonds issued by non-financial 
companies. 
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where otherwise government intervention is not widespread (including in the 
UK and USA). As a result, in most countries, there are no hostile bank acqui- 
sitions. It is, thus, conceivable that the performance implications of M&A in 
banking are different from merger activities in other industries where the 
market for corporate control is more competitive. 
1.4 Agency-theoretic Explanations for Value-destroying M&A 
Against the background of continually high volumes of M&A activities, researchers in 
the fields of finance and strategic management are puzzled by the lack of empirical stud- 
ies that report merger-related wealth gains for acquiring bank shareholders (Amel et al., 
2004; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994). Table 5-1 (pg. 83) 
presents the results of a selection of bank merger performance studies and shows that 
positive announcement returns for acquiring banks rarely materialise. Similar results are 
reported in the literature that examines the long-term financial performance results fol- 
lowing bank M&A (see Table 6-1, pg. 121). Collectively, these findings contradict stan- 
dard economic theory which posits that M&A occur because of their potential to cut 
costs and/or increase revenues. Instead, non-performing merger activities are consistent 
with explanations that, at least in part, stress the role of managerial opportunism behind 
M&A. The extant literature has developed a number of possible explanations for why 
managers may engage in non-value maximising M&A. 
(1) The hubris hypothesis suggests that senior executives overestimate their own abili- 
ties to identify and realise the potential gains from a merger (Roll, 1986; Hay- 
ward and Hambrick, 1997). According to this argument, disappointing firm 
performance in the post-merger period is the result of unrealistic expectations 
on the part of executives of the bidding firm. 
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(2) Theories of managerial opportunism propose that managers may engage in M&A 
activity and knowingly put corporate performance at risk to pursue personal 
objectives such as higher remuneration and other firm size-related benefits 
(Anderson et al., 2004). 
(3) A final agency-theoretic explanation of why so many acquisitions do not lead to 
wealth gains for shareholders is based on a managerial preference for risk-reducing 
strategies. At a basic level, the argument posits that, because senior executives 
cannot diversify their human capital invested in a firm, they, instead, engage in 
corporate strategies that decrease the variance of company returns in order to 
minimise their own employment risk (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Wright et al., 
2002). Shareholders, on the other hand, who may deal with earnings volatility 
by holding diversified portfolios, are vulnerable to low returns when bank man- 
agers engage in product-diversifying acquisition strategies (Morck et al., 1990). 
It is important to note that prevailing motives behind bank M&A may vary con- 
siderably across countries and time periods (e. g., financial distress in Japan in the nine- 
ties; or overcapacity and the search for economies of scale in the US, Spain, and Italy in 
recent years). Also, there are explanations for underperforming bank mergers that are 
not based on agency costs between managers and shareholders. For example, Heffernan 
(2005, pp. 251-2) argues that the increases in market concentration levels that resulted 
from bank consolidation may have had adverse effects on regional competition and 
post-merger efficiency, and may, thus, have partly offset merger-related performance 
gains. Further, DeLong and DeYoung (2007) show that negative market reactions to 
bank mergers are especially pronounced at the beginning of bank merger waves. This 
implies that uncertainty resulting from a lack of informational spillovers following com- 
pleted M&A makes investors wary of the performance implications of announced deals. 
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1.5 Contributions of the Thesis 
Given the high values of deals in the financial sector over the past twenty years and 
given the pivotal role of banks as the main providers of corporate finance and govern- 
ance advice to the firms which they fund, establishing a clearer understanding of the 
performance implications of bank M&A is important. Until today, knowledge accumula- 
tion about the antecedents of value creation for US and European bank M&A remains 
patchy. This thesis, therefore, makes a number of valuable contributions to the under- 
standing of what motivates bank mergers and what determines their outcomes. 
Throughout this thesis, the performance implications of bank mergers will be ex- 
amined from the perspective of the bidding bank. Consequently, the underlying research 
question is whether the management of the bidding bank has made the correct decision 
in pursuing M&A. Empirical analyses that examine the post-merger performance of 
newly-merged entities of bidders and targets, on the other hand, seek to establish 
whether merged firms are more effective at delivering banking services than bidder and 
target have been before the M&A transaction. The focus on bidding banks in this thesis 
follows numerous studies 2 and is based on the stylised fact that, while target bank share- 
holders are practically always set to gain from takeover approaches, the shareholder 
wealth effects on bidding banks vary widely and are often negative. 
This thesis is the first empirical investigation to directly compare the performance 
implications of bank mergers in Europe and the US. As detailed below, the main contri- 
butions can be grouped into three distinct themes: A Comparison of Bidder Perform- 
2 Among others, James and Weir (1987), Rossi and Volpin (2004), DeLong (2003a), and Campa and Her- 
nando (2006) focus on the returns that bidding shareholders realise following bank mergers. Similarly, 
Cornett and Tehranian (1992), Cornett et al. (2003), Knapp et al. (2006), and others examine merger- 
related changes in accounting performance as realised by acquiring credit institutions. 
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ance in a US and non-US Context; the Motivations behind Bank Mergers in Europe and 
the US; and the Role of the Legal and Regulatory Environment. 
L5.1 A Comparison of Bidder Performance in a US and non-US Context 
This thesis, for the first time, performs a direct comparison between the merger per- 
formance of European and US M&A on the basis of short-term valuation effects 
(Chapter 5) and long-term accounting returns (Chapter 6). An important contribution of 
such an exercise is to demonstrate that conclusions drawn from samples of US bank 
mergers may have to be modified outside their original market context. 
Previous research into the performance effects of bank mergers overwhelmingly 
focuses on consolidation in an US-context and reaches conclusions which are mixed at 
best (for an overview, see Amel et al., 2004). The literature examining the shareholder 
wealth implications of the market for corporate control has repeatedly reported investor 
scepticism about any gains associated with US-focused bank mergers Games and Weir, 
1987; DeLong, 2001; Cornett et al., 2003; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). Studies that 
focus on European banking, by contrast, tend to find more favourable market reactions 
to bank consolidation (Beitel et al., 2004; Lepetit et al., 2004; Karceski et al., 2005). Simi- 
larly, research on the long-term performance of bank M&A based on US data fails to 
find improvements in the post-merger period (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Houston et al., 
2001; Ramaswamy, 1997; DeLong, 2003b; Akhavein et al., 1997). Again, studies in a 
European market context appear more optimistic about merger-induced gains in long- 
term performance than US-based studies. Vander Vennet (1996), Focarelli and Pozzolo 
(2005), and Campa and Hernando (2006) report improvements in financial performance 
in the years following European bank mergers. 
Chapter 5 of this thesis compares the short-term valuation effects of bank M&A 
in Europe and the US in a single sample and confirms that, while US bank merger an- 
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nouncements attract a negative market reaction, M&A targeted at European economies 
leads to positive abnormal returns. Also, Chapter 5 finds evidence that European cross- 
border M&A creates bidder wealth in Europe and leads to bidding bank losses in the 
US. Further, contrary to similar activities in the US, product diversifying bank mergers 
do not destroy bidder wealth in Europe. 
Chapter 6 then offers a direct comparison of the long-term performance results of 
bank mergers in Europe and the US. Arguably, the realised performance effects of bank 
mergers and acquisitions (rather than the value effects of M&A) are a particularly impor- 
tant metric for investors, depositors and policymakers to assess the success of M&A 
strategies (Group of Ten, 2001). Further, the cost and efficiency implications of bank 
M&A are of interest to bank regulators who are concerned with the effects of larger and 
more diversified financial firms on systemic stability (Barth et al., 2004). An important 
contribution of Chapter 6 is to show that the performance implications of bank M&A 
are different between Europe and the US. Thus, European bank mergers produce small 
performance gains for acquiring banks in the post-merger period, while US banking 
firms do not experience any changes in performance as a result of M&A. The profitabil- 
ity gains of European credit institutions are particularly pronounced for product diversi- 
fying and cross-border mergers. Further, European banks reduce non-interest expenses 
and, to some extent, retreat from lending activities in the post-merger period. US banks, 
by contrast, manage to increase their on- and off-balance sheet activities in the post- 
merger period. 
A valuable contribution of both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 is to show that conclu- 
sions based on an US market context do not necessarily apply to markets outside the US. 
This is particularly true for some of the so-called `stylised facts' about M&A that have 
emerged from the US-based literature. According to these `facts', bank mergers are per- 
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formance neutral at best, and bidding banks are very strong performers in the pre- 
merger period. While both `facts' can be verified for the US subsample of bank mergers, 
neither holds for European M&A in the analyses performed in this thesis. Specifically, 
European bank M&A generate both positive market revaluations and profitability in- 
creases in the post-merger period. Further, the results presented in Chapter 6 show that 
bidding banks are only weakly-performing against their peers in the pre-merger period. 
1.5.2 Motivations behind Bank Mergers in Europe and the US 
Common rationales behind bank mergers include raising market power (Berger et al., 
1998; Bikker and Haaf, 2002), an optimal response to industry deregulation or techno- 
logical progress (Group of Ten, 2001), executive hubris (Anderson et al., 2004; Hughes 
et al., 2003), or averting bank failure (Heffernan, 2005). However, differences in the mo- 
tives behind M&A across geographic regions have received little academic attention to 
date. Chapter 6 seeks to make a contribution here by presenting new insights into what 
motivates bank M&A in Europe and the US. 
The reasons for M&A most frequently-cited by managers are to cut costs and to 
increase revenues in the post-merger period (Amel et al., 2004; Berger et al., 1999). Cost 
cutting will be targeted at interest and non-interest expenses and revenue enhancements 
tend to involve an expansion in lending as well as in off-balance sheet activities. To es- 
tablish the motives behind M&A in Europe and the US, Chapter 6 analyses bidding 
banks' post-merger financial statements for results consistent with a cost-cutting strat- 
egy (e. g. economising on labour costs or branch networks) or a revenue-enhancing 
strategy (e. g. selling different types of financial products or increased lending). 
Consequently, a valuable contribution of Chapter 6 is that it is the first investiga- 
tion to document different motives behind bank M&A in Europe and the US. There is 
some evidence consistent with European banks pursuing a cost-cutting strategy during 
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the three years following a merger. Specifically, banks in Europe manage to reduce non- 
interest expenses and, to some extent, retreat from lending activities in the post-merger 
period. US banks, by contrast, manage to increase their on- and off-balance sheet activi- 
ties, thus, pointing towards revenue-enhancement as a motivation behind M&A. How- 
ever, US banks experience a deterioration in cost efficiency, possibly as a result of their 
efforts to increase revenue. 
A further contribution of Chapter 6 is that the results control for a mean rever- 
sion trend in performance data. Mean reversion describes the phenomenon of 
above-industry pre-merger performance reverting to zero following a merger (see 
Knapp et al., 2006; Barber and Lyon, 1996). Since a mean reversion trend may wrongly 
be interpreted as M&A having negative performance effects, many previous studies may 
suffer from a negative bias against M&A performance (Morck et al., 1990; Ghosh, 2001). 
L. 5.3 The Role of the Legal and Regulatory Environment 
To date, knowledge accumulation about the antecedents of value creation for US and 
European bank M&A remains patchy (Amel et al., 2004). This thesis documents differ- 
ent performance implications of bank M&A in Europe and the US and makes some of 
its most important contributions when seeking to explain reported performance differ- 
ences between the two geographic areas. To do so, three empirical chapters analyse the 
potential influence of laws and regulations, which affect the banking sector as well as the 
wider financial system, on M&A activities and performance. Chapter 4 examines the 
deregulation of the banking industry in selected countries, Chapter 5 studies the quality 
of target country regulations that protect minority shareholders, and Chapter 7 analyses 
whether the stringency of bank regulation in the country of the bidding bank impacts 
upon the design and effectiveness of the corporate governance arrangements of bidding 
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banks. The main contributions of these chapters regarding any impact of the legal and 
regulatory environment on merger outcomes are detailed below. 
As an introductory chapter to the empirical investigations that follow, Chapter 4 
explains in more detail how industry deregulation has enabled the massive scale of bank 
mergers over the last twenty years. Since few general conclusions about deregulation and 
bank M&A can be drawn from large cross-sections of countries, Chapter 4 examines 
four different banking systems (the US, Germany, Japan, and the UK) to highlight the 
different approaches that regulators have taken to facilitate the consolidation of national 
banking sectors. Differences in regulation across countries and how these have pro- 
moted M&A activities are discussed. For example, it is argued that the US provides the 
clearest example of a causal link between regulatory changes and an unprecedented 
surge in M&A. Germany, on the other hand, has maintained many legal obstacles to 
consolidation, especially consolidation between different types of financial institutions 
within its three-pillar banking structure (commercial, savings and cooperative banks). 
Chapter 5 contributes to the literature that employs investor protection regimes to 
explain why the same type of corporate event may attract different market reactions 
across countries. Specifically, Chapter 5 compares the bidder announcement returns as- 
sociated with US and European bank mergers and shows that the legal and regulatory 
environment prevalent in the target country impacts market expectations about the 
value that bidders may extract from targets in these environments. Accordingly, it is ar- 
gued that changes in the bidder's market valuation signal a stock market assessment of 
the efficiency of internal governance and external control mechanisms employed by tar- 
get institutions. 
The results presented in Chapter 5, for the first time, cast some light on the dif- 
ferent value effects surrounding bank mergers in Europe and the US. Bidder an- 
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nouncement returns are negative to deals where targets operate under a high investor 
protection regime (e. g. the US). It is suggested that this may be due to bidders finding it 
more difficult to capture acquisition-related gains from a target in the liquid (and, hence, 
competitive) takeover markets associated with this type of corporate governance system 
(see La Porta et al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Conversely, in low investor 
protection environments (most European economies), a less freely-operating market for 
corporate control lets bidders earn superior announcement returns by compensating for 
the higher private benefits of control, as well as higher agency and information asymme- 
try costs. Consistent with the argument that low target protection regimes necessitate 
compensation for bidding bank shareholders, it is shown that investor preference for 
cash-financed bank mergers is particularly strong in low-protection environments. Also, 
Chapter 5 finds evidence that cross-border M&A creates bidder wealth if acquisition 
targets are located in a less sophisticated protection environment than their acquirers. 
Also, Chapter 5 provides the first empirical investigation into the value effects of 
investor protection regimes that is not restricted to cross-border M&A. Previous studies 
related to this chapter (l3ris and Cabolis, 2004; Starks and Wei, 2004) analyse the influ- 
ence of investor protection regimes on the performance of cross-border deals and, 
hence, argue that any effect of target firm protection laws on bidder returns only exists 
if targets and acquirers operate under different regimes-that is, if acquisition targets 
switch investor protection regimes following a deal. 
Chapter 7 continues to elaborate on the legal perspectives theme and examines 
the effects of bidding bank governance on acquisition outcomes under different regula- 
tory regimes. It is argued that monitoring by shareholders in the bidding bank may play 
a key role in improving merger outcomes, since bidding shareholders are frequently ex- 
posed to managerial opportunism through M&A. As detailed above (Section 1.4), 
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merger activities tend to destroy bidder wealth, while managers at the bidding firm are 
set to benefit from higher prestige and increased remuneration packages regardless of 
the performance of a takeover (Anderson et al., 2004; Masulis et al., 2007; Bliss and 
Rosen, 2001). Specifically, Chapter 7 contributes to the literature that analyses the rela- 
tionship between regulation and governance-a topic linked to the wider debate of cau- 
sality between regulation and the emergence of economic institutions that promote 
shareholder value (Roe, 2005,2003; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Thus, Chapter 7 is par- 
ticularly concerned with the following question: Is regulation a substitute or a comple- 
ment to corporate governance? The widely-accepted view for banking firms is that gov- 
ernance and regulation are substitutes. The argument goes that the presence of a regula- 
tor weakens board monitoring, because shareholders will not duplicate efforts by regula- 
tors when mitigating against contracting costs between managers and shareholders 
(Subrahmanyam et al., 1997; Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986; Kole and Lehn, 1999). Yet, 
the results of Chapter 7 are inconsistent with this view and, instead, point to a comple- 
mentary relationship between regulation and governance. 
Recent studies related to Chapter 7, such as Adams and Mehran (2003) or Becher 
and Frye (2007), restrict their analysis to the composition of boards and the design of 
governance mechanisms in regulated and unregulated industries. It could, therefore, be 
argued that these studies contrast the potential monitoring capabilities of regulated versus 
unregulated industries. Thus, an important contribution of Chapter 7 is that it examines 
the actual monitoring effectiveness of shareholder monitoring in preventing value- 
destroying acquisitions under different regulatory regimes. 
Chapter 7 makes several further contributions. First, this chapter analyses the gov- 
ernance of banking firms. In the applied literature, there is a tendency to exclude bank- 
ing firms from governance research on the premise that tight industry regulation substi- 
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tutes for shareholder monitoring of management. However, the corporate governance 
of banking firms constitutes an important case to analyse. Owing to the special attrib- 
utes of banking (e. g. the opaqueness of corporate finance operations that rely on privi- 
leged information on clients as well as a weakly-functioning takeover market; see Section 
1.3), there may exist above normal constraints on the protection of shareholder interests 
in the context of M&A. Since the results of Chapter 7 point to a complementary role 
between regulation and firm-level governance, it cannot be confirmed that the reasons 
for excluding banking from much of the extant governance research are well-founded. 
Further, little academic work has been devoted to the study of European bank govern- 
ance. This study is the first to contrast internal governance mechanisms for the US and 
European credit institutions and, in particular, to analyse European bank governance 
arrangements in the context of bank mergers. Finally, Chapter 7 presents a unique, 
manually collected dataset on the corporate governance of banking firms in Europe and 
the US. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows. 
" As a background to the analysis, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the patterns 
of merger activity worldwide and identifies banks as the spearheads of M&A ac- 
tivities in the financial sector. 
" Chapter 3 explains the research methods used in this thesis and outlines how the 
sample of M&A transactions has been collected. The following four chapters are 
of an empirical nature. 
" Chapter 4 discusses how the deregulation of bank M&A in four selected bank- 
ing systems has led to an increase in such activities. 
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9 Chapter 5 analyses the merger announcement returns to bidding bank share- 
holders in Europe and the US. 
" Chapter 6 studies the financial performance following bank mergers in Europe 
and the US, and makes some inferences about the motivation behind M&A in 
both geographic regions. 
" Chapter 7 analyses the effectiveness of board characteristics in preventing un- 
derperforming M&A under the different bank regulatory regimes of Europe and 
the US. 
9 Chapter 8 draws together the conclusions, policy implications and limitations of 
this thesis. Directions for further research are also discussed in this chapter. 
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Banks and the Global Consolidation of the 
Financial Services Sector 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the consolidation that has transformed the finan- 
cial services industry in many countries over the last two decades. As a result of these 
activities, banking firms have grown larger and market an ever more diverse product 
range to clients in many more countries. An examination of the global patterns of finan- 
cial M&A shows that mergers between institutions where bidders and targets are char- 
tered in the same country and operate in the same industry are by far the most common 
form of industry consolidation. Further, banks are spearheading the consolidation of the 
financial sector as both the number and the value of mergers between banks have been 
consistently higher than those between either insurance companies or securities firms 
(e. g. investment banks). Even though bank M&A has been a global phenomenon, acqui- 
sition activities have been more widespread in particular countries. For example, US 
banks have been by far the most active players in the market for corporate control. The 
number of US credit institutions roughly halved between 1985 and 2001. However, 
starting in the late nineties, banks in other countries-most importantly, Japan, France 
and the UK-were consolidating at a much higher pace as well. 
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According to the Group of Ten (2001), consolidation involves the resources of an 
industry to become more tightly controlled either as a result of combinations of existing 
firms, growth among leading firms, or the exit of weaker firms from the sector. This 
analysis focuses on the first of these three methods by examining the M&A activities of 
banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. However, control over industry assets 
may also become more concentrated in the absence of acquisitions. For instance, joint 
ventures and strategic alliances, which are not covered in detail in this overview, are 
methods of consolidation that do not entail a transfer of ownership and a change in 
corporate control. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section discusses 
different types of M&A activity. This is followed by an overview of acquisition activities 
in the last two decades in the financial services industry in general and the banking in- 
dustry in particular. 
2.2 A Typology of Merger Activity 
Figure 2-1 presents a typology of different types of M&A activity. M&A transactions fall 
into one of four categories based on the financial products offered by bidders and tar- 
gets and the country of charter of the merging institutions. A commercial bank in the 
UK acquiring a French credit institution would be an example of a cross-border in- 
market merger (Type III consolidation), whereas a German insurer acquiring a retail 
bank in Germany falls into the category of Type II consolidation (domestic cross- 
market mergers). 
The relative importance of each of the four types of consolidation in the financial 
services industry is indicated by Figure 2-2 which presents the aggregate value of each 
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Figure 2-1 Typology of Mergers and Acquisitions 
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merger type as a percentage share of total financial M&A activity during the nineties. 
The data presented form a complete account of the financial M&A activities in the G-10 
countries plus Spain and Australia during the nineties when a total of 7,300 financial in- 
stitutions were acquired. It becomes obvious that the bulk of M&A transactions took 
the form of Type I consolidation. In total, 76% of the value of mergers in the financial 
services industry involved companies operating in the same country and marketing the 
same products. 
Domestic cross-market mergers (Type II consolidation), by contrast, only ac- 
counted for 13% of the total value of M&A activity. Perhaps most striking, however, are 
the marked differences in the overall levels of cross-border and domestic M&A activity. 
A mere 11% of deal values were due to financial companies acquiring a target in a for- 
eign country (Type III and Type IV consolidation), with Type IV consolidation (cross- 
border cross-market mergers) accounting for 2% of the total value of financial acquisi- 
tion during the nineties. As will be discussed later, these differences point to operational 
and, in the case of banking, to regulatory barriers associated with managing assets across 
borders. 
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Figure 2-2 Total Value of Financial M&A Deals 1990 - 1999, by Merger Type 
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Sourrr. Group of Ten (2001), Statistical Annex. Financial M&A include all acquisitions where one of 
the parties belongs to one of the followuig groups: banks, insurance, or securities companies. 
2.3 M&A of Banking, Insurance & Securities Firms 
Figure 2-3 contrasts the volumes of financial M&A deals for banking, insurance and se- 
curities firms. For each of the three industries, the number of Type I- IV mergers is 
plotted against time. The resulting three time-series sequences illustrate two points: First, 
there was a general increase in the overall level of M&A activity throughout the nineties. 
Regardless of the type of consolidation and financial industry considered, the number of 
mergers and acquisitions increased steadily throughout the nineties from already high 
levels. Second, while domestic in-market mergers were the most common type of M&A 
activity in any of the three industries, the relative importance of Type II - IV consolida- 
tion varies by industry. 
For securities firms, Figure 2-3 highlights the relative importance of cross-market 
mergers. Differences in annual volumes between Type I and Type II consolidation are 
considerably smaller for the securities industry than, say, for banking. This hints at the 
importance of product diversification strategies for investment banks, commodity firms, 
and the like. 
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Figure 2-3 Number of M&A by Financial Industry and Merger Type, 1990-1999 
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Senn Group of Ten (2001), Statistical Annex. Ntuttber of M&A transactions is by the industry sector of the target firm. Reference 
cotmtries are the G- 10 countries plus Spain and Australia. The year of the deal aimotmcemeut is used as the year of the merger or acqui- 
sition, but only deals completed as of May 2000 are included in the sample. Banks are defined as commercial banks, bank bolding cony 
panies, credit institutions, real estate mortgage bankers, and savings and tutttual savings banks. Insurance companies include both life and 
non-life utsurers. Securities firms are made up of investment banks, securities and commodities firms, and other firms like exchanges. 
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Conversely, in the banking industry, Type I consolidation has been much more 
prevalent. Thus, domestic cross-market mergers (though second in terms of the overall 
frequency) are only playing a very minor role. There were 543 cross-market acquisitions 
made by banks during the nineties, compared with 540 acquisitions of the same type 
made by securities firms (with total transaction values even exceeding those of the bank- 
ing industry in some years). It can, therefore, be argued that the banking industry, above 
all other financial services industries, is primarily occupied with domestic merger activity. 
The insurance industry, on the other hand, exhibits the highest share of cross-bor- 
der in-market activity; that is, the insurance industry is the leader in deals where a finan- 
cial firm is taken over by a company that operates in the same industry but is chartered 
in a foreign country. Towards the latter half of the nineties, the volume of Type III 
mergers was more than half of that of Type I activity, pointing to the role of cross-bor- 
der mergers as an instrument to benefit from diversification of insurance risk. 
Figure 2-4 compares the cumulative values of M&A transactions in the banking, 
insurance and securities industry for all merger types during the nineties. The M&A ac- 
tivities of banks alone corresponded to 72% of aggregate transaction values with insur- 
ers and securities firms in second and third rank, respectively. Consequently, the con- 
solidation of the financial services industry over the nineties can, effectively, be de- 
scribed as the consolidation of the banking sector. The next section examines the con- 
solidation of the banking industry at country-level greater detail. 
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Figure 2-4 Industry Shares of Total Value of M&A Transactions, 1990-1999 
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Source: Group of Ten (2001), Statistical Annex. Financial 
M&A include all acquisitions where one of the parties be- 
longs to one of the following groups: banks, insurance, or 
securities companies. 
2.4 Recent Trends in Bank M&A 
2.4.1 Worldwide Trends 
The sharp increase in both the number and the value of global bank acquisitions over 
the past 20 years is illustrated by Figure 2-5. Annual total transaction values rose steadily 
over much of the 1980s before peaking in the latter half of the nineties. Two relatively 
active years in terms of merger volumes coincide with major regulatory initiatives: In 
1989, the Second Banking Co-ordination Directive introduced a `single passport' 
whereby European institutions only have to be chartered in a single European country 
in order to operate throughout the EU. Second, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
the Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 eliminated previous geographic restrictions on US 
banking and branching. Echoing a general downturn in the world economy after the 
bursting of the dotcom bubble, the first years of the new millennium saw a sharp fall in 
the overall values of bank M&A. However, it appears this trend has reversed as Thom- 
son Financial reports a rise in global bank merger activity for 2003 and 2004. 
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Source. Hagendorff et al. (2007a). Columns show global transaction values in billion USD by \'car. Deal values 
are reported in constant 2004 S using the US CPI. The line represents the number of bank mergers by year. 
Transactions are reported with credit institutions as acquirers and credit institutions, life as well as non-life in- 
surers, brokerage and asset management firms as targets. The announcement date of the transaction is em- 
ployed as the year of the acquisition. Only acquisitions that involve at least 5'%, of the target and were com- 
pleted as of May 2005 are included. Data are from Thomson Financial; Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(http: //stats. bls. goc). 
Figure 2-5 also indicates that total M&A values in the banking industry have been 
rising more sharply than the underlying volume of bank acquisitions. This is reflected in 
a narrowing gap between the line (representing the frequency) and the columns (repre- 
senting total transaction values) in Figure 2-5. The rising column suggest increasing deal 
values over the last 20 years as previous bank M&A have rendered some retail banking 
markets more concentrated, leaving fewer attractive acquisition targets as a result. 
In order to assess annual transaction values in greater detail, Figure 2-6 offers a 
break down of acquisition activity by target country for three five-year periods. In total, 
1,869 transactions were reported for the G-10 countries plus Spain and Australia be- 
tween 1987 and 2004. Further, while the US witnessed the largest value of bank merger 
activity worldwide, banks started to consolidate at an increased pace in a number of 
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Figure 2-6 Total Value of Bank M&A by Region for Selected Periods (mill USD) 
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Sours-e: Thomson Financial. Reference countries are the Group of Ten cotuitries plus Australia and 
Spain. Countries are referred to be nation of the acquisition target. All acquisitions where the acquirer is 
a credit institution and the target is a credit institutions as well or, alternatively, and insurance company, 
mortgage broker or securities firm are included. Announcement dates are used as years of the acgttisi- 
tion. All deals involve at least 50/0 of the value of the target and are completed by May 2005. 
other countries during the latter half of the nineties. This is reflected in a decline of the 
US share of global bank M&A from roughly two-thirds in the period 1993 - 1998 to 
less than half between 1999 and 2004. Among the countries experiencing the sharpest 
increase in bank merger activity were Japan as well as the UK and France. 
24.2 Bank Consolidation at the Nation-level 
Turning to individual financial systems next, the high volumes of bank lei&A outlined 
above have led to both a continuous decline in the number of credit institutions and an 
increase in the market share of the remaining institutions. As Table 2-1 indicates, the 
decline in the number of institutions is especially large in the US, Germany and France. 
The combined number of chartered banks, cooperatives, mutual and savings banks has 
roughly halved in these countries since 1987. With more than 9,000 institutions disap- 
pearing, the number of credit institutions has shrunk the most in the US during the 
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Table 2-1 Total Number of Credit Institutions in Selected Countries 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Year 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Australia 32 32 32 37 36 35 33 34 34 33 29 28 26 25 27 
Canada 11 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 15 
France n. a. 2050 2021 1981 1823 1701 1635 1618 1453 1404 1288 1242 1168 1108 1067 
Germany 4340 4223 4089 3913 3716 3517 3769 3613 3500 3392 3284 3111 2833 2575 2370 
Italy 409 403 391 1138 1114 1088 1051 977 959 917 916 901 861 828 821 
Japant 90 158 158 156 154 152 151 151 150 146 145 139 136 136 131 
Netherlands 85 86 170 180 173 177 175 173 174 172 169 162 85 87 84 
Spain 346 334 333 327 323 319 316 316 318 313 307 300 290 281 281 
Sweden 142 136 135 128 122 99 99 100 103 103 102 103 103 102 104 
Switzerland 452 454 455 457 444 434 419 393 382 370 360 339 334 335 327 
United Kingdomt 53 52 49 47 41 39 37 37 40 44 45 45 41 44 42 
United States 17,427 16,668 15,915 15,285 14,611 13,985 13,363 12,741 12,113 11,600 11,067 10,599 10,363 8,461 8,230 
Sourrc OECD, Bank Pmflabil7. y (2002). Total number of credit institutions includes commercial banks, cooperative, mutual and savings 
banks. t Denotes only data on commercial banks are available. 
reference period. Part of this decline was caused by a savings and loans crisis over the 
period 1986 - 1995 which led to the industry exit of more than a thousand institutions. 
However, the substantial fall in the number of credit institutions worldwide is largely 
due to industry consolidation which was witnessed by virtually all the reference coun- 
tries on a comparable scale. Exceptions to this trend are Canada and, to a lesser degree, 
Australia which both traditionally had few institutions and where the number of institu- 
tions has, thus, remained constant over the reference period. 
Table 2-1 also indicates that despite the ubiquitous decline in the number of banks, 
mutuals and cooperatives, the number of financial institutions continues to vary across 
countries. Countries with a high number of credit institutions like the US, Germany, 
France, and Italy can be found next to countries with relatively few like Australia, Can- 
ada, and the UK. A third group is situated somewhere between the two extremes and 
includes Spain, Japan, Switzerland, and Belgium. While some of the differences can be 
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Figure 2-7 Largest Five Banks' Assets as a Percentage of all Banks' Assets 
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explained by the size of the domestic economy (i. e. large economies tend to have more 
banks than small ones), this may only explain some of the variation since substantial dif- 
ferences in the total number of credit institutions also exist for similar-sized economies 
(e. g. Germany and Japan, Spain and Italy). 
As Figure 2-7 indicates, the share of bank assets held by the five largest credit in- 
stitutions increased as the number of institutions was drastically reduced in most coun- 
tries. Belgium, Sweden and, most notably, the US experienced the largest proportional 
increase in market concentration. Yet, by international standards concentration levels 
remain low in Germany and the US. ' By contrast, in countries like Canada, Sweden and 
Switzerland the largest five credit institutions have reached dominating positions as their 
combined assets correspond to about 90% of those of the domestic banking industry. 
Consequently, the potential for future Mi&A is greatly restricted, not least by competi- 
3 While market share data are a rather crude measure of concentration, they tend to be readily available 
and comparable across countries and years. More refined measures of concentration such as a Herfindahl- 
index (=sum of squares of banks' market shares, based on total assets or sales) may be more appropriate 
to measure market concentration -within countries, but the underlying data are not as readily available for 
non-listed firms. 
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tion policy. Finally, a third group of countries revolves around Austria, France, and the 
UK where concentration levels have remained roughly constant or even fell during the 
nineties. Collectively, it is evident that all countries, apart from the UK and France, ex- 
perienced quite substantial increases in market concentration levels over recent years. 
Some countries, however, have started with already high levels in 1980 (e. g. Australia, 
Canada, and Sweden). This hints at different practices across regulatory regimes as re- 
gards concentration in the banking sector before consolidation had led to more concen- 
trated market structures. 
2.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter outlines that domestic in-market mergers are the most common type of 
consolidation in the financial services industry, and that banks are spearheading the con- 
solidation of the financial services sector across large part of the globe. While the M&A 
activities in the banking industry have been a worldwide phenomenon, the consolidation 
of industry assets has been particularly pronounced in the US, and more recently, in 
Europe. 
There are two general issues with the data presented in this chapter. First, macro 
data cannot adequately stress differences in banking sectors between individual coun- 
tries. For example, consolidation in the UK was primarily driven by commercial banks 
in the private sector, whereas much of the bank M&A activity in Germany was due to 
small public-sector institutions preparing for changes in EU law which affected their 
funding strategy after July 2005. Second, the descriptive statistics used in this chapter 
have been obtained from a multitude of different sources ranging from official govern- 
ment figures, commercial databases, to academic publications. Data from sources as di- 
verse as this are difficult to compare across indicators, countries and (though to a lesser 
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extent) over time. In order to remedy issues arising from a purely quantitative analysis, 
Section 4 offers a discussion of a more qualitative nature and describes how deregula- 
tion has transformed the banking industry of the US, UK, Germany and Japan over the 
last two decades. 
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Research Methods & Data 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines different research methods used in the analysis of bank merger 
performance and introduces a sample of bank merger activity that will be analysed in 
subsequent empirical chapters. From the discussion below, it will become obvious that 
merger announcement returns as well as the financial (accounting) performance follow- 
ing bank mergers are particularly suitable to gauge the performance effects of bank 
M&-A. 
This chapter is organised as follows: The next section introduces four perform- 
ance metrics that have been frequently employed in the applied literature and discusses 
their merits and disadvantages in the context of different research settings. Finally, this 
chapter also outlines how the dataset of bank mergers was compiled and filtered. 
3.2 The Key Merger Performance Measures 
Acquisitions are one of the most-widely studied types of corporate strategy. This over- 
view outlines how the performance implications of bank M&A can be measured and 
under what conditions reliable inferences can be drawn about the extent to which per- 
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formance changes are linked to a merger. The applied literature employs four different 
metrics of acquisition performance: 
(i) market reaction data 
(ü) financial performance 
(iii) divestiture data, and 
(iv) subjective measures of performance 
The discussion below reveals that each metric captures different types of per- 
formance and that there are certain benefits and drawbacks associated with the use of 
any of the measures listed above. As a result, this thesis employs a range of metrics to 
study bank merger performance. Chapter 5 examines the market reaction to M&A, 
Chapter 6 analyses corporate performance, and both the market reaction and corporate 
performance are studied in Chapter 7. It could, therefore, be argued that the present 
thesis analyses both short-term, expected performance (on the basis of market reaction 
data) and data of a more long-term nature that reflect realised performance. The use of 
divestiture data and subjective measures, on the other hand, has fundamental flaws and 
will, thus, not be employed in this thesis. While some divestitures are clearly perform- 
ance-related, post-acquisition asset sales occur for other reasons as well, making divesti- 
ture rates an unreliable indicator of acquisition failure. Further, subjective measures, 
which are collected from questionnaires or interviews with decision-makers working for 
one of the merger parties, can be ambiguous to interpret and place undue emphasis on 
the skills of the researcher to collect this information. 
3.2.1 Market Reaction Data 
Event studies are based on the proposition that, in an efficient market, the wealth ef- 
fects accruing to shareholders represent an unbiased estimate of the net present value of 
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future synergies generated by a merger (Lubatkin, 1983). For each sample security i, let 
e,, be the component of returns that is unexpected at point tgiven a particular model of 
`normal' security price behaviour and the modifying conditions X, . 
e;, =R -B [R;, I Xr ] (3.1) 
There are two main types of event-study methodologies that differ with respect to 
the exact estimation procedure employed to capture normal security performance (see 
for example, Brown and Warner, 1980; Campbell et al., 1997). 
(1) Mean-adjusted return models predict a constant return K; (e. g. mean daily 
stock returns before the event period) for every security i and calculate ab- 
normal returns as the differences between the observed returns and pre- 
dicted security price behaviour: 
(2) The market-adjusted return model assumes a linear relationship between 
the expected return on any security i and the return on a market portfolio. 
Let I7, and R., denote the returns on security i and a market portfolio dur- 
ing period t, respectively: i, = AR, = R, - ä, - AR . Accordingly, the ab- 
normal returns, e;, , are the prediction errors of the market model. 
These 
residuals are referred to as abnormal returns (AR) throughout this text and 
are typically assumed to have the usual Gaussian properties 
(E[e;, ]=O; Var[e]=Q? ). 
The market model has gained a much wider popularity in the applied literature 
than the constant returns model. This is mainly because the former's specification ac- 
counts for the variation in abnormal returns that is due to variation in the returns on the 
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market portfolio which reduces the variation in abnormal returns (Campbell and Wasley, 
1993). 
Standardised Test Statistics 
In order to make reliable inferences about the impact of any event on the distribution of 
stock returns, well-specified test statistics are needed. Test statistics compare detected 
abnormal returns to their assumed distribution under the null hypothesis of zero ab- 
normal returns. Patel (1976) and Dodd and Warner (1983) standardise each excess re- 
turn by the square root of its estimation period return variance to ensure a uniform vari- 
ance of the abnormal returns. This prevents securities with large variances from domi- 
nating the test. Further, by using the non-event window return variance, any issues with 
serial correlation between the AR and their corresponding variance terms during the 
event window are prevented. Let SARI, denote standardised AR and d the estimated 
AR variance obtained from market model regressions over the non-event period for se- 
curity s. 
SAR, = AR, Q, 1+1+ L(R" 
- R' )Z (3.2) 
L' 
(R -R. )2 
k, is the return to the market index and R. the average market return over the L; days 
included in the estimation period. For each security i, the SARI, are aggregated across 
the time of the event window (i. e. d2i dj; +1 days) to yield standardised cumulative ab- 
normal returns (SCAR),, 
'-I 1 
SCAR = SAR;, (3.3) 
=a, d21-d+1. 
To test for the significance of the average standardised cumulative abnormal returns, 
SCAR;,, the following test statistic is computed for a sample of n securities: 
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zý = 72 AR; 
f, (3.4) 
SCAR; =- SCAR, . 
(3.5) 
n ; _I 
Under the assumptions that SCAR,, are independent across securities and that the 
expected value of SARI, is zero, the test statistic z, will be distributed unit normal. While 
Brown and Warner (1985) argue that standardised event-study tests are powerful and 
well-specified, corporate events may cause an increase in the variance of security returns 
that leaves these tests misspecified if changes in the variability of returns are indistin- 
guishable from abnormal security price performance (see for example, Beaver, 1968). 
Boehmer et al. (1991) introduce a test statistic that is similar to the standardisation pro- 
cedure of Patell (1976) but, unlike Patell's approach, their test statistic uses variance in- 
formation from both the event period and the estimation period. Crucially, there is only 
a small loss in power associated with using this method should there be no event- 
induced changes in variance. Thus, abnormal returns are standardised as in (3.2) and the 
standard deviation of the standardised abnormal returns are represented by. 
QStR = ýfSAR;, - SAR;, /nl I2n(n-1) . (3.6) 
For multi-day events (T=event window duration), the test statistic is as follows: 
T 111 E- SAR;, 
z =T 
n 
T 
3. ''J) (' 
2j 
aSAR, 
" 
l-l 
Non-Parametric Tests 
The distribution of daily price returns (and, thus, the distribution of daily excess returns) 
deviates from the unit normal distribution assumed by parametric test statistics. In fact, 
daily excess returns are skewed to the right (Cowan and Sergeant, 1996; Corrado and 
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Zivney, 1992; Brown and Warner, 1985), which leaves parametric tests poorly specified 
as they normally assume that the expected probabilities of detecting positive and nega- 
Live abnormal returns are both 0.5. 
Corrado (1989) introduced the following specification for a rank test: The time- 
series of security i's excess returns is transformed into their corresponding ranks 
r. e. k = rank(AR;, ), AK4 > AR,, ku > k,, ) during the estimation period (L) and the 
event window (T). For t0, the rank statistic kro is the ratio of the mean deviation of the 
securities' ranks to the estimated standard deviation of the sample mean abnormal rank. 
kro =1- 
ik, 
a -k . r(k) 
(3.8) 
nil 
By construction, the expected rank under the null hypothesis is 0.5 plus half the number 
of security is non-missing ranks during the estimation period and the event window 
0.5+(L; +T, )/2). The standard deviation of the portfolio mean abnormal rank 
is estimated over the entire sample period (4. +T), 
_ 
L+T l2 
S(T) 
LI 
+T, (n 
E(k -k; )). (3.9) 
In the absence of cross-sectional correlation, the rank statistic is distributed unit normal. 
For multi-day event studies, if k, denotes the average abnormal rank on day t, the rank 
statistic takes the following form: 
T_TT 
Z3 =ýk, ýs2(k) q Zk, 
IS(T)VT 
. (3.10) 
I=t r=t r=1 
Other non-parametric test statistics include the generalised sign test which exam- 
ines whether the distribution of securities with positive CAR deviates from the number 
expected under the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance (see for example, 
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Cowan and Sergeant, 1996). However, Corrado and Zivney (1992) find that the rank 
test outperforms the sign test in detecting small levels of abnormal performance (less 
than ± 1% of abnormal performance). By the same token, Campbell and Wasley (1993) 
find the rank statistic is very robust across numerous event conditions. 
Problems Associated with Event Studies 
A number of drawbacks are associated with employing shareholder returns as a measure 
of post-acquisition performance. 
(1) The CARs methodology relies on complete share price data. Conclusions about 
the performance of the firms involved in a merger can, thus, only be drawn for 
large publicly-listed companies. It is conceivable, however, that the results ob- 
tained from event studies do not hold for non-listed companies and, hence, may 
not be representative for all firms (see Rhoades, 1998). 
(2) Despite the wide application of event study methods, it is important to point 
out that this method relies on asset prices to incorporate information in a timely 
and efficient manner in order to make inferences about merger outcomes on the 
basis of shareholder returns. In many cases, inferences about merger outcomes 
are drawn before acquisition benefits have actually materialised. These issues are 
further exacerbated in the face of information asymmetries between bidding 
managers and investors (who are essentially outsiders to a transaction). Hence, it 
may be questionable whether the market response to M&A always provides an 
accurate and unbiased estimate of the value-creating potential of acquisitions 
(Healy et al., 1997). 
(3) If longer time periods are examined, other drawbacks emerge that lead Lyon et 
al. (1999) to refer to event studies with examination periods spanning over 
many months as `treacherous'. Generally, the longer the event window, the 
40 
Chapter 3: Research Methods & Data 
more likely it is that events other than the merger generate abnormal returns to 
shareholders. Fama (1998) reports the results of long-term event studies display 
anomalies and are often not robust. Further, Lyon et al. (1999) show that mis- 
specification is particularly common in non-random, single-industry samples 
(such as the one sought in this thesis). Also, there are issues with the use of a 
single-index model in multi-country event studies involving different stock mar- 
kets that, inter alia, differ in terms of their sensitivity to news (see Park, 2004). 
(4) Finally, even for short event windows, the duration of the event window is, es- 
sentially, arbitrary. The examination period around the announcement date of 
an acquisition varies across different studies. Outside narrow event window 
specifications of a few days surrounding the merger announcement, reported re- 
sults are sensitive to the particular time period under examination. 
3.2.2 Financial Performance 
Measuring a firm's (long-term) financial performance following a merger or an acquisi- 
tion is based on the proposition that by comparing the accounting data of the compa- 
nies involved in an acquisition, before and after the transaction, gives an accurate meas- 
ure of the synergies that are created when the assets of two firms are combined. Unlike 
the announcement returns methodology, which in many cases makes inferences about 
investors' expectations as to the various types of benefits accruing from a merger, oper- 
ating performance measures capture the realised economic benefits of a merger as they 
materialise over a reference period of up to several years. Abnormal operating perform- 
ance of firm i in year t (AP,, ) is defined as realised performance minus expected per- 
formance. 
AP,., = performance;, - E(peformance;, ) (3.11) 
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When assessing post-acquisition performance, researchers typically calculate returns ei- 
ther on the book value of assets (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Houston et al., 2001; Ramas- 
wamy, 1997; DeLong, 2003b; Akhavein et al., 1997), income or cost. A growing number 
of studies employ cash flow data rather than profits in order to prevent that either the 
choice of merger finance or accounting method may impact results (Healy et al., 1992; 
Ghosh, 2001; Healy et al., 1997). 
Meaningful inferences about performance changes associated with M&A may 
only be made if corporate performance is assessed against the correct benchmark. Two 
types of benchmarks are suitable for such a comparison. 
(1) Financial performance data may be measured against mean values of 
non-merging banks domiciled in the same region or country to yield mar- 
ket-adjusted returns. This has been the most commonly used method, arguably 
because of its intuitive appeal (e. g., Cornett and Tehranian, 1992; Pilloff, 1996; 
DeLong, 2003b; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). 
(2) A portfolio of firms that have been individually-matched on the basis of size 
and/or pre-merger performance may also be used as a benchmark. While the 
use of performance-adjusted returns is relatively new to the bank merger litera- 
ture, this method of determining event-induced changes in performance enjoys 
a somewhat wider popularity in the corporate finance literature (e. g., Barber and 
Lyon, 1997; Loughran and Ritter, 1997). The method is based on the observa- 
tion that, while bidding firms tend to outperform the general market before a 
merger, industry-adjusted performance reverts to zero in the years following a 
deal. Many studies mistakenly ascribe this mean reversion to M&A having nega- 
tive performance effects (Morck et al., 1990; Ghosh, 2001). Knapp et al. (2006) 
find evidence of a mean reversion trend in industry-adjusted returns for a sam- 
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ple of bank mergers. The authors report performance losses when measuring 
post-merger profitability against average industry values and profitability in- 
creases after correcting for a reverting mean in the performance data. 
Testing Procedures 
To test the null hypothesis of no abnormal performance for a sample of n observations, 
a simple t-statistic is computed, 
_ 
AP 
(3.12) t 
c(APE )I-, rn-, 
where AP is the sample average and Q(AP, ) the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
abnormal performance for a sample of n companies. This statistic follows a student 
t-distribution which converges to N(0,1) as n increases provided that abnormal perform- 
ance measures are independent and identically distributed. 
However, since accounting ratios are often skewed (Healy et al., 1992; Loughran 
and Ritter, 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1996), Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (T") which avoid 
the normality assumption in (3.12) are also calculated. This statistic is based on the rank 
order (i. e. magnitude) of differences between pre- and post-acquisition performance, 
rather than on the actual value of performance differences. To test the null hypothesis 
that median abnormal performance is equal to zero, the absolute values of AP for all i 
during t are ranked. D indicates the rank sum of the positive values of AP. 
T* _ 
D-E(D) 
aD 
n(n+l) E(D) =4 (3.13) 
2_ n(n+1)(2n+1) C° 
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Drawbacks Associated with Profitability Measures 
The two most severe drawbacks associated with the operating performance metric are as 
follows. 
(1) Researchers studying the accounting effects of a merger have to take great care 
when choosing a performance metric. Many standard profitability measures (e. g. 
ROE, ROA) are influenced by both the method of takeover accounting (i. e. 
pooling versus purchase) and the financing of a merger (i. e. debt or equity). Pool- 
ing of interests accounting, whereby any premium paid for the target's equity is 
subtracted from the acquiring firm's equity, leads to higher post-acquisition 
profitability than purchase accounting that involves asset mark-ups following a 
merger. As regards merger finance, debt-financed acquisitions lead to lower net 
income resulting from increases in interest expenses (Healy et al., 1992). 
(2) When determining the length of the event window, there is a trade-off between 
allowing the reference period to be long enough for merger-related synergies to 
materialise and maintaining a clean dataset which remains unaffected by changes 
in corporate strategy which may also impact firm profitability (such as subse- 
quent mergers). By design, the accounting returns to b1&A are estimated over a 
period of several years and the risk that confounding events drive the reported 
results is, thus, disproportionately high. 
3.23 Other Performance Measures 
For reasons of completeness, two more measures of acquisition performance- 
divestiture data and subjective measures of performance-are discussed here. However, 
due to the drawbacks associated with them, neither of these measures will be employed 
in this thesis. 
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Divestiture Data 
Based on the rationale that an acquisition is ultimately failed if the bidder decides to sell 
off the target's assets completely, a small number of M&A studies have relied on divesti- 
ture data as a measure of post-acquisition performance. These studies define acquisition 
success in terms of whether the acquisition is retained (success) or divested (failure), 
given that management's dissatisfaction with the performance of an acquired firm will, 
sooner or later, prompt a sell-off. 
Previous studies find divestiture rates ranging between 23.4%. (Montgomery and 
Wilson, 1986) and 50% (Porter, 1987). However, the basic issue with divestiture data is 
that post-merger asset sales may be motivated by reasons other than acquisition failure. 
Management, for instance, may decide to sell off an acquisition target to realise cash- 
flows following the successful restructuring of the acquired company. 
Kaplan and Weisbach (1992) and Bergh (1997) report that a large number of di- 
vestitures are not performance-related. Bergh (1997) finds that the average divested unit 
has a net positive operating cash-flow in the years preceding divestment. Similarly, for a 
sample of 271 large acquisitions completed between 1971 - 1982, Kaplan and Weisbach 
(1992) find that only one-third of divested acquisitions can be classified as unsuccessful. 
The authors survey the business press coverage of each divestiture and find the two 
most commonly-cited reasons for divestitures are changes in corporate strategy and rais- 
ing funds for further acquisitions. Capron et al. (2001) view acquisitions as a vehicle to 
achieve value-creating changes in a firm's portfolio of resources. Consequently, if merg- 
ers are viewed as `a resource reconfiguration process' (see for example, Barney et at, 
2001), they may create conflicts and redundancies with existing resources and prompt a 
sell-off of excess physical assets. 
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Subjective Measures 
A considerable number of M&A performance studies-many of them in the manage- 
ment literature-rely on managers to evaluate their success in achieving various post- 
acquisition targets (see for example, Datta et al. 1992; Capron & Pistre, 2002). These 
subjective performance data tend to be collected either through interviews (e. g., Very 
and Schweiger, 2001), or questionnaires (e. g., Capron, 1999) sent to managers asking 
them to assess how well a merger has achieved a number of specified targets. Alterna- 
tively, to avoid the possibility that managers are subject to an `upward bias' (Lubatkin 
and Shrieves, 1986) when assessing their own performance, security market analysts (e. g. 
Hayward, 2002) or journalists (e. g. Hitt et al., 1998) are surveyed instead. Generally, the 
resulting data permit a fine-grained analysis of the synergetic benefits of a merger, espe- 
cially with regards to more complex processes such as due the diligence process or post- 
merger integration. Also, qualitative data can measure management's success in attaining 
multiple motives (Brouthers et al., 1998). However, there are a number of serious draw- 
backs associated with subjective metrics. 
(1) Even though subjective measures of performance are applicable to the widest 
possible range of companies-that is, sample companies do not have to be 
listed or adhere to a particular method of accounting-they rely on partici- 
pants' responding, which may introduce a non-response bias. 
(2) By the same token, it is difficult for researchers to be able to talk to senior 
managers, i. e. those individuals that make key decisions. In reality, most in- 
terviewees are a compromise between those decision-makers directly in- 
volved in the acquisition and employees available for an interview. 
(3) How reliable is the information source? If insiders (i. e. target or bidding firm 
management) are subject to upward bias, relying on certain groups of `outsid- 
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ers' such as analysts or journalists instead, raises questions about the accuracy 
of the collected information. Lubatkin and Shrieves (1986) argue that, due to 
frequent and personal interactions between management, on the one hand, 
and journalists and security market analysts, on the other, any bias on the side 
of management may easily be transferred to outsiders and undermine the ac- 
curacy of their judgement. 
(4) Finally, the skills of the interviewer in finding the relevant information and 
assessing their reliability plays a disproportionately large role when collecting 
qualitative data. 
3.3 Data Collection: Bank Merger Sample 
The dataset of bank M&A that will be analysed in various empirical chapters of this the- 
sis is obtained from Thomson Financial. ' Thomson Financial extract information on 
worldwide M&A transactions from hundreds of English and foreign language news 
sources as well as from company filings and M&A legal specialists. Fuller et al. (2002) 
lend support to the quality of the information supplied by Thomson Financial. The au- 
thors find in a random sample of 500 acquisitions that the announcement date supplied 
by Thomson Financial is correct in 93% of cases and that the remainder is correct 
within a time span of ±2 days. 
The sample is subject to the following criteria. 
(i) Both acquirers and targets are listed in the US or Europe (i. e. EU-15 
countries plus Switzerland). 
4 The M&A component of Thomson Financial is sometimes also referred to as SDC Platinum in the ap- 
plied literature. 
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(u) Bank mergers are announced between 01.01.1992 and 31.12.2004 and 
completed as of 31 May 2005. Consequently, deals that were cancelled af- 
ter their announcement or whose status Thomson Financial identifies as 
still pending by that date are excluded. 
(iiii) Acquirers are commercial banks, bank holding companies and credit insti- 
tutions. Targets may also be insurance companies (life and non-life), mort- 
gage bankers, and security brokers. This means that the performance ef- 
fects of financial consolidation across different financial product markets 
may also be assessed. 
(iv) While the terms merger and acquisition are used interchangeably through- 
out this study, only majority acquisitions which result in the acquirer hav- 
ing a stake of at least 50% in a target institution are included in the sample. 
(v) Finally, for reasons of data availability, the sample is restricted to large 
transactions with an underlying deal value of at least $100 million in con- 
stant 2004 $. 
3.3.1 Data Filtering 
After collecting the dataset, the sample is filtered to identify erroneous observations. 
The sample is reduced after omitting cases for any of the following reasons. (Additional 
filters will be applied in the empirical chapters. ) 
" The target is a failing institution (data item: FBNK=yes). Failing targets sug- 
gelt that the transaction is involuntary. (One deal was identified as a involving 
a failed target. ) 
" The announcement date supplied by Thomson Financial is inaccurate. Follow- 
ing Moeller and Schlingemann (2005), changes in the trading volumes of the 
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acquirer on the announcement date are analysed. If market-adjusted volumes 
increase significantly on t=0, this is interpreted as evidence of an accurately 
reported announcement date. (In the case of two deals, the accuracy of the 
announcement date could not be verified. ) 
3.3.2 Sample Description 
The distribution of sample deals over time is given by Table 3-1. It is evident that a ma- 
jority of the merger activity took place between 1997 and 2000 and that M&A activities 
resurged in 2004. Incidentally, both periods were also characterised by high M&A vol- 
umes in the non-financial sector (see Figure 1-1, pg. 2). Table 3-2 reports the geographi- 
cal distribution of sample transactions. The sample is clearly dominated by US deals 
with 72% of all acquirers and 71% of all targets domiciled in the US. However, the 
dominance of US merger activity does not permit any conclusions as to the general pace 
of bank consolidation in Europe. As will be discussed in Chapter 4 in more detail, the 
consolidation of bank assets in countries like Germany, France and Italy over the period 
of this study largely involves non-listed public sector and cooperative institutions. These 
institutions face increasing pressures to consolidate as a result of declines in government 
ownership, the phasing out of public guarantees of their liabilities (CEPR, 2005), and 
growing monetary integration across most parts of the EU (Allen and Song, 2005; God- 
dard et al., 2007). 5 
Table 3-3 presents descriptive statistics for the subsamples of US and European 
bank acquirers. While this is a preliminary comparison between the European and US 
cohort (further analysis will follow in later empirical chapters), the statistics presented 
point to some differences in the nature and scale of AMA activities between both geo- 
5 For a general overview of the main forces which have driven consolidation in the EU, see CEPR (2005). 
Berger et al. (1999) provide an extensive discussion of similar issues for the US market. 
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graphic regions. The data presented indicate that average (median) deal values in Europe 
are larger than in the US (differences statistically significant at the 1% level). 
The relatively smaller US deals are the legacy of regulatory restrictions on the geo- 
graphic scope and product mix of local banks that had not been completely lifted before 
the mid-nineties (Group of Ten, 2001). Further, European acquirers are larger than their 
US counterparts (both in terms of assets and deposits; t-statistic and Wilcoxon rank sum 
test significant at 1%). Consistent with the extant literature Games and Weir, 1987; Jen- 
sen and Ruback, 1983; Becher, 2000), acquiring banks in both Europe and the US are 
larger than the targets they acquire. The variable relative size measures target assets in 
terms of the acquiring bank's assets. The coefficient is 0.3 in the US and 0.31 in Europe 
(differences are not statistically significant). 
Further, cash finance (i. e. the percentage of deals that is financed by cash, rather 
than by a mix of cash and equity) is significantly higher in Europe (85%) than in the US 
(65%). This is consistent with Rossi and Volpin (2004) who observe that in countries 
with less sophisticated rights for minority shareholders (i. e. most European economies), 
there is a preference for all-cash bids. Further, the share of cross-border deals is larger in 
Europe reflecting already high market concentration levels in many European econo- 
mies where further deals are likely to raise anti-trust issues and, cross-border consolida- 
tion may provide a viable alternative for further growth. Finally, deal values as a share of 
a target's net sales are higher in the US than in Europe (difference between means are 
significant at 5% and between median values significant at 1%). This is suggestive of US 
acquirers either having greater confidence to add value from an acquisition in the post- 
merger period or, alternatively, overpayment for targets and, thus, poor judgement of 
US bidders. 
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Table 3-1 Total Number and Value of Sample Deals per Year 
Year Number Value ($ mil) % Value 
1992 22 13,511.50 1.2 
1993 23 15,703.20 1.3 
1994 25 12,056.00 1.1 
1995 36 60,776.90 5.6 
1996 18 13,501.40 1.2 
1997 55 136,386.30 12.6 
1998 44 242,007.60 22.3 
1999 52 162,526.80 15.0 
2000 41 132,168.80 12.2 
2001 36 66,823.20 6.2 
2002 19 43,851.40 4.0 
2003 26 61,633.10 5.7 
2004 22 123,136.10 11.4 
Total 414 1,084,082.30 100 
Source: Thomson Financial 
Table 3-2 Frequencies of Sampled Bank M&A by Count 
Acquirer 
Nation AU BE DE Fl FR GE GR 
Target Nation 
IR IT LU NL PO SP SE SW UK US Total 
AU 3 3 
BE 4 1 4 1 10 
DE 3 1 4 
FT 1 1 
FR 1 14 1 1 17 
GE 1 4 1 1 7 
GR 8 8 
IR 1 1 
IT 1 25 1 27 
LU 1 1 
NL 1 1 4 6 
PO 3 3 
SP 1 4 1 6 
SE 1 2 3 6 
SW 3 1 4 
UK 2 21 7 2 14 
US 1 295 296 
Total 4 6 4 3 18 69 3 25 1 44 44 3 10 306 414 
Note: AU=Austria, BG=Belgium, DG=Denmark, FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, 
IR=Ireland, IT=Italy, LU=Luxemburg, NL=Netherlands, PO=Portugal, SP=Spain, SG=Sweden, 
SW=Switzerland, UK=United Kingdom, US=USA. Domestic M&A deals are in italics. 
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3.4 Other Data Sources 
In addition to Thomson Financial, data for this thesis were obtained from a number of 
other sources. Since these data sources are rather specific to the analysis performed in 
individual chapters, they are merely listed below. A more detailed explanation of the 
data collected, including a discussion of the filtering technique employed to verify the 
accuracy of the data, can be found in the chapters that use these data. 
" Worldscope covers financial statement data of approximately 40,000 companies 
(representing 95% of global market capitalisation). The source was accessed 
via the Datastream Advance intranet. 
" Bankscope. A database containing data from the financial statements of 25,000 
banks (both public and private) by Fitch's Ratings. Some of the data items are 
specific to banks (e. g. capital adequacy or loan loss ratios) and are unavailable 
on Worldscope. The database was accessed via a CD-ROM (version 202.1). 
" Other Sources: EDGAR Companies Filings Database, IMF - International 
Financial Statistics, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Bank for Interna- 
tional Settlements, European Central Bank Statistics (all available online. ) 
3.5 Tools of Analysis 
For the statistical analyses, two software applications have been used. Univariate and 
multivariate analyses were completed using Stata (version 9). However, since files con- 
taining daily share price information over several years are rather large, data manage- 
ment tasks (e. g. transposing, sorting and matching data) could not be performed in a 
timely efficient manner using Stata. These tasks were performed with SAS (version 9.1). 
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3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter introduces different methodologies to gauge post-merger performance 
changes. Based on the advantages and disadvantages associated with each of these met- 
rics, two research methods are identified as particularly suitable to examine the perform- 
ance effects of bank M&A: expected performance gains (i. e. merger announcement re- 
turns) and changes in realised accounting performance in the years following a merger. 
Regarding the use of event studies, it is concluded that any testing procedure has 
to be chosen on the basis of the specific assumptions underlying it. However, non- 
parametric test specifications, which do not assume a unit normal distribution in the ex- 
cess returns, appear to be most powerful when detecting abnormal security price per- 
formance. Further, in this thesis, the long-term performance following bank AMA is 
measured on the basis of accounting returns and not on the basis of event studies. This 
is because long-term event studies are prone to anomalies and serious misspecification, 
especially in single-industry studies. Also, there is a risk that differences in the sensitivity 
of stock markets to news may make the results of long-term event studies in multi- 
country settings difficult to interpret. 
As for the use of accounting data, it is argued that a trend to mean reversion trend 
in performance data suggests that accounting performance should be adjusted by firms 
of similar pre-merger performance. This avoids a negative bias in merger performance 
studies that wrongly ascribes the reversion of above-industry performance of bidding 
banks to M&A having negative performance effects. Also, a number of other issues- 
including the impact of merger finance and merger accounting should be considered 
when dealing with accounting data in order to make accurate inferences about whether 
changes in corporate performance are due to M&A. 
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Finally, this chapter also introduces the bank merger sample that forms the basis 
for analyses in Chapters 5,6 and 7. 
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Bank Deregulation and Bank Consolidation 
in Selected Countries 
4.1 Introduction6 
Chapter 2 demonstrates an increase in both the number and value of bank M&A across 
developed countries. While the motivation behind M&A varies for individual deals, in- 
creases in M&A activity in various countries have largely been a response to changes in 
regulation. This chapter discusses the impact of bank deregulation on bank merger ac- 
tivity for selected countries in more detail. In doing so, this chapter also provides an 
overview of some banking sectors which will be useful when interpreting results in later 
chapters. 
Since the extent to which individual banking sectors have consolidated to date 
varies considerably across countries (with important implications for the structure and 
efficiency of local credit institutions), it is difficult to draw generally applicable conclu- 
sions about deregulation and bank M&A from large cross-sections of countries (e. g., 
Barth et al., 2004). This chapter has less ambitious objectives. The chapter examines 
6A 
similar version of this chapter has been published as Hagendorff, J., Collins, M. & Keasey, K. (2007a), 
Bank Deregulation and Acquisition Activity: The Cases of the US, Italy and Germany. Journal of Financial 
Regulation and Compliance. Vol. 15, No . 
2, pg. 199-209. 
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four different banking systems in leading developed nations (US, Germany, Japan, and 
the UK) in order to highlight the different approaches that regulatory regimes have 
taken to facilitate the consolidation of national banking sectors. Additionally, specific 
policy recommendations that are conducive to further consolidation and more inte- 
grated financial systems are critically evaluated for each country. 
Arguably, the US provides the clearest example of a causal link between relaxing 
regulatory restrictions and an unprecedented surge in M&A. Even so, bank supervisors 
could promote further merger activities, especially between large and medium-sized 
banks, by abolishing restrictions on the market share of retail banks and by adopting 
new capital regulations (i. e. Basel II). Germany, on the other hand, has maintained many 
legal obstacles to consolidation, especially consolidation between different types of insti- 
tutions within its three-pillar banking structure (commercial, savings and cooperative 
banks). To date, there has been no attempt by regulators in Germany to privatise finan- 
cial institutions in the public sector which still accounts for the majority of retail depos- 
its. In Japan, regulators will increase competition in the banking sector through a gradual 
privatisation of Japan Post, but continue to maintain legal obstacles between banking 
and insurance. The UK market, which has been one of the earliest consolidators, is 
likely to experience further bank M&A amongst medium-sized institutions following the 
fall-out from the crisis caused by US subprime mortgage problems including the UK 
government bail-out of Northern Rock in 2007. 
Further, this chapter highlights two themes that will be revisited in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis: First, the removal of demarcation lines between the activities that 
banks are permitted to engage in is an important driver behind the surge in bank merger 
activity, while differences between countries in the regulation of bank activities remain. 
Second, based on the importance of banks across countries, one may distinguish be- 
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tween different types of financial systems with far-reaching implications for the devel- 
opment of capital markets, the legal protection of different investor groups, and the 
functioning of the market for corporate control. Both these factors-bank activities and 
financial systems-may well have potential implications for the performance effects of 
bank M&A. 
The next section briefly discusses the reasons bank regulators are promoting more 
consolidated banking sectors. This is followed by an analysis of the recent history of 
deregulation in the US, the UK, Japan, and Germany. For each of these banking sectors, 
there is a subsection containing suggestions on what regulators should do next in order 
to achieve an even more integrated banking sector. General conclusions are drawn in 
the final section. 
4.2 Why Deregulate? 
As a result of rising bank merger transaction values over much of the 1980s and 1990s, 
banking firms have grown larger and market an ever more diverse product range to cli- 
ents in many more countries. While concerns have been raised about the risks that big- 
ger and increasingly more complex financial institutions pose to financial stability and, in 
particular, to banks' ability to asses their own risk-taking (Bank for International Settle- 
ments, 2006), bank supervisors believe that consolidation provides net gains for a coun- 
try's financial sector (Group of Ten, 2001). Part of the rationale is that M&A should let 
institutions exploit cost-based synergies (i. e. economies of scale and scope), leading to 
lower transaction costs, higher market liquidity and, ultimately, better risk diversification. 
Also, bank mergers can lead to the absorption of excess capacity in the banking system 
without the negative externalities associated with industry exits through bank failure (see 
for example, Wolgast, 2001; Berger et al., 1999). 
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More recently, the argument that bank ownership matters has also fuelled support 
among policymakers to promote further bank consolidation (CEPR, 2005). Specifically, 
supervisors have become concerned that more foreign bank ownership means a less 
stable credit supply when foreign banks react procyclicly to changes in their home coun- 
try's economic environment possibly to the detriment of economic activity in the host 
country (de Haas and van Lelyveld, 2006; Molyneux and Seth, 1998). 
4.3 Banking Structures and Financial Systems 
The discussion in Chapter 2 demonstrated several similarities between G-10 countries in 
terms of the nature as well as the effects of financial consolidation. This is not surprising 
given that the countries surveyed exhibit highly-developed financial systems wherein 
banks play a vital role in the transfer of resources from surplus units (savers) to deficit 
units (borrowers) by economising on informational frictions between the two parties. 
While banks are the primary intermediators of credit risk in all developed economies, 
the exact extent to which capital markets compete with banks as dominant risk manag- 
ers and providers of external finance varies by country (Levine, 2002; Allen and San- 
tomero, 2001). It has become common in the literature to use a comparison between 
bank-oriented financial systems and market-oriented economies to conceptualise the 
degree of capital market development vis-a-vis the banking sector (Mallin et al., 2005). 
(i) In a market-oriented financial system, banks face strong competition from debt 
and equity markets as well as from other non-bank financial intermediaries such 
as pension funds and mutual funds. Increased competition threatens the viability 
of many of the banks' traditional lines of business and, consequently, brings 
about a decline in traditional activities such as taking deposits and making out 
loans (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Allen and Santomero, 1997). 
59 
Chapter 4: Bank Deregulation 
(ii) Bank-based financial systems, by contrast, exhibit less developed financial mar- 
kets which, in turn, permits banks to continue to act as the main intermediators 
of credit risk in these economies (Diamond, 1984; Collins and Baker, 2003, pp. 
47-56). Among other things, this involves banks providing a much larger share 
of business and consumer finance than credit institutions chartered in financial 
systems with strong competition from non-bank intermediaries. 
La Porta et al. (1998; 2000), Nenova (2003), Dyck and Zingales (2004), and others 
view cross-country difference in capital market development as a result of how well 
market investors are protected from expropriation by insiders. Roe (2005), by contrast, 
argues that the distinguishing feature between financial systems is not the general legal 
framework, but financial regulations and the political will to enact these regulations. 
However, the development of capital markets may well have repercussions for the fre- 
quency and performance of bank M&A. For instance, well-functioning capital markets 
that quickly and publicly convey information to investors are a prerequisite for efficient 
takeovers. This notion is embodied in the market for corporate control argument which 
posits that liquid capital markets minimise the private benefits of control by replacing 
management that fails to maximise shareholder value (Kini et al., 2004). 
Figure 4-1 provides an organising framework for different types of banking sys- 
tems. A 2X2 matrix organises the G-10 counties plus Spain and Switzerland according 
to the level of competition between banks, on the one hand, and competition between 
the banking sector and capital markets, on the other. Competition among banks is 
measured by the market share of the largest-five institutions (see Figure 2-7, pg. 31) 7 To 
7 Concentration ratios are more helpful to gauge competition than, say, the number of credit institutions, 
because they take into account both the size distribution of banks and the relative size of a geographically 
60 
Chapter 4: Bank Deregulation 
distinguish between low and high market concentration levels, any country where the 
largest five credit institutions account for more than 50% of national banking assets is 
allocated to Groups II and III (and the remainder to Groups I and IV). Average stock 
market capitalisation to GDP ratios (taken from Barth et al., 2004) are used to proxy for 
the degree of competition that banks face as the major intermediators of credit risk 
from non-bank financial institutions-with higher ratios indicating more competition 
from capital markets. Countries with a stock market to GDP ratio above the cohort av- 
erage during 1997 - 20018 are assigned to the `high' category (Groups I and II), while 
countries exhibiting below-average competition from financial markets are in Groups 
III and IV. Consequently, the country matrix presented by Figure 4-1 distinguishes be- 
tween four groups of financial systems: 
(i) Low levels of market concentration with banks occupying a leading posi- 
tion in a country's financial system (i. e. Germany, Italy); 
(h) in Spain and the US, capital markets and banks compete at par, even 
though the market for banking services is relatively unconcentrated; 
(iii) highly developed stock markets coupled with high levels of concentration 
in banking (e. g. UK, Australia); 
(iv) Japan and France combine consolidated markets for banking services with 
bank-based economies. 
defined market. The link between market structures and competitive conditions is well-documented in the 
literature under the so-called structure-conduct-performance paradigm (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002). 
8 The cohort mean is 0.92. Values are averaged over a five-year period in order to ensure that short-term 
fluctuations in the combined value of a country's listed shares do not drive classifications. 
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Figure 4-1 Country Matrix: Financial Systems 
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Market Concentration 
The following section discusses how regulators have promoted M&A activities in 
different banking systems. The discussion below examines this issue for one country in 
each of the four groups of counties identified above: the US, the UK, Japan, and Ger- 
many. 
4.4 The United States 
4.4.1 Recent Deregulation and the Role of Bank Regulators 
The US has witnessed the largest share of recent M&A activity in the financial sector. ' 
Also, the US provides what perhaps is the clearest example of a causal link between the 
deregulation of the banking sector and financial consolidation. Both the unique struc- 
ture of the US banking system that prevailed for much of the twentieth century and its 
9The value share of US deals in terms of worldwide activity in the financial services industry stood at 
roughly 70% between 1993 and 1998 (Group of Ten, 2001, StatitticalAnnex). 
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subsequent restructuring-brought about by an unprecedented bank merger wave-can 
directly be attributed to regulatory changes in the financial sector. 
The Banking Act of 1933, passed in the midst of the Great Depression, restricted 
both the product mix and the geographical scope of credit institutions. More specifically, 
the Glass Steagall sections (20,32) of the Act imposed a strict separation of commercial 
and investment banking-with the only exception being municipal government debt 
that could still be underwritten by commercial banks. These measures were taken to 
prevent contagion between different types of institutions as well as to mitigate against 
conflicts of interest when banks hold equity in firms whose debts they underwrite. " 
Further, the Banking Act transferred branching regulations to the state level with the 
effect that each state had different degrees of restrictions. Legislation generally discour- 
aged interstate branching and, in some cases, even intrastate branching in order to limit 
concentration in the banking sector. 
The introduction of bank holding companies (BHCs) in the sixties offered a 
loophole for most credit institutions to overcome the product and geographic specialisa- 
tions that regulators had imposed on them. For instance, branches located in different 
states could be reorganised as individual bank subsidiaries under a `multi-bank' holding 
company. While this led to the creation of a number of regional banks, nationwide 
branching did not emerge because of the considerable costs involved for banks which 
still had to capitalise each entity separately. Under the organisational framework of the 
10 The conflict of interest view posits that lenders and borrowers may collude when issuing corporate debt 
to the public. Banks may be inclined to back non-performing loans of problem borrowers by underwrit- 
ing debt issues that capitalise on information asymmetries between them and the public regarding the 
creditworthiness of a borrower. However, the empirical evidence of this moral hazard problem is weak 
(Kroszner and Rajan, 1994). 
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Table 4-1 US Banking Structure, 2003 
Categories Number of 
Institutions 
Number of 
Branches 
Value of 
Accounts 
(USD billion) 
Commercial banks 7,865 68,070 726.9 
thrift institutionst 10,900 10,050 134.5 
savings banks 1,970 n. a. n. a. 
savings and loan 396 n. a. n. a. 
associations 
total 18,765 78,120 861.4 
branches of foreien banks 281 n. a. 10.7 
Source. Bank for International Settlements, Statistics on Payment and Settlement 
Systems in Selected Counteies (2004). Number of savings banks from FDIC, Statis- 
tics on Banking (2003). Number of savings and loan associations from OTS, 
2003 Factbook (2004). t Includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, 
cooperative and industrial banks, and credit unions. 
BHC, banks could also diversify into credit card operations, mortgage lending, and due 
to a Supreme Court ruling in 1987, into a limited amount of securities activities. 
The regulatory framework outlined above led to a banking system with an unusu- 
ally high number of institutions operating in a market that is highly fragmented along 
regions and financial products (see Table 4-1). As this framework was increasingly 
abandoned by policymakers during the nineties, the US financial sector underwent a 
dramatic transformation that saw the emergence of both nationwide branching and uni- 
versal banking. More specifically, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Efficiency Act 
of 1994 eliminated restrictions on interstate banking and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Fi- 
nancial Modernisation Act of 1999 repealed the Glass-Steagall type restrictions and, thus, 
effectively introduced universal banking to the US. The next section outlines how bank 
regulators in the US are most likely to stimulate further M&A activities in the near fu- 
ture. 
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4.4.2 Bank Deregulation and Future M&A Activities 
The US continues to have an unusually high number of credit institutions, with many 
thrift institutions" that are large in number, but small in terms of the combined value of 
their deposits. Consequently, the five largest banks owned less than 25% of the indus- 
try's assets in 2003. On the whole, banks with truly national branch structures are slow 
to emerge, even though two recent mega-mergers created institutions that, for the first 
time, are about to exceed limits set by regulators on the number of deposits held by any 
US bank. 12 Thus, retail banking in the US has remained what, essentially, is a local rather 
than a national industry-with high concentration ratios in the provision of banking 
services only in densely-populated areas (OECD, 2003). 
In order to stimulate further M&A activity, regulators may consider lifting remain- 
ing restrictions on retail banking. In particular, the share of nationwide deposits that a 
single institution can hold (currently 10%) should be raised, while similar restrictions on 
the share of state deposits (currently 30%) may be kept intact. This would almost cer- 
tainly spark further merger activities amongst large and very large commercial banks and 
make nationwide branching a reality. Should regulators not amend current deposit ceil- 
ings, it is almost inevitable that US top-tier institutions will start engaging in cross- 
border mergers to maintain the high growth rates of recent years. It is a peculiarity of 
the US system that almost all of its largest banks have little presence abroad. 
tt Thrifts comprise institutions such as savings banks, savings and loan associations, cooperative and in- 
dustrial banks, as well as credit unions. 
12 The mega-mergers are (i) the takeover of Bank One by JP Morgan Chase in 2004, which combined JP 
Morgan Chase's strengths in investment and retail banking in the northeast of the US with Bank One's 
commercial banking presence in the Midwest, and (ii) the Bank of America-Fleet Boston merger one year 
earlier. 
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Nonetheless, most bank US M&A activities in the near future will be targeted at 
US institutions and will, thus, mainly involve small commercial banks and thrift institu- 
tions. Any regulatory interference aimed at increasing M&A would have to be specifi- 
cally targeted at these types of institutions. For example, in order to facilitate consolida- 
Lion among small and medium-sized banks, the adoption of new minimum capital regu- 
lations in the US (i. e. Basel II) could play a crucial role. It is widely-expected that Basel 
II will result in somewhat lower regulatory capital requirements for large institutions 
that have the skills and resources to manage risk more effectively. If adopted, Basel II 
will act as an incentive for medium-sized banks to merge into larger institutions that are 
able to apply more advanced risk management and measurement techniques and free 
regulatory capital in the process. 
4.5 United Kingdom 
4.5.1 Historical Context 
The UK market for banking services stands out from those of many other countries: 
First, retail banking is a fairly concentrated industry by international standards, with half 
of all private-sector deposits held in one of the three largest banks in 2004 (Reuters 
Business Insights, 2004, p. 54). Second, levels of market concentration fell slightly over 
the past twenty years owing to an influx of new entrants. Third, a majority of banking 
groups and building societies in the UK are controlled by foreign owners. 
In the recent past, the UK implemented an array of regulatory changes with pro- 
found implications for the structure of the banking system in general and financial 
M&A in particular. Between 1970 and 1985, the amalgamation of Trustee Savings Banks 
(TSB) transformed a network of local savings banks with government-guaranteed liabili- 
ties into a large commercial bank. The TSB Group was privatised in 1985 and taken 
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over by Lloyds Bank in 1994. Similarly, the Building Societies Act of 1986 enabled the 
demutualisation of building societies and their subsequent transformation into listed 
banks. As a result, the number of building societies decreased from 190 in 1984 to 59 in 
2006" and most of the ten largest building societies in 1986 had converted into bank plc 
status by the end of the year 2000. While converted building societies were protected 
from hostile takeovers for the first five years of their new legal status, they were soon 
actively involved in the merger activities of the UK's financial sector. As well as M&A 
amongst demutualised institutions, mergers between commercial banks and converted 
building societies became more frequent in the 1990s. This refers to both commercial 
banks acquiring former building societies (e. g. Cheltenham & Gloucester was taken over 
by Lloyds Bank in 1995) as well as building societies taking over long-established banks 
as the example of Halifax's acquisition of Bank of Scotland in 2001 shows. Table 4-2 
indicates that building societies continue to be a key element of the UK banking struc- 
ture since they account for approximately 15% of the total number of credit institutions 
and branches. 
As well as the Building Societies Act, the Financial Services Act of 1986 was a ma- 
jor part of the financial sector reforms in the UK which are collectively known as `Big 
Bang'. Inter alia, the Act eroded barriers of entry for banks into the brokerage business 
by abolishing hurdles to competition such as fixed commissions. The wave of mergers 
across different financial product markets that followed these changes led to many UK 
securities firms being acquired by local retail banks or foreign investors which desired a 
foothold in the London market. 
13 Building Societies Association, mww. b a. o g. uk. 
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Table 4-2 UK Banking Structure, 2003 
Categories Number of Number of Number of Value of 
Institutions Branches Accounts Accounts 
(thousands) (GBP billions) 
Credit institutions 423 14,280t 127,995t 743.1 
of which building societies 63 2,081 n. a. n. a. 
postal institution 1 16,500} 13,9001' 1.4t' 
branches of foreign banks 186 n. a. n. a. n. a. 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Se- 
lected Countries (2004). Figures for building societies from the FSA. tEstimated. Tor the Post Of- 
fice, National Savings Ordinary Accounts only. National Savings Bank facilities are available at UK 
post offices. 
Owing to these recent regulatory changes, UK commercial banks can be charac- 
terised as `restricted universal'. That is, while they may compete across traditional lines 
of business, banks are discouraged from owning commercial interests in non-banks. As 
in virtually all developed countries, the number of in-market bank mergers rose sharply 
during the nineties leading to a constant reshuffling of the UK's `big four'-now HSBC, 
Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS, and Barclays. By 2000, this had led to such high levels 
of market concentration in the provision of banking services to private customers and 
SMEs that the Treasury-sponsored Cruickshank Report (2000) found evidence of seri- 
ous competition problems in these markets. 
4.5.2 Future M&A and the Role of Regulators 
While anti-trust concerns forestall large-scale bank mergers (for example, the Depart- 
ment of Trade and Industry vetoed a bid for Abbey National by Lloyds TSB in 2001), 
the UK is likely to play a prominent part in the pan-European and international consoli- 
dation of banks. For instance, Barclays, on the one hand, and a consortium of banks led 
by RBS, on the other, started a bidding war for Amsterdam-based ABN Amro in spring 
2007. The group around RBS secured control over the Dutch lender later in 2007. By 
the same token, the mortgage lender Abbey, was acquired by Banco Santander, Spain's 
largest lender. Further, large UK banks are turning increasingly towards emerging mar- 
kets (East Asia and Latin America in particular) to benefit from strong economic 
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growth and rising demand for banking services in these regions. HSBC has bought a 
number of minority stakes in Chinese, Indian and Latin American institutions and was 
rumoured to bid for Korea Exchange Bank in 2005. 
Finally, there is scope for further consolidation among smaller banks in the UK. 
Pressures towards further merger activities may have intensified following a bank run on 
Northern Rock in 2007 that demonstrated the inadequacy of deposit insurance ar- 
rangements in the UK. At present, up to £35,000 per account and institution are guar- 
anteed under the Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS). 14 While the Gov- 
ernment guaranteed all deposits held with Northern Rock before the bank run, some 
depositors may opt to deposit funds in larger and, arguably, safer banks in the future. 
Decisions as regards the future of deposit insurance arrangements in the UK, are likely 
to have an impact on bank M&A in the future. For example, should the present system 
of deposit insurance not be altered, there will be pressure for small and medium sized 
banks to consolidate further. 15 
4.6 Japan 
4.6.1 Recent Deregulation and the Role of Bank Regulators 
Japanese banks can be classified as commercial banks (i. e. wholesale city banks, long- 
term credit banks, trust, and regional banks), shinkin banks (local level institutions), 
14 Before October 2007 depositors' funds were insured up to £33,000 with sums over £2,000 paid out at a 
penal rate of 90%. 
is In late December 2007, the governor of the Bank of England has expressed his support for system of 
deposit insurance covering 100% of deposits of a `substantially increased and widely-understood limit' 
(www. bankofengland. co. uk/publications/speeches/2007/speech324. pdf; accessed 22 Jan. 2008). At the 
time of writing, the UK government was in support of a pre-funded deposit protection scheme similar to 
the FDIC in the US. 
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credit cooperatives, agricultural and fishery cooperatives or government-operated postal 
savings banks (see Table 4-3). After World War II, Japan's financial system was subor- 
dinated to the overall aim of post-war reconstruction. The Ministry of Finance-until 
recently, Japan's financial regulator-restricted competition by segmenting the banking 
system along product lines, regions, and client industries. In the same vein, the Ministry 
also regulated interest rates on deposits, obstructed foreign institutions from entering 
the domestic market, and discouraged the development of capital markets. In return for 
the banks' compliance, their liabilities were guaranteed under the so-called `convoy sys- 
tem' which effectively socialised credit risk in Japan's post-war banking system. In a fi- 
nancial system that muted market forces between different types of financial services 
providers, banks became heavily-dependent on traditional lines of banking business. 
Until recently, little consolidation took place in the Japanese banking industry and 
much of the M&A activity that eventually occurred was the direct result of a banking 
crisis that is rooted in the deregulation of interest rates during the 1980s as well as in 
other policy initiatives designed to introduce some degree of competition into Japan's 
financial sector. In response to eroding interest rate margins, banks aggressively in- 
creased their lending to riskier segments of the economy such as the real estate industry 
or SMEs and, as a result, were burdened by non-performing loans (NPLs) on an un- 
precedented scale when both real estate and equity prices plummeted at the beginning 
of the nineties. The number of high profile bank failures that followed prompted the 
Japanese government to either nationalise or merge ailing institutions in an attempt to 
prevent a systemic crisis. " As a result, the 21 largest depository institutions (by assets) 
operating in 1995 had consolidated into just four banking groups by 2001. 
16 Among those banks that eventually failed were Hyogo Bank in 1995, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, a city 
bank, in 1997, and Long-Term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit Bank in 1998. 
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Table 4-3 Number and Type of Japanese Credit Institutions, 2003 
Categories Number of Number of Number of Value of 
Institutions Branches Accounts Accounts 
(thousands) (JPY billion) 
Domestically licensed banks 154 12,539 337,650 252,591 
cooperatives and rural banks, 1,799 22,885 79,432 32,0016 
Post office 1 24,122 119,321 58,039 
total 1,955 59,579 536,403 349,307 
branches of foreign banks 72 107 n. a. 2,182 
Source Bank for International Settlements, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Systems in Selected 
Countries (2004). a Includes shinkin banks, Shinkin Central Bank, Norinchukin Bank, Shoko 
Chukin Bank, Shinkumi Federation Bank, National Federation of Labour Credit Associations, credit 
cooperatives, labour credit associations, agricultural cooperatives and fishery cooperatives. b Figures 
for shinkin banks only. 
Thus, most of Japan's large banks have been created by the recent wave of mega- 
mergers. This M&A wave started in 1999 when Industrial Bank of Japan and Fuji Bank 
merged under a single bank holding company. Since most of these mega-mergers were 
primarily arranged to avert bank failures on a large scale and were, hence, ultimately po- 
litically-motivated, the resulting institutions suffered from chronically low levels of effi- 
ciency and profitability. Coupled with the effects of financial distress, this has led to a 
general decline of Japanese banks vis-ä-vis their competitors in the US and Europe. 
Eight out of the ten largest credit institutions (by assets) were chartered in Japan any- 
time during the period 1988 - 1994, compared with only one in 1998.17 
Japan's `Big Bang' reforms of 1996 introduced more competition into the finan- 
cial sector by combining short and long-term lending and by liberalising fees and com- 
missions. Further, a restricted model of universal banking became permissible whereby 
Japanese banks could combine commercial banking with securities activities (albeit not 
with insurance). These reforms sparked some financial consolidation as banks began to 
diversify earning streams in order to limit their exposure to interest income. 
17 Figures from Group of Ten, StatisticalAnnex (2001, p. 457). 
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4.6.2 Bank Deregulation and Future MergerActivities 
In 2004, all major Japanese banks reported profits for the first time after the crisis. 
Moreover, the merger announcement between Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group 
(MTFG) and UFJ in 2004-number two and four of Japan's banks, respectively-is 
widely interpreted as a signal that a new era of consolidation has started. Thus, future 
M&A will be less motivated by weak pre-merger performance of the institutions con- 
cerned, and more by potential increases in earning power and efficiency following a 
merger. Many large Japanese banks have already broadened their scope and diversified 
into fee and commission-based business. Mizuho Financial Group, for instance, follow- 
ing a number of small acquisitions increased the share of non-interest income to 36% in 
2003 (The Banker, August 2004, pg. 20). Nonetheless, the profitability of Japan's banks 
remains low and many institutions continue to be burdened by high levels of bad debt. 
Some banks have preferred strategic alliances (e. g. MTFG acquired a 15% stake in 
the consumer finance company Acorn in 2004) or organic growth (e. g. Shinsei has de- 
veloped a diversified investment banking business over the past five years) over mergers 
and acquisitions. Since this is likely to continue in the near future, merger activity in Ja- 
pan will probably be dominated by few high-value deals; that is, financial consolidation 
will involve substantially larger transactions than in other countries. If banks improve 
their financial health through increases in profitability and the economy, after more than 
a decade of recession, enters a steady growth phase, further consolidation amongst Ja- 
pan's giant banks is very likely. 
In 2007, the government embarked on a ten-year privatisation programme of Ja- 
pan Post, the world's largest bank by assets. The vast increase in competition that is 
likely to result from a privatised Post Bank will lead to further merger activity between 
mid-sized regional institutions. Finally, financial regulators have so far maintained strong 
72 
Chapter 4: Bank Deregulation 
demarcation lines between banking and insurance underwriting. M&A in the financial 
sector as a whole are likely to increase markedly once the Bank of Japan permits banks 
to engage in insurance underwriting. 
4.7 Germany 
4.7.1 Historical Context 
Germany's bank structure is multi-layered and exhibits a sizable public sector next to 
commercial and cooperative banks. Germany is the most fragmented banking market in 
Europe. As Table 4-4 reports, less than 20% of the number of credit institutions are 
classified as commercial banks, while cooperative and rural banks make by far the larg- 
est contribution to the overall number of credit institutions. The dominant role of the 
public sector is illustrated by the position of savings banks as market leaders in retail 
banking (by number of accounts). 
Under German banking law, institutions have traditionally faced few restrictions 
on their cross-holdings with commerce and on the blending of commercial banking and 
securities activities. The only exception is a relatively strict institutional separation be- 
tween banking and insurance which, however, can be easily circumvented through the 
use of strategic alliances and cross-shareholdings. Thus, the four big private sector 
banks (Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, Hypo-Vereinsbank [now part of the Unicredit 
Group], and Commerzbank) are true universal banks. 
M&A activity amongst private sector institutions was virtually non-existent during 
the last decade. By contrast, regulators sparked a wave of consolidation involving public 
sector institutions in 2005 when savings banks (Sparkassen) and their wholesale partners, 
the state banks (Landesbanken), lost the public guarantees that have underpinned their 
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liabilities for decades. " Savings banks and state banks, thus, had to streamline their op- 
erations in preparation for a new era when the financial soundness of their institutions 
would determine their cost of finance in the credit markets. Particularly for savings 
banks with few branches, consolidation is inevitable to achieve much-needed cost sav- 
ings by expanding their reach beyond what in many cases is not more than a small mu- 
nicipality. 
At state-level, there has been some consolidation amongst Landesbanken when 
Landesbank Hamburg and Landesbank Kiel announced to merge into HSH Nordbank 
in 2004. Further, Stuttgart-based LBBW acquired Sachsen LB in 2007 which suffered 
heavy losses from investments in assets backed by US subprime mortgages. Similarly, 
WestLB is said to be interested in acquiring some of the smaller state banks like Bankge- 
sellschaft Berlin or Bremer Landesbank. It is a widely-held view that, following the end 
of state-backed funding, the number of Landesbanken will be reduced from ten today to 
three or four over the next few years. 
18 These guarantees come in the form of Anstaltslast (obligation to maintain an institution's solvency) and 
Gewährträgerhaftung (statutory ultimate guarantee obligation). The guarantees were abolished in response to 
pressures from the European Commission that regarded them as a form of illegal state aid (see ECB, 2002, 
p. 49). 
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Table 4-4 Germany's Institutional Framework, 2003 
Categories Number of Number of Number of Value of 
Institutions Branches Accounts Accounts 
(thousands) (EUR 
billion) 
Credit institutions 2,295 46,693 84,265 631.5 
of which: 
commercial bankst 397 16,254 16,765 265.8 
savings banks 502 15,830 40,900 241.0 
cooperative and rural 1,396 14,609 26,600 124.7 
banks 
branches of foreien banks 121 144 n. a. 7.9 
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Statistics on Payment and Settlement Sys- 
tems in Selected Countries (2004). t Includes big banks, regional banks and other 
commercial banks, branches of foreign banks, mortgage banks and banks with a spe- 
cial function. 
4. Z2 Deregulation and Bank MergerActivity in the Future 
In the near future, acquisitions of savings banks by Landesbanken as well as mergers 
involving institutions in the private and the public sector are likely forms of consolida- 
tion. While public sector banking assets tend to be held by municipalities, many of 
which are reluctant to let go the political influence attached to them, local governments 
are feeling increasingly pressured to raise money through the privatisation of savings 
institutions. So far, two high-profile attempts to privatise a savings bank have been 
thwarted. The first was in 2003 when Stralsund City Parliament intended to sell its Spar- 
kasse to private investors. The decision was later overturned by a state court which 
maintained that, because savings banks are committed to `public welfare', they cannot 
be privatised. A second attempt to privatise a savings banks was made in 2007 when- 
following the EU Commission's approval of a public bailout package of Bankgesell- 
schaft Berlin in 2004-thp city of Berlin was coerced into selling the Landesbank and 
the savings bank it owned. As part of the agreement with the EU Commission, private 
sector bidders were also permitted to make offers. However, private sector suitors were 
eventually outbid by the Association of Savings Banks which was, perhaps, eager to pre- 
vent the precedent of a savings banks under private ownership. 
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Similar to experiences in the UK which privatised its savings bank sector, regula- 
tors in Germany could potentially bring about a massive wave of merger activity be- 
tween commercial and savings banks should they embark on the privatisation of the 
Sparkassen sector. Commercial banks have repeatedly expressed interest in acquiring 
savings banks to bolster their small share of the retail market. However, any change to 
Section 40 of the German Banking Act requires an agreement between state govern- 
ments (which own savings banks) and the federal government (that regulates them). At 
the moment, the federal government opposes privatisation for fears that access to bank 
finance for the economy's sizable SME sector might suffer as a result. Nonetheless, it is 
widely expected that these restrictions will fall in the medium-term. 
Unlike their counterparts in the US, bank supervisors in Germany have never 
openly frowned upon consolidation and increasing concentration in the commercial 
banking industry. However, in order to encourage mergers in the private sector, which 
hitherto have almost been nonexistent, regulators should make it very clear that there is 
no alternative to M&A in order to form globally competitive credit institutions. In this 
context, regulators should signal their intention not to `shield' banks from foreign take- 
overs. On the other hand, the substantial job cuts necessary to reduce the overcapacity 
in Germany's retail banking sector are likely to meet public resistance. This is one of the 
reasons why the type of large-scale bank mergers necessary to achieve meaningful cost 
savings will face additional obstacles in the near future. After all, the memory of the ill- 
fated merger attempt between Deutsche and Dresdner Bank in 2000 which failed, 
among other reasons, because of the trade unions' opposition to the substantial redun- 
dancies that had been announced, is still fresh. 
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4.8 Summary of the Findings and Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examines the role of deregulation in stimulating M&A activities of banking 
firms. Over the last two decades, supervisors in the US, UK, Germany, and Japan have 
begun to deregulate parts of their banking industries, thus, sparking a process of con- 
solidation in their national banking sectors that is still ongoing. Since deregulation has 
taken different forms across these countries, any future steps that regulators embark on 
have to be viewed against the light of existing differences in banking systems and regula- 
tory practices. The conclusions are as follows. 
Germany has perhaps the greatest potential for bank M&A due to a largely un- 
reformed public sector. The privatisation of the savings banks, in particular, 
would spark a wave of bank mergers between different types of credit institu- 
tions once demarcation lines between public and private sector banks have been 
demolished. 
" The US still has potential for further consolidation should regulators adopt 
Basel II and lift restrictions on the share of national deposits that credit institu- 
tions can presently hold. 
" The UK, one of the earliest consolidators, has mostly exhausted its potential for 
further domestic mergers on a large scale, but, following a run on a mid-sized 
bank in 2007, may well see further consolidation if the existing system of de- 
posit protection is not overhauled. Present deposit insurance arrangements still 
penalise some depositors with funds in failing institutions relatively harshly and 
may lead to depositors preferring larger and, arguably, safer institutions. While 
such changes are likely to be implemented soon, the existing legislation had not 
been changed markedly at the time this thesis went to press. 
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" Japan, only just recovering from a banking crisis, will see some M&A activity in 
anticipation of a privatised and, hence, more competitive post bank. Also, 
should regulators permit mergers between insurance underwriters and banking 
firms, merger activities in the financial sector will increase substantially. 
While this chapter highlights the role of regulators in increasing the volumes of 
bank M&A, it should not be left unmentioned that there are also limits to what regula- 
tors can achieve. Particularly in Germany, and to a lesser extent in many Continental 
European economies, the political context in which regulators operate (see Roe, 2003) 
means the redundancies associated with large-scale bank mergers attract hostility and 
obstruct many policy initiatives aimed at deregulating banking further. This problem is 
aggravated if, as in the cases of Germany, bank finance is a very important source of 
external finance and policymakers are concerned about the effects of a more concen- 
trated banking sector on SME finance. In these countries, a public debate spelling out 
the advantages of a more integrated financial system will have to precede any drastic 
policy measures. It is in this role that bank supervisors, particularly in Germany, are 
most likely to make an impact, before they can lead the way to further bank consolida- 
tion. 
Finally, this chapter identifies two themes behind AMA that will be revisited in 
later chapters. First, while the deregulation of activities that banks may engage in is one 
of the driving forces behind bank mergers, countries still vary in terms of the extent and 
type of bank regulation. Second, the role of banking firms relative to financial markets 
varies across countries. This has important implications for financial systems across 
countries, because capital market development tends to be associated with a functioning 
market for corporate control as well as with better protection for minority shareholders. 
For example, the bank-centred economies of Japan and Germany have relatively under- 
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developed capital markets, virtually no hostile takeovers and minority shareholders suf- 
fer a relatively greater risk of being expropriation by insiders. Both bank regulation and 
capital market development may have an important impact on the performance of bank 
mergers across countries. With this in mind, Chapter 7 examines the impact that the 
stringency of bank regulation between Europe and the US has on the effectiveness of 
bidding banks' governance arrangements. The next chapter examines whether the level 
of investor protection prevalent in the target country partly explains the market reaction 
to M&A in Europe and the US. 
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Investor Protection and the Value Effects of 
Bank Merger Announcements in Europe 
and the US 
5.1 Introduction19 
Recent empirical work has proposed that the legal and regulatory environment of a 
country can help explain different investor reactions to similar-type events (Rossi and 
Volpin, 2004; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). In an efficient market, where assets are 
priced rationally, the revaluation effects of bank merger announcements may serve as an 
accurate assessment of the net benefits that shareholders can extract from a proposed 
transaction. For a sample of 204 bank mergers between 1996 and 2004, this chapter 
compares the acquirer returns associated with US and European bank merger an- 
nouncements and demonstrates that more sophisticated investor protection laws in the 
target country lower the returns that bidders earn in the takeover market. This chapter 
argues that systemic differences in law and regulation between countries, as encapsu- 
lated in investor protection regimes, partially determine investor expectations about the 
value-creating potential of a bank merger at the time of its announcement. 
19 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as Hagendorff, J, Collins, NI., Keasey, K 
Investor Protection and the and the Value Effects of Bank Merger Announcements in Europe and the US, 
Journal of Banking & Finance (forthcoming in 2008). 
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In two recent papers related to this chapter, Bris and Cabolis (2004) and Starks 
and Wei (2004) examine the value effects of cross-border mergers. Both papers find that 
changes in targets' investor protection regimes-the distinctive feature of cross-border 
M&A-generate statistically significant valuation effects. However, the approach taken 
in this chapter differs in two respects: First, the analysis is not restricted to cross-border 
deals. Hence, any effect of target firm protection laws on bidder returns exists inde- 
pendently of targets switching investor protection regimes in the post-merger period. 
For instance, a US acquirer seeking to bid for an Italian credit institution will be equally 
concerned about the target's governance arrangements (including the possibility of ex- 
propriation by insiders or bidding wars) as an Italian bidder when seeking acquisitions in 
Italy. Second, because the analysis is not concerned with target returns, 20 this chapter 
effectively examines the expected gains that bidders may extract from M&A in different 
economic environments. In this context, a target's level of investor protection (which 
may or may not be identical to that of the acquirer) proxies the overall benefits and 
costs associated with acquisition activities that bidding banks are likely to encounter in 
20 The analysis follows previous research (e. g., James and Weir, 1987; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; DeLong, 
2003a; Campa and Hernando, 2006) by not examining the returns that target shareholders realise. How- 
ever, on a theoretical level, one may expect target shareholders to realise higher abnormal announcement 
returns in more advanced investor protection environments where more developed capital markets, with 
more hostile takeovers and bidding wars (La Porta et al., 2002), drive up acquisition premiums (Moeller 
and Schlingemann, 2005). Also, one may expect wealth transfers from bidding to target bank shareholders 
to be more pronounced for acquisitions motivated by managerial hubris (i. e. when bidding managers 
overestimate the value creating potential of b1&A) or, equally, by entrenchment (e. g. when managers fa- 
vour corporate growth over profitability). Acquisitions are more likely to lead to lower value gains for 
target shareholders, on the other hand, when acquisitions are made in low protection environments (Bris 
and Cabolis, 2004) or are purely synergy-oriented. 
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different legal environments across which the effectiveness of governance and disclo- 
sure practices may vary greatly. 
The following section offers a discussion of the findings of studies that examine 
the market reaction to bank mergers as well as a discussion of the literature on investor 
protection. Subsequently, the bank merger sample and research methodology are intro- 
duced. This is followed by univariate tests to gauge the market valuation effects of bank 
mergers in Europe and the US by deal type and by level of investor protection before 
the findings of cross-sectional analyses are discussed. 
5.2 Background: 
The Value Effects of Bank Mergers and Investor Protection 
5.21 The Market Valuation Effects ofBank M&A in Europe and the US 
Table 5-1 presents the results of key bank merger performance studies that use either 
European or US data; ten studies report negative abnormal returns, seven studies can- 
not detect any abnormal share price performance and one study finds positive abnormal 
returns for acquiring banks. The overall results of two further studies (Becher, 2000; 
Pilloff, 1996) are ambiguous. James and Weir (1987), Houston and Ryngaert (1994), 
DeLong (2001), Cornett et al. (2003), Anderson et al. (2004), DeLong and DeYoung 
(2007), and others examine the investor reaction to bank merger announcements in the 
US and find bidding bank shareholders realise losses in the order of 2%. Lepetit et al. 
(2004), and Karceski et al. (2005) offer evidence that European bank M&A has no effect on 
firm value, while others report that bidder returns associated with bank acquisitions in 
Europe are only marginally negative (Campa and Hernando, 2006) or even positive 
(Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000). 
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It has been suggested in the applied literature that the apparent differences in the 
market valuation effects of European and US bank mergers are caused by differences in 
the predominant method of takeover finance over time (Amel et al., 2004) or differ- 
ences in deal characteristics such as transaction values (Cybo-Ottone and Murgia, 2000). 
This chapter argues that systemic differences in law and regulation between countries 
partially determine investor expectations regarding the value-creating potential of a bank 
merger at the time of its announcement. Consistent with this main hypothesis, Table 5-1 
shows that Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000), the European study where the share of tar- 
gets in the UK (arguably, one of the most advanced investor protection environment) is 
the lowest (10% of the sample), find positive abnormal returns, while Campa and Her- 
nando (2006), who employ the highest share of UK acquisitions (23%), exhibit negative 
abnormal returns in the announcement period. 
5.22 Investor Protection and the Expected Gains from Acquisitions 
Investor protection regimes have been shown to partly explain why the same type of 
corporate event may attract different investor reactions across countries. Dyck and Zin- 
gales (2004) point out that investor protection creates and destroys opportunities for 
expropriation of outside investors (creditors and minority shareholders) by insiders 
(managers and majority shareholders). This is because investor protection determines 
the value of the private benefits of control that insiders may enjoy. Depending on the 
degree of agency conflict, expropriations by insiders can take forms of varying severity 
(La Porta et al., 2000; Morck et al., 1990)-ranging from asset stripping to wasteful be- 
havior such as value-destroying acquisition strategies. However, when investors see their 
claims protected by the law and enforceable through the legal system, demand for cer- 
tain types of financial assets is likely to increase (Hope, 2003), thus, facilitating the de- 
velopment of different governance systems. La Porta et al. (2002) find that countries 
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with more elaborate disclosure and accounting rules have more valuable stock markets 
and more IPOs (market-based governance), while countries with stronger creditor pro- 
tection laws have larger credit markets (bank-based governance). 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) provide a link between governance systems and the mar- 
ket for corporate control-a vital element of market-based governance which acts to 
replace failing management (Kini et al., 2004; James and Weir, 1987). The authors ob- 
serve increased levels of takeover market activity and a higher propensity for bidding 
wars in countries with more elaborate shareholder protection rights, possibly because 
these regimes facilitate a more freely-operating market for corporate control. Moeller 
and Schlingemann (2005) find that acquisition targets operating within more liquid take- 
over markets diminish the announcement period returns that bidding shareholders real- 
ise. For a sample of cross-border deals involving targets in the UK, Canada, France and 
Germany, the authors show that acquisitions of UK companies attract the least favor- 
able market reaction. They attribute the low bidder returns for UK acquisitions to lower 
agency conflict in markets where targets benefit from sophisticated shareholder protec- 
tion rights as well to a higher likelihood of bidding wars for attractive targets causing 
merger-related gains to be bid away. By the same token, Starks and Wei (2004) argue 
that bidders have to pay higher premiums for targets located in relatively more sophisti- 
cated protection environments in an effort to compensate target shareholders for 
poorer governance practices following mergers21 
21 Rather than the negative value effect of investor protection in the target's country on bidder returns 
hypothesised in this chapter, the opposite effect is also conceivable. Dahlquist et al. (2003), for example, 
argue that bidders may be rewarded for acquisitions in high protection economies owing to the higher 
company disclosure standards as well as lower agency and transaction costs associated with M&A in these 
regulatory environments. While Bris and Cabolis (2004) find some evidence consistent with this in a sam- 
ple of cross-border mergers-the authors detect higher bidder returns for M&A targeted at companies in 
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The evidence on the valuation effects of mergers in different investor protection 
regimes is rather limited for banking firms. DeLong (2003a), in an international sample 
of bank merger activity, finds higher abnormal returns for a portfolio of non-US acquir- 
ers (iincluding Japanese and European banks) vis-ä-vis bidding banks in the US. While 
the author suggests that this result is driven by underlying differences in financial sys- 
tems, she does not control for the impact of investor protection on her findings. Simi- 
larly, Kiymaz (2004) reports that the wealth effects for bidding institutions vary with the 
location of the target. In a sample of cross-border acquisitions made by US financial 
firms, deals targeted at financial institutions in Latin America and East Asia lead to 
higher value gains for bidding firms. Again, differences in investor protection are not 
among the conditions examined by the author. 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
5.3.1 M&A Data 
The bank merger sample was obtained from Thomson Financial's M&A database (SDC 
Platinum). Please refer to Section 3.3 (pg. 47) for a detailed discussion of the sample se- 
lection criteria. To briefly reiterate, sample deals were announced between 1996 and 
2004 and both acquirers and targets are listed in the US or Europe (i. e. EU-15 countries 
plus Switzerland). While acquirers are commercial banks, bank holding companies and 
credit institutions, targets may also be insurance companies (life and non-life), mortgage 
bankers, as well as security brokers. Only majority acquisitions which resulted in the ac- 
quirer having a stake of at least 50% in a target institution were included. Finally, for 
reasons of data availability, the sample is restricted to transactions with an underlying 
deal value of at least $100 million in constant 2004 S. 
countries where corruption is less widespread-they do not find bidder returns to increase with more 
general measures of investor protection (such as creditor or shareholder rights). 
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The resulting sample is further reduced after omitting cases for one of the follow- 
ing reasons: (i) share prices are not available on Datastream or (ii) there are less than 90 
trading days between separate merger announcements made by the same bidder. How- 
ever, the sample contains serial acquirers over longer time periods. This is because a siz- 
able share of M&A activities is due to a small number of serial acquirers whose exclu- 
sion would forestall opportunities to analyse this large and very relevant share of bank 
M&A. 
Table 5-2 presents the final bank merger sample. Panel A shows that while the US 
was responsible for most of the M&A activity over the sample period, the mean value 
of acquisitions made by European banks was higher in almost every sample year. Ac- 
cordingly, European banks account for 26% of the number of M&A deals, but for 35% 
of the overall value of M&A activity during the sample period. The smaller average deal 
values in the US are the legacy of regulatory restrictions on the geographic scope and 
product mix of local banks that had not been completely lifted before the mid-nineties 
(see Section 4.4). 
The geographic composition of the sample is given by Panel B of Table 5-2. The 
US dominates the sampled transactions with 151 acquisitions, while 53 deals are of 
European origin. As previously mentioned, the dominance of US merger activity in the 
sample does not permit any conclusions as to the general pace of bank consolidation in 
Europe. The consolidation of bank assets in countries like Germany, France and Italy 
over the period of study has largely involved non-listed public sector and cooperative 
institutions (see Hagendorff et at, 2007a). These institutions face increasing pressures to 
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Table 5-2 Overview of M&A Sample 
The table breaks down 204 bank M&A deals in the period 1996-2004 by transaction year and the bidder's country of origin. Deal values are 
measured in constant 2004 S using the US CPI. Only majority acquisitions between publicly listed banks (as acquirers) and financial services 
firms (as targets) are included. Bidders and acquisition targets are from the US and Europe (EU-15 plus Switzerland). The value of the 
acquired equity is at least S 100 million in constant 2004 $ and all mergers were completed by May 2005 
Panel A. Distribution of Acquisitions by Year 
Year Total 
No. of Mergers 
US Europe Total 
Total Value (mil $) 
US Europe Total 
Ave Value (mil $) 
US Europe 
1996 11 9(821/o) 2(181/o) 10,317 4,825 (47%) 5,491 (53%) 938 536 2,746 
1997 30 24 (80%) 6 (209/6) 80,988 33,791 (42°/n) 47,198 (58%) 2,700 1,408 7,866 
1998 32 28 (88%) 4(12%) 258,122 237,615 (921/6) 20,507 (8%) 8,066 8,486 5,127 
1999 27 18 (67%) 9 (33%) 96,377 25,012 (26%) 71,365 (74%) 3,570 1,390 7,929 
2000 29 14 (489/4) 15 (52%) 83,818 38,156 (46%) 45,662 (541/6) 2,890 2,725 3,044 
2001 28 19 (68%) 9(32%) 52,048 11,380 (22%) 40,668 (789/6) 1,859 599 4,519 
2002 14 11 (79%) 3(211/. ) 26,545 9,952 (37%) 16,593 (63"/u) 1,896 905 5,531 
2003 17 14(82%) 3 (18%) 57,330 55,852 (97%) 1,477 (3%) 3,372 3,989 492 
2004 16 14 (88°/u) 2 (13%) 93,899 78,001 (83%) 15,898 (17%) 5,869 5,572 7,949 
All 204 151(74%) 53 (26%) 759,444 494,585 (65%) 264,859 (35%) 3,723 3,275 4,997 
Panel B: Distribution of Acquisitions by Country 
Acquirer Nation BE DE FR GE GR 
Target Nation 
IR IT NL PO SP SW UK US Total 
Belgium 2 3 1 6 
Denmark 2 2 
France 1 2 1 1 1 6 
Germany 1 1 2 
Greece 7 7 
Italy 5 1 6 
Netherlands 1 1 3 5 
Portugal 2 2 
Spain 1 21 4 
Sweden 1 1 
Switzerland 2 1 3 
UK 1 2 5 1 9 
US 151 151 
Total 4 3 3 3 8 253 3 226 160 204 
Source Thomson Financial, Bureau of Labor Statistics (http: //stats. bls. gov). Domestic M&A in italics. 
consolidate as a result of declines in government ownership and the phasing out of pub- 
lic guarantees of their liabilities (CEPR, 2005) as well as because of monetary integration 
across most parts of the EU (Allen and Song, 2005). 
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5.3.2 Investor Protection 
The level of investor protection is proxied by two indexes developed by La Porta et 
al. (1998). 
(i) An index of anti-director rights that are prevalent in the target institution's 
country and bolster the interests of shareholders against those of management. 
This measure revolves around voting procedures for the election of directors 
and the approval of major corporate issues (see Table 5-3). Based on six dif- 
ferent anti-director rights, the index varies from 0 to 6 with higher numbers 
indicating better protection for shareholders from expropriation by manage- 
ment. Following Rossi and Volpin (2004), the anti-director index is multiplied 
by a measure of the rule of law which rates the law and order tradition in the 
target country (also taken from La Porta et al., 1998); the resulting variable is 
labeled `shareholder protection'. 22 
(ü) The second index measures the quality of national accounting standards. This 
index reflects the inclusion of 90 accounting items in national practices and, 
thus, ranges from 0 to 90 where higher values indicate better investor protec- 
tion. Accounting standards are at the core of corporate governance because 
they make company disclosures interpretable and contracts between investors 
and management (which tend to rely on some measure of company size or 
profitability) meaningful (La Porta et al., 2000). 
Panel B of Table 5-3 presents the country scores for both investor protection 
measures. Out of the sample countries, common-law countries (the UK & the US) ex- 
22 While this index is static over time, it is reasonable to expect that the underlying variables do not vary 
greatly over the sample period. Relatively few deals occurred after the passing of SOX in 2002 which, if 
anything, only reinforced the position of the US as a high investor protection economy. 
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hibit very high standards of investor protection, while Italy, Germany and Belgium 
(civil-law countries) score relatively low in this respect. As for the quality of accounting 
standards, Table 5-3 suggests that Sweden, the UK and the US have leading positions, 
while corporate disclosure practices lack transparency in Portugal, Greece and Austria. 
Although the two investor protection indices measure somewhat different institu- 
tional characteristics, there is a strong association between the two measures. First, this 
is evident in a strong correlation between shareholder protection and accounting quality 
(rr0.79; significant at 1%). Second, Table 5-4 classifies deals relative to the sample's 
median values of shareholder protection and accounting quality and shows that both 
measures consistently describe target countries' protection levels as either above- or be- 
low-median for most transactions (196 or 96%). Only in eight cases do the two meas- 
ures come to a conflicting assessment when acquisitions that are targeted at above- 
median accounting environments are classified as below-median in terms of shareholder 
protection. For instance, this is the case for both Switzerland and Germany where there 
is a combination of relatively weak investor protection laws and the type of strong law 
enforcement that is common to civil-law countries and reflected in the high accounting 
standards measure. 
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Table 5-3 Investor Protection 
Investor protection is proxied by two indexes from La Ports et al. (1998). Anti-director rights vary between 0 and 6 
depending on the inclusion of six different voting rights as detailed below. This index is multiplied by an index of the 
rule of law (varying between 0 and 10) and called shareholder protection. Accounting standards vary from 0 to 90 
depending on the inclusion of 90 accounting items in national accounting standards 
Panel A. Index Composition 
Anti-director (1) What is the percentage of share capital required to call in an extraordinary shareholders' meeting? 
rights (2) Are proxy votes permissible or do shareholder have to be present (either personally or through 
an authorised representative) at shareholders' meetings? 
(3) Are there restrictions on selling shares around the time of meetings? 
(4) Is cumulative voting for directors permissible? Alternatively, are there other mechanisms in place 
by which minority interests name a proportional number of directors? 
(5) Do minority shareholders have legal mechanisms to fight perceived oppression? For example, 
can they insist on their shares being repurchased should they object key decisions taken by man- 
agement? 
(6) Do shareholders have preemptive rights to new issues that protect their stake from dilution? 
Rule of law Assessment of the law and order tradition in the country produced by the rating agency International 
Country Risk and quoted by La Porta et al. (1998). Varies between 0 and 10 where lower scores 
indicate a lower tradition for law and order. 
Accounting Index constructed from company reports in different countries. Reports are examined and rated 
standards according to their inclusion or omission of 90 items. These items fall into seven categories (general 
information, income statements, balance sheets, funds flow statement, accounting standards, stock 
data, and special items). 
Panel B: Country Scores 
Country Shareholder Protection 
(0-60) 
Accounting Standards 
(0-90) 
Belgium 0 61 
Denmark 20 62 
France 28.95 69 
Germany 9.23 62 
Greece 14.24 55 
Ireland 31.2 n. a. 
Italy 6.75 62 
Netherlands 40 64 
Portugal 26.04 36 
Spain 31.2 64 
Sweden 30 83 
Switzerland 20 68 
United Kingdom 42.85 78 
United States 50 75 
Table 5-4 Interaction between Shareholder Protection and Accounting Quality 
Investor protection is proxied by two indexes from La Porta et al. (1998) and multi- 
plied by an index of the rule of law. Accounting standards vary from 0 to 90 depend- 
ing, on the inclusion of 90 accountine items in national accountine standards 
Shareholder Protection 
Below median Above median Total 
Accounting Below median 36 0 36 
Quality Above median 8 160 168 
Total 44 160 204 
Pearson X2 = 158.96 (p = 0.00) 
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5.3.3 Methodology 
To analyze investor reactions to bank M&-A, standardised market model abnormal re- 
turns (AR,, ) are calculated as detailed in Section 3.2.1 (pg. 35). Specifically, the follow- 
ing model assumes a linear relationship between the expected return on security i (R71) 
and the return on a market portfolio (R, N): 
AR;, = R;, - ä; - '13, R., . (5.1) 
Abnormal share price performance is estimated for different time periods sur- 
rounding the announcement date supplied by Thomson Financial. Market model pa- 
rameters are calculated using 100-day daily return observations starting from 121 days to 
21 days before the acquisition announcement. Market returns are based on national 
bank-sector indexes provided by Datastream. When determining statistical significance, 
Dodd and Warner (1983) standardise abnormal returns by the square root of their esti- 
mation period return variance (er; ): 
2 
SA R,, = AR;, v; I1 +1+L RM' - RM) (5.2) L; 
(RM, _RM)Z 
m=l 
This procedure prevents securities with large variances from dominating the test. 
Subsequently, abnormal return statistics reported in Boehmer et al. (1991) are used to 
correct for increases in the variance of abnormal returns that is common for merging 
parties at announcement. Failure to account for event-induced increases in variance 
leaves tests misspecified, while there is only a small loss of statistical power associated 
with using the following procedure if historic and event window variance are identical 
(Cowan and Sergeant, 1996), 
aSAR, _ 
jSAR;, 
-jSAR;, /n 
Zn(n-1) 
. (5.3) Vi=t , _l 
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This yields the following test statistic: 
AR;, /n 
Z= 
jS 
i=1 USAR, 
(5.4) 
As a robustness test, the analysis also accounts for the non-normal distribution of 
security returns by using a sign test as suggested in Corrado (1989) to detect abnormal 
share price performance. The use of non-parametric test statistics makes inferences less 
sensitive to the effects of outliers. 
5.4 Empirical Results: Bidder Abnormal Returns 
Table 5-5 presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated with different 
event window specifications during the announcement period of bank mergers. Bidding 
bank shareholders realise negative abnormal returns over the various event window 
lengths reported. For example, on the day of the acquisition announcement (t=0), mean 
abnormal returns are -0.93% against the national bank sector index (statistically signifi- 
cant at the 1%-level according to both the t-statistic and the rank test). Collectively, the 
results indicate that investors are sceptical about acquirers gaining from bank M&A 
even though the magnitude of abnormal share price performance is less pronounced 
over longer examination periods. Mean abnormal returns for the 3-, 5- and 11-day peri- 
ods are -0.50%, -0.32% and -0.18%, respectively. The results for the 26-day CAR 
(-0.12%), by comparison, are ambiguous-with the rank statistic significant, but not the 
t-test. 
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Table 5-5 Bidder Abnormal Returns 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. 
All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal returns are calculated against national Data- 
stream banks-only indexes using market model regressions that are averaged over 
each event window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardised predic- 
tion errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return variance following merger an- 
nouncements (Boehmer et al., 1991) and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989). 
Event window Ave CAR Pos. Neg. r -Test Rank test 
(1-20; t+5) -0.12% 66 138 -0.54 -3.42- 
(f-10; 1+1) -0.18% 69 135 -1.66' -2.99"" 
(1-2; 1+2) -0.32% 66 138 -5.67'^ -3.75"" 
(1-1; 1+1) -0.50% 63 141 -13.55"' -4.61"" 
0 -0.93% 74 130 1 -53.45"" -5.61"" 
* (**, ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
Next, the value implications of bank merger activities in the context of different 
investor protection environments and different types of deals are considered. The fol- 
lowing section presents preliminary findings on how the laws and regulation prevalent in 
target countries explain bidder returns in Europe and the US, before the specific effects 
of activity diversification, geographic diversification and takeover finance are considered. 
5.4.1 Announcements Returns and Investor Protection 
If investor protection regimes impact a priori expectations about the value-creating po- 
tential of a proposed transaction, one may expect bank merger announcements that tar- 
get European credit institutions to elicit a different market reaction than merger an- 
nouncements aimed at US banks. This is because the competitive bidding conditions 
associated with targets in high protection economies such as the US may severely re- 
strict the ability of bidders to extract gains from acquisitions (see Rossi and Volpin, 2004; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Consequently, it is hypothesised that US bidders (be- 
cause they tend to target US institutions) realise abnormal returns that are negative on 
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Table 5-6 Abnormal Returns by Region and Investor Protection Levels 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. 
Abnormal returns are calculated against the Datastream bank sector index using market model regressions. Abnor- 
mal returns are averaged over each event window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardised predic- 
tion errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return variance following merger announcements (Bochmer et al., 
1991) and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989) 
Panel A. Abnormal Returns for European and US Bank Acquirers 
(t-20; t+5) (1-10; t+1) (t-2; 1+2) (t-1; t+1) 0 
EUR mergers ave CAR -0.03% 0.03% 0.08% 0.09% 0.36% 
x=53 t-stat 
-0.21 0.85 3.12* 6.15"" 40.67'"" 
rank stat 
-1.43 0.37 0.91 0.70 2.06'" 
US mergers ave CAR -0.14% -0.25% -0.47% -0.70% -1.40% 
n=151 t-stat 
-0.83 -2.82""' -10.17" -24.09"" -98.18- 
rank star 
-2 85'"' -3.04° -3.95" -4.72° -6.96- 
Mean Diff 0.12%° 0.28% 0.54"/0"* 0.801/0' 1.76 /o*- 
A(CAR)EuR. us (p= 0.03) (p= 0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.00) (p=0.00) 
Panel B: Target Investor Protection Measures by Deciles, ranked by CAR(, y 02) 
Di ave CAR n Shareholder Accounting 
Protection Quality 
Di (low) -2.22% 21 47.68 75.14 
D2 -1.15% 20 47.00 73.65 
D3 -0.73% 21 47.16 73.75 
D4 -0.45% 20 46.01 72.05 
D5 -0.32% 20 45.50 71.15 
D6 -0.18% 21 42.38 72.60 
D7 -0.04% 20 43.97 70.30 
Ds 0.20% 21 38.23 69.75 
D9 0.47% 20 39.51 69.38 
Dio (high) 1.31% 20 30.38 67.85 
Differences in Investor Protection 
D1-D o 17.30"' 7.29*" 
Di-Ds 2.18' 3.99"' 
Ds-D o 15.12°° 3.30"' 
* (**, ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Paired /-tests are used to determine differences in mean re- 
turns and assume unequal variances. 
average. Low investor protection environments, on the other hand, suffer from in- 
creased agency conflict and, thus, exhibit less liquid markets for corporate control (La 
Porta et al., 1998). European bidders are likely to benefit from subdued competition 
levels for attractive acquisition targets by gaining access to higher abnormal returns in 
the takeover market than those bidders that predominantly target high protection 
economies. Thus, 
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Hl: The market reaction to European bank merger announcements will be 
more positive than to deals announced in the US. 
In line with H1, Panel A of Table 5-6 documents a positive market revaluation for 
European bank acquirers and value losses for US bidders in the merger announcement 
period. Mean abnormal returns to European bidders are a positive and significant 0.36% 
on the announcement day and a smaller (yet according to the t-test still statistically sig- 
nificant) 0.09% and 0.08% over the 3- and 5-day period. While the insignificance of the 
rank statistic for 3- and 5-day CAR may be due to the fact that non-parametric tests of- 
ten struggle to detect small levels of abnormal share price performance (Cowan and 
Sergeant, 1996), a major finding is that, in contrast to US transactions, bidding bank 
shareholders in Europe do not realise any statistically significant wealth losses as a result 
of bank M&A. The losses pertaining to US investors range from -1.40% on the an- 
nouncement day to -0.14% for 26-day CAR (all significant at 1%). Most critically, the 
last row in Panel A of Table 5-6 confirms that the abnormal returns of European bank 
merger announcements are significantly higher than those associated with US acquisi- 
tions-a result which is significant for all event window specifications. While the posi- 
tive CAR for European bidding banks are consistent with the findings of Cybo-Ottone 
and Murgia (2000), this study is the first to show that bidders in Europe realise higher 
announcement returns than US institutions using a direct comparison of the value ef- 
fects of M&A activities in both geographic regions. 
To explore the impact of investor protection applicable to targets on bidder 
wealth directly, Panel B of Table 5-6 ranks the full sample into ten portfolios based on 
the magnitude of the 5-day abnormal returns that bidders realise. Consistent with the 
notion that merger-related gains may easily be bid away in the type of competitive take- 
over markets prevalent in high protection environments, acquisitions in the lowest re- 
turn decile occur in countries where targets enjoy one of the highest levels of investor 
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protection (as measured in terms of both shareholder protection and accounting quality). 
By the same token, bidder returns are especially pronounced where targets operate in 
low protection environments. In low protection environments, investors may demand 
compensation for lower governance standards and a higher risk of expropriation by in- 
siders. Tests of the equality of means confirm statistically significant differences in both 
target protection measures between the top, middle and bottom return portfolio. 
5.4.2 Product Diversification and Investor Protection 
Recent regulatory changes in the US (above all, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999) 
repealed boundaries between different types of financial services such as banking and 
insurance as well as between retail and investment banking (Berger et al., 1999). Legal 
harmonisation within the EU-first in the form of national `big bangs' (e. g. in Britain 
when commercial banks were permitted to acquire brokerage houses in 1986) and sub- 
sequently at EU-level (above all, the Second Banking Directive of 1989 which permitted 
universal banking throughout Europe)-encouraged financial conglomeration by allow- 
ing consolidation across different types of institutions (Allen and Song, 2005). 
Previous research findings lead to two predictions. Investors will generally be 
sceptical about cost efficiencies resulting from product diversifying bank mergers. 
DeLong (2001), Ramaswamy (1997), and Beitel et al. (2004) find that diversifying bank 
M&A lead to value losses. It is commonly argued that, while diversification may yield 
gains from cross-selling different financial products (economies of scope), such gains 
are considerably smaller than the potential cost reductions and efficiency improvements 
associated with product focusing bank mergers (economies of scale). On the other hand, 
there are caveats to the negative view of product diversification. Very few studies have 
incorporated data after the deregulation of product diversifying bank mergers in Europe 
and the US and the type of large credit institutions that have formed recently may be 
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best suited to reap any merger-related benefits (see Berger and Mester, 1997). The sec- 
ond prediction is that bank shareholders will be especially wary of product diversifying 
bank mergers in low protection environments. It is conceivable that bidders find it more 
difficult to assess the true value of a target and the synergistic benefits of a proposed 
transaction if the disclosure practices of the target are weak. Additionally, diversification 
strategies bear an increased risk for bidding shareholders of expropriation by insiders 
(Morck et al., 1990; Denis et al., 1997). For example, in low protection economies, bid- 
ding bank managers may engage in empire-building strategies when committing to 
value-destroying bank mergers in order to lower both the variance of company returns 
and their employment risk (Cornett et al., 2003; Anderson et al., 2004). This can be 
summarised as: 
H2a: Product diversification attracts a negative market reaction. 
H2b: Investors will be especially sceptical about product diversification in low 
protection environments. 
Following Campa and Hernando (2004) and Doukas and Kan (2006), deals are 
classified as diversifying if the first two digits of the SIC code of the main industry of 
the institutions involved in a deal are not identical. Accordingly, a bank (SIC 60-) ac- 
quiring a broker (SIC 62-) is regarded as a diversifying merger, while deals between state 
banks (SIC 6021) and commercial banks (SIC 6029) are classified as product-focusing. 23 
23 While SIC codes do not always accurately reflect the activities of financial firms (see DeLong, 2001), 
each deal was carefully examined to avoid issues of misclassification. As a robustness check, a second 
measure of diversification was used that is, arguably, more suitable to account for the nature of some 
sample banks as integrated financial firms that engage in multiple activities and, hence, have more than 
one applicable SIC code. Following Sirower (1997), the number of industry classification codes shared 
between bidders and targets are examined. Deals are then classified as diversifying if bidders and targets 
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Table 5-7 reports abnormal returns for deals that are focusing and diversifying 
along product lines. Results are presented for the full sample as well as for the subsets 
of European and US deals. First, the results show that product diversification, generally, 
attracts negative abnormal returns-the only exceptions are European deals over the 1-, 
3-and 5-day event window where the abnormal returns associated with diversifying 
D7&A are positive (significant t-statistic, insignificant rank statistic)24 
However, in contrast to H2a, the losses in bidder wealth following the an- 
nouncement of diversifying mergers are smaller than the losses that result from focusing 
bank M&A. For the full sample, diversifying mergers lead to mean abnormal returns 
of -0.03% over the 3-day event window (significant t-statistic, insignificant rank statistic) 
compared with -0.61% for focusing deals (significant at 1%). This finding is consistent 
with bancassurance and other forms of cross-selling financial products having some per- 
formance-enhancing effect-albeit at a small level. 
do not share any SIC codes. The results when using this measure of diversification are practically identical 
to the results reported in this chapter. 
24 Studies such as Berger et al. (1999) and Berger and Mester (1997) suggest that recent changes in regula- 
tion and the increasing scale of credit institutions have made product diversification more profitable. In 
unreported tests, it is examined whether this holds for the present sample. There is no evidence that the 
value effect of diversification is more pronounced for M&A valued at more than $1 billion in either 
Europe or the US. On the other hand, it cannot be reliably tested whether product diversification creates 
bidder value before and after the passing of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) as these transactions 
were extremely rare. While US banks could engage in securities activities through so-called 'section 20' 
subsidiaries during the pre-GLBA period of the sample (provided these activities did not exceed 25% of 
the BHC's revenue), there were only six diversifying deals in the US and five such deals in Europe before 
GLBA was passed. 
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Table 5-7 Abnormal Returns for Product-Focusing and Diversifying Mergers 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal returns are 
calculated against national Datastream bank-sector indexes using market model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged over each event 
window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardised prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return variance following 
merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991), and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989). Acquirers are commercial banks, bank holding 
companies, credit institutions, and savings banks. Targets are also insurance companies (life and non-life), mortgage bankers, as well as security 
brokers and flotation companies. Product-focusing mergers involve banks where the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of their main 
product line are identical 
Full Sample (n=204) US (n=151) Europe (n=53) 
Focusing Diversifying A(CAR) Focusing Diversifying A(CAR) Focusing Diversifying A(CAR) 
n 164 40 130 21 34 19 
(t-20; t+5) 
-0.12% -0.10% 0.02% -0.15% -0.11% 0.04% 0.01% -0.09% -0.10% 
(-0.5860) (-1.434) P=0.76 (-0.8758) (-2.6059)°' P=0.59 (0.1640) (-1.4482) P=0.26 
[-2.7936]"' [-2.2154]" [-2.3654]'"' [-2.4769]" [-1.2943] [-0.4929] 
(t-10; t+1) -0.20% -0.08% 0.13% -0.27% -0.15% 0.12% 0.04/o 0.01% -0.03% 
(-2.0656)° (-1.961)`" P=0.11 (-3.1936)^' (-5.2912)'"' P=0.29 (1.6500) (-0.0127) P-0.85 
[-2.9017]'° [-0.8463] [-2.7772]"' [-1.8616]' [-0.2257] [0.7459] 
(t-2; t+2) -0.39% -0.04% 0.35% -0.50% -0.20% 0.31% 0.05% 0.14% 0.09% 
(-7.7265)""' (-2.161)" P=0.03"' (-12.172)°' (-10.217)"" P=0.10' (4.4986)"" (4.1068)- p=0.79 
[-3.8025]"` [-0.5211] [3.7528]'° [-1.8484]' [0.0305] [1.1834] 
(t-1; 1+1) -0.61% -0.03% 0.57% -0.79% -0.17% 0.61% 0.08% 0.12% 0.09% 
(-18.868)"' (-3.716)""' P=0.01°' (-29.468)°" (-16.090)°' P=0.02" (10.413)°' (5.2516)° P=0.93 
[-4.8561]°' [-0.1238] [-4.7432]"" [-1.3040] [0.1804] [1.1359] 
0 -1.16% -0.03% 1.14% -1.60% -0.15% 1.45% 0.50% 0.11% -0.39% 
(-70.450)"' (-29.07)`" P=0.04- (-124.09)'"' (-21.54)"" P=0.09' (97.811)""' (-65.61)*- P=0.68 
[-5.8409]"" [-0.5246] [-6.0600]'"' [-1.9766]° [1.3340] [1.2966] 
* (**, ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. Paired t-tests are used to determine differences in means and assume unequal variances 
t-Statistics are in parentheses (... ) and rank statistics in square brackets [... j. 
Henceforth, the difference in abnormal returns between diversifying and focusing 
bank M&A shall be referred to as the `value effect' of product diversification. For the 
full sample, the magnitude of this effect is 1.14% and 0.57% over the 1- and 3-day event 
window, respectively (all significant at less than 5%). The effect is even larger for US 
bidders over the same observation periods (1.45% and 0.61%, significant at 1%). Criti- 
cally, however, no value effect of product diversification can be found when diversifying 
M&A are announced in European banking as none of the differences in abnormal re- 
turns between diversifying and focusing M&A are statistically significant. 
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Table 5-8 The Diversification Effect by Shareholder Protection Quality, CAR(, 
-Z; t+2) 
Five-day abnormal returns (market model) are presented for three portfolios depending on the quality of shareholder protection 
(La Porti et al., 1998). Shareholder protection applies to targets and is based on an index of anti-director rights (varying between 
0 and 6) multiplied by an index of the rule of law (varying between 0 and 10). Product-focusing mergers involve banks where the 
first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of their main product line are identical. Paired I-tests are used to determine differences 
in means and assume unequal variances 
Low Protection Medium Protection High Protection 
(0-20) (21-40) (41-60) 
Focus Divers. A(CAR) Focus Divers. A(CAR) Focus Divers. A(CAR) 
N 16 994 139 27 
Ave CAR 0.31% 0.13% -0.18% -0.24% -0.10% 0.14% -0.48% -0.08% 0.40%- 
t-Test p=0.81 - p=0.59 p=0.02 
26.51'^ 0.21 24.88'° -10.33"" -11.12"` -2.90'" 
Rank test 2.21° 0.48 -0.25 -0.32 -3.89'^ -0.73 
* (**, ***) denotes significance at the 10% (5%, 1%) level. 
While the absence of a positive value effect associated with product diversification 
in Europe is in line with H2b (investors are more sceptical about diversifying M&A tar- 
geted at low protection environments), this argument is examined in more detail. Table 
5-8 presents 5-day CAR by tercile portfolios of the quality of shareholder protection 
that is prevalent in the target country. Consistent with prior expectations, investors 
value financial diversification over product focus only in the top protection tercile (i. e. 
only in the top tercile is the difference in abnormal returns between diversifying and fo- 
cusing mergers significant at 5%). In lower protection environments, where investors 
are more likely to be expropriated, there is no value effect associated with product di- 
versification. 
5.4.3 Geographic Diversification and Investor Protection 
Table 5-9 reports abnormal returns to bidding banks for domestic and cross-border 
deals. Almost half of all sampled merger activity in Europe involves geographic diversi- 
fication. By contrast, there are no cross-border bids by US banks in the sample25 Whilst 
25 Some researchers have likened inter-state mergers in the US to cross-border M&A (see DeLong, 2001). 
In unreported tests, no differences in the market reaction to inter- and intra-state M&A in the US can be 
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the vast majority of cross-border mergers in Europe were aimed at other European in- 
stitutions and frequently involved banks in closely integrated economic regions (e. g. the 
Benelux countries, Scandinavia, Germany & Austria), nine of the deals were cross- 
border mergers targeted at US banks. 
Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) document for financial firms and Goergen and Renne- 
boog (2004) for non-financial firms that cross-border M&A generate value gains for acquiring 
firms in Europe. Alternatively, cross-border bank mergers do not offer the same potential 
for front- and back office rationalisations as domestic M&A where overlapping branch 
networks can be trimmed and administrative tasks streamlined in the aftermath of a deal 
(DeLong, 2001). Further, both the pervasive role of regulation (Kiymaz, 2004) and out- 
right protectionism by some European governments (Allen and Song, 2005; Campa and 
Hernando, 2004) may cause cross-border bank M&A to attract a negative market reac- 
tion. Thus, 
H3a: Cross-border bank mergers receive a negative market reaction. 
In contrast to H3a, Table 5-9 presents evidence of relatively positive market re- 
valuation effects following the announcement of cross-border bank M&A in Europe. 
Over the duration of the 1-, 3-, and 5-day event window, cross-border bids create share- 
holder value. More specifically, European cross-border deals attract a positive market 
revaluation of 0.55% on the announcement day (significant at 1% [t-test] and 5% [rank 
test]). The investor reaction to geographically focusing deals is less pronounced, but still 
a positive 0.21% (significant t-statistic, insignificant rank statistic). These findings are 
found. It is important to bear in mind, however, that there are legal, regulatory and cultural aspects associ- 
ated with M&A across country borders-most notably, changes in the investor protection environment 
applicable to the target-that do not apply to mergers within the US. 
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replicated for 3- and 5-day CAR, but not for any broader event window specifications. 6 
However, an important aspect about cross-border mergers is that they tend to be 
`cross-regime' mergers. Next to a transfer of legal ownership, cross-border mergers usu- 
ally also entail a transfer of the corporate governance regime that is relevant to the target 
when the bidder's accounting and general disclosure laws are adopted by the acquired 
firm in the post-merger period (Bris and Cabolis, 2004). One may, thus, expect the mar- 
ket reaction to cross-border M&A to be influenced by differences in the quality of in- 
vestor protection regimes between bidders and targets. Starks and Wei (2004) observe 
that bidders pay a lower control premium for acquisition targets domiciled in investor 
protection regimes that are less sophisticated than that of the bidder. Based on the idea 
that bidding shareholders have to be compensated for acquisitions in environments with 
less efficient internal and external control mechanisms, the following hypothesis is pro- 
posed: 
H3b: If acquisitions are made in the context of protection regimes which are 
less sophisticated than that of the bidding bank, bidders will realise 
higher announcement period returns. 
The argument that differences in investor protection laws between merging banks 
have market valuation effects in cross-border M&A is tested directly. Table 5-9 divides 
cross-border deals into two groups. The first group (n=11) contains acquisitions where 
the shareholder protection prevalent in the bidder's country is greater than that in the 
target country. The contrary is true for the control group (n=13), either because targets 
operate within a relatively more sophisticated regime or the transaction is not a 
26 In unreported tests, cross-border mergers within Europe (n=15) attract higher announcement returns 
than cross-border mergers between European and US banks (n=9). For 5-day CAR, mergers with US 
targets lead to bidder returns of -0.05% and bidders with targets in Europe to 0.28%. However, differ- 
ences in announcement returns between the two groups are not statistically significant. 
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`cross-regime' merger. To assess whether cross-border mergers lead to a change in the 
target's effective protection regime, bidders with cross-listings in different investor pro- 
tection environments are identified. If bidders have multiple listings, the highest protec- 
tion environment in which the acquirer's shares are traded is the effective level of pro- 
tection enjoyed by bidding bank shareholders. 7 
Table 5-9 shows that with the exception of 26-day CAR, abnormal returns associ- 
ated with AMA in lower protection environments (+) are consistently higher than in 
high protection environments (-). On the announcement date, cross-border bids tar- 
geted at banks operating in lower protection regimes realise abnormal returns of 1.34%, 
while cross-border bids where targets operate under a relatively more sophisticated pro- 
tection regime attract abnormal returns of -0.28%. The difference in announcement re- 
turns is statistically different (at the 5%-level) on the announcement day as well as for 
longer event window specifications. Consistent with H3b, this suggests that cross- 
border bank mergers create value only if deals are targeted at environments that offer 
less investor protection (i. e. `cross-regime' M&A with targets in less advanced protection 
systems). Accordingly, bidding bank shareholders are compensated for acquiring equity 
in an environment where the private benefits of control are higher than in their own 
environment. No such gains exist if bidders target a higher protection regime, as bidding 
bank shareholders will not demand compensation for a higher risk of expropriation if 
the transparency practices by targets are more advanced in this type of environment. 
27 For example, Germany's Deutsche Bank is listed on the NYSE and, thus, complies with US disclosure 
rules. If Deutsche acquires an institution in the US, this transaction is, strictly speaking, not `cross-regime'. 
Only direct listings and, in the US, Level II and Level III ADR issues which subject bidders to stricter 
SEC disclosure rules qualify as cross-listings (see Bris and Cabolis, 2004). 
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Table 5-10 Method of Payment and Announcement Returns 
The sample consists of 204 US and European bank acquirers between 1996 and 2004. All banks are publicly traded. Abnormal returns 
are calculated against Datastream bank sector indexes using market model regressions. Abnormal returns are averaged over each event 
window. Tests of statistical significance are based on standardised prediction errors, adjusted for increases in the daily return variance 
following merger announcements (Boehmer et al., 1991), and a non-parametric rank test (Corrado, 1989). Transactions that were 
completely paid for in cash arc classified as all-cash bids with the remaining deals (equity, mixed finance) classified as 'not all-cash'. 
Relative bid size is the deal value divided by the bidder's market capitalization at the end of the fiscal year prior to the merger 
announcement. Bid sizes above and below the sample mean are examined separately. 
(t-20; t+5) (t-10; t+1) (t-2; 02) (t-1; r+1) 0 
Panel A: European M&A 
Al . All European Deals 
all-cash (n=26) 0.06% 0.03"/aß 0.32%" 0.42%"""/t 1.33"/x^"/t 
not all-cash (n=27) -0.11% 0.02% -0.15%'°"' -0.22%""' -0.57% 
A(CAR)- 0.18% 0.00% 0.47% 0.64% 1.90%, 
A. 2 Rel. bid size>mean 
all-cash (n=6) 0.34% 0.18% 0.81%t 0.91% 2.32% 
not all-cash (n=21) -0.12% 0.05% -0.16% -0.22% -0.22% 
A(CAR)o. 0.46% 0.13% 0.97% 1.13% 2.54% 
A3 Rel. bid size<mean 
all-cash (n=20) -0.021/6 -0.02% 0.17% 0.27% 1.04% 
not all-cash (n=6) -0.09% -0.06% -0.12% -0.22% -1.79% 
A(CAR),. e 0.07% 0.04% 0.29W 0.49%** 2.83%** 
Panel B: US M&A 
B. 1 All US Deals 
all-cash (n=19) -0.15% -0.29%"" -0.27%"' -0.37% -0.19%_ 
not all-cash (n=132) -0.15%- -0.25% /t -0.49%-/t -0.75%'»/t - 
A(CAR)_ -0.01% -0.04% 0.21% 0.38%- 1.38%°' 
B. 2 Rel. bid size>mean 
all-cash (n=4) -0.01% -0.57% -0.09% 0.04"/6 0.70% 
not all-cash (n=57) -0.15%** -0.24%*** -0.46%'^/t -0.76%*"/t -1.70% 
A(CAR)_ 0.15% -0.34% 0.37% 0.80% 2.40% 
B. 3 Rel. bid size<mcan 
all-cash (n=15) -0.19% -0.21% -0.32% -0.48%** -0.43% 
not all-cash (n=75) -0.14%-4 -0.25%"'/t -0.50%^'/t -0.74% /t - 
A(CAR),.. -0.05% 0.04% 0.18% 0.26% 1.05%* 
(**, ***) denotes significance at the 101/6 (5%, 1%) level based on t-tests (assuming unequal variances) and tdenotes significance of at least 
5% according to a rank test. 
5.4.4 Takeover Finance and Investor Protection 
Table 5-10 presents evidence on how the mode of takeover finance (cash, equity, or a 
mixture of both) impacts upon merger announcement returns. As a percentage of total 
transactions, Europe has a substantially higher share of cash-financed takeovers (49%), 
compared with the US (19%). By the same token, the share of purely equity-financed 
deals is much smaller in Europe (34%) than in the US (68%). This is consistent with 
Rossi and Volpin (2004) who observe for a sample of cross-border mergers that there is 
a preference for all-cash bids in countries with less sophisticated rights for minority 
shareholders. Against the background of an increased risk of expropriation for minority 
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shareholders under a low protection regime, target shareholders are less likely to accept 
the bidder's equity as a transaction currency outside the US or the UK. The use of eq- 
uity as acquisition currency is believed to signal to investors that the bidder's equity is 
overvalued and the proposed transaction, hence, less desirable at the financial terms of- 
fered (Becher, 2000; Anderson et al., 2004). Thus, 
H4a: Cash-financed deals receive a more positive market reaction than other 
forms of takeover finance. 
H4b: Any value premium associated with cash over other forms of acquisition 
finance is larger in low protection regimes. 
The results in Table 5-10 show that abnormal returns associated with all-cash bids 
are positive and statistically significant in Europe (Panel A. 1) and negative and signifi- 
cant in the US (Panel B. 1). More fundamentally however, the results are broadly consis- 
tent with cash finance generating higher abnormal returns than non-cash finance in both 
Europe and the US (H4a). On t=0, the difference in mean abnormal returns associated 
with cash- and non-cash finance deals is 1.90% in Europe and 1.38% in the US (statisti- 
cally significant at the 7%- and 1%-level, respectively). While differences in the market 
reaction to all-cash and non-cash finance are not statistically significant over longer ex- 
amination periods, the positive value effect of cash finance tends to be more pro- 
nounced in Europe than in the US over most event windows (H4b). 
Next, it is examined whether investor preference for cash-finance varies with the 
value of the proposed bank merger. Relative bid size is the ratio of deal value to the 
market value of the bidder's equity in the fiscal year before the merger announcement. 
Even though abnormal returns are statistically indistinguishable from zero and based on 
very small sample sizes for most subsamples, the positive value effect of cash-finance is 
among the strongest when European acquirers undertake low relative value M&A 
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(Panel A. 3). Consequently, the value premium investors attach to cash finance appears 
to be more pronounced when European acquirers with high market valuations initiate 
M&A deals of low relative value. Moeller et al. (2004) proffer evidence that high-value 
bidding firms realise lower announcement returns than firms with lower market valua- 
tions and suggest that investors view the management of high valuation firms-because 
they are less likely to be subjected to a hostile takeover bid-as more entrenched. 
5.5 Regression Analysis: 
Bank Merger Returns and Investor Protection 
Cross-sectional regression analysis is used in this section to examine further the impact 
of the target's investor protection regime on the market reaction to bank merger an- 
nouncements. In the preceding sections, univariate tests have demonstrated that bank 
bids targeted at low protection economies (Europe) elicit a more positive market re- 
valuation than bank M&A aimed at high protection environments (the US). Also, a 
positive market revaluation associated with product diversification in the US and with 
cash-finance in Europe was found. The explanation put forward for these findings-a 
negative impact of target protection laws on bidder returns-is further strengthened by 
the regression results in this section. Further, the effects of various acquirer and deal 
characteristics on bidder abnormal returns are analysed. The model specification is as 
follows: 
C4R(r-2; 
1+2) ,: a+ 
ß1 Investor Protection + ß2 TargetEPS+/ß3 ProductFocus 
+ß4 Rel. ROE+ß5 CashDummy+ß6 DealValue+g Crossborder (5.5) 
+ß8 Nonlnt. Inc. +/39 Acq. TotalCost+ßßlo Acq. ROE+e 
The dependent variable is the estimated 5-day cumulative abnormal performance 
of acquiring banks around the announcement date of a merger. As indicated above, the 
level of investor protection that applies to targets is proxied by two indexes taken from 
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La Porta et al. (1998). An index of anti-director rights that captures the various rights 
that shareholders possess against management and a second index that measures the 
quality of national accounting standards. The control variables in (5.5) are from World- 
scope and include pre-merger earnings per share (EPS) of the target and relative ROE 
which is the ROE of the target divided by the ROE of the acquirer (all in t-1). Other 
variables are deal value (measured as the logarithm of the dollar value of the M&A 
transaction), a cross-border dummy (takes the value of 1 for acquisitions where target 
and acquirers are located in different countries and 0 otherwise), and product diversifi- 
cation (measured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the first two digits of 
the four-digit SIC code of the companies in a merger are identical and 0 otherwise). The 
cash-only dummy is 1 if a merger is financed by 100% cash rather than by a mix of cash 
and equity (in which case the variable is 0). Total cost is expressed on a per-employee 
basis and non-interest income is measured as the share of non-interest income to the 
total of non-interest and interest income (both in t-1). The latter ratio indicates the sig- 
nificance of fee-generating activities versus more traditional loan activities for a bank.. 
Table 5-11 presents different specifications of the regression model. In Column 1, 
investor protection measures are excluded and the coefficients on various control vari- 
ables are estimated instead. The results show that bids made by profitable banks (i. e. 
with a high return on equity) and takeovers targeted at relatively more profitable banks 
(as reflected by a high relative ROE) are associated with higher announcement returns. 
Further, consistent with the findings of the univariate analyses, there is a positive and 
significant association between abnormal returns and cross-border acquisitions, on the 
one hand, and all-cash bids, on the other. 
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Table 5-11 Regressions: Abnormal Returns and Investor Protection 
The table reports least squares regressions of the effect of investor protection and control variables on bidders' 5-day 
cumulative abnormal returns in percentage points. The sample consists of 204 commercial banks in the US and Europe 
(EU-15 plus Switzerland) that announced majority acquisitions in the period 1996 - 2004. Abnormal returns are calcu- 
lated against national Datastream bank sector indexes and averaged over (t-2; 1+2) days surrounding the announcement 
date. The 5-day CAR are regressed against investor protection proxies in the target country and a vector of controlling 
variables. Shareholder protection is an index of anti-director rights multiplied by an index if the quality of law enforce- 
ment (both from La Porta et al., 1998) and accounting standards capture the quality of local disclosure practices of 
accounting information (also from La Porta et al., 1998). The control variables arc from the V6orldscope database. They 
include earnings per share of the target (EPS), return on equity (ROE); relative ROE is the ROE of the target divided 
by the ROE of the acquirer (all in t-I). Deal values are the logarithm of the dollar value of the M&A transaction; cross- 
border is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions where target and acquirers are located in different 
countries; product focus is measured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the first two digits of the four-digit 
SIC code of the companies in a merger are identical and 0 otherwise. The cash-only dummy is I if a transaction is 
100% cash-financed and 0 otherwise. Total costs are expressed on a per-employee basis and non-interest income is 
measured as the share of non-interest income to the total of non-interest and interest income (in 1-ll. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Shareholder Protection 
-0.168*** -0.202*** 
(0.057) (0.071) 
Accounting Standards 
-0.025** -0.031** 
(0.011) (0.015) 
Target EPS. 1 -0.104* -0.033** -0.160** -0.027* -0.087 
(0.06) (0.016) (0.066) (0.016) (0.064) 
Product Focus 
-0.189 -0.328* -0.268 -0.394** -0.436 
(0.263) (0.192) (0.314) (0.195) (0.32) 
Rel. ROE 0.911*** 0.733** 0.783** 
(0.309) (0.361) (0.37) 
Cash-only dummy 0.603** 0.468 0.773*** 
(0.263) (0.307) (0.279) 
Deal value -0.039 0.043 
(0.078) (0.088) 
Cross-border dummy 0.706** 1206*** 
(0.345) (0.451) 
Non-interest income 'i -0.12e-7* -0.3e-7*** -0.1c-7 
(0.07e-7) (0.1e-7) (0.1e-7) 
Acquirer total cost i. t 0.158 -0.035 
(0.256) (0.253) 
Acquirer ROEra 5.819*** 
(1.911) 
Constant 
-1.595** 0.748** 0.141 1.830** 1.816 
(0.657) (0.298) (0.782) (0.79) (1.479) 
Observations 192 194 187 194 192 
R-squared 19.70 7.00 24.60 5.40 15.80 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-robust and reported in parentheses. 
' Significant at 10%; " significant at 5%; `"' significant at 1% 
The results in Column 2 of Table 5-11 present evidence that shareholder protec- 
tion has a negative and statistically significant impact (at less than 1%) on bidder returns 
during the announcement period. Consequently, the better shareholders are protected 
from expropriation by managers, the lower the abnormal returns associated with bank 
M&A. One would, therefore, expect abnormal returns to be lower where targets operate 
under a high investor protection regime (such as the US) compared with countries 
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where higher information asymmetry and agency costs lead to a less competitive market 
for corporate control (many European economies). In the latter, bidders will find it eas- 
ier to extract economic gains from their targets. Further, the results in Column 2 indi- 
cate a negative association between bidder returns and the product focus of the pro- 
posed transaction as well as between bidder returns and target earnings per share (sig- 
nificant at the 5% level). The former result confirms market confidence in diversifying 
bank mergers as demonstrated by the univariate tests, while the latter result suggests that 
underperforming targets offer opportunities for bidders to create value. 
Next, the second index of investor protection is used as a robustness test. Share- 
holder protection as a proxy for the level of investor protection in Columns 4 and 5 of 
Table 5-11 is replaced with an index of the quality of accounting standards applying to 
target banks. The results are in line with the findings above. Lower levels of target pro- 
tection are associated with higher bidder returns. Again, product diversification is asso- 
ciated with higher returns in Column 4, but the coefficient loses its significance in Col- 
umn 5 when further control variables are added. The results of this regression confirm 
that, next to investor protection, relatively more profitable targets and all-cash bids 
translate into higher market expectations at the time of the bank merger announcement. 
Interestingly, the value of the announced deals has no effect on abnormal returns for 
any of the specifications. While deal size is somewhat a proxy for the degree of market 
power which newly-formed institutions are likely to enjoy, the sampled banks do not 
seem to benefit from this, possibly because the sampling criterion of deals no smaller 
than $100 million has led to a sample of large and very large institutions where the 
scope for significant economies of scale may be limited. 
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5.5.1 Robustness 
It is conceivable that the main result-a negative impact of investor protection laws on 
abnormal bidder returns-is in fact driven by the negative impact of non-cash finance 
(which is more prevalent under high protection regimes) on abnormal returns. Thus, the 
sensitivity of the coefficient on shareholder protection for cash versus non-cash finance 
is examined. Regressions in Columns 2-5 in Table 5-11 are re-estimated for subsamples 
of cash and non-cash deals. The results are broadly similar; most importantly, the statis- 
tical significance of the investor protection variable remains at or below 5% for all 
specifications. Also, the multivariate analysis was performed using different event win- 
dow lengths (3-day, 11-day CAR). The main results do not change; the conclusions are, 
thus, not contingent on the use of a particular event window specification. 
Next, all bank acquisitions valued at more than $1 billion are classified as 
mega-mergers and the resulting mean abnormal returns compared with those of the rest 
of the sample. There are no differences in CAR between different deal values. This runs 
contrary to the view that mega-mergers-because they create banks that are `too-big-to- 
fail' (TBTF) and, thus, entrench management and encourage post-merger risk taking- 
should lower the expected gains from M&A. The lack of an observable impact of mega- 
mergers on announcement returns can be interpreted as either suggesting that mergers 
valued at $1 billion are not large enough to cause TBTF concerns or that some bidders 
may have already crossed the critical asset threshold for TBTF considerations to be- 
come effective before the focal acquisition. 
Due to the dominance of US transactions in the sample, it is important to verify 
that the negative relationship between both target protection measures and bidder ab- 
normal returns, as identified for the entire sample in Section 5.3.2, also exists in a non- 
US context. Bidder performance of European deals is ranked by return quintiles and 
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shareholder protection for targets in the lowest quintile is found to be significantly 
higher (at 1%) than in the highest return portfolio. 
Serial acquisitions form a sizable share of M&A activities in the banking industry. 
For transactions that are part of a merger program, the bidder's market valuation may 
partly reflect investor anticipation of future bidding activity before any announcements 
are made. This anticipation effect may potentially depress the announcement returns 
that serial acquirers earn vis-a-vis first-time bidders (see Song and Walkling, 2006). To 
account for this, a binary variable (zero for first bids and one for second or higher order 
bids) is added to the multivariate regressions. The merger program dummy does not 
enter the regressions at customary significance levels indicating the absence of anticipa- 
tion effects on bank merger announcement returns. 
While the multivariate regressions demonstrate that shareholder protection and 
accounting quality have comparable effects in the market for corporate control, the in- 
dices still measure somewhat different institutional characteristics. Section 5.3.2 identi- 
fies deals-mostly targeted at civil law-based countries like Switzerland and Germany 
that combine strong accounting regulations with a relatively weak form of investor pro- 
tection-where the two measures point to different conclusions. It is, thus, opportune 
to examine whether the market reaction to M&A differs in cases where the two meas- 
ures do not reach a conclusive assessment of the level of investor protection that is 
prevalent in the target country. A series of interaction terms between a binary variable 
that takes the value 1 if there is a discrepancy between the two measures and target eps, 
deal value, and acquirer cost is created. None of the interaction terms enter the regres- 
sions at customary significance levels. Consequently, there is no evidence of a modified 
investor reaction to bank merger announcements targeted at countries where the level 
of investor protection is relatively ambiguous. 
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The analyses performed in this chapter indicate that the level of investor protection en- 
joyed by shareholders in the target country partly determines market expectations about 
merger-related performance gains at the time of large bank merger announcements. The 
results suggest that the positive bidder returns in European economies reflect an opti- 
mistic market assessment of the acquirer's ability to extract economic gains from targets 
in a low investor protection environment. By contrast, high investor protection re- 
gimes-characterised by market-based governance, a less pronounced manager- 
shareholder conflict and a much more competitive market for corporate control-make 
it more difficult for bidders to realise gains following an acquisition. 
Two main implications arise from these findings. First, the positive value effects 
of European bank merger announcements are at odds with some regulatory practices in 
the EU which prevent the consolidation of national banking sectors. 28 The positive 
market reaction to European cross-border mergers, in particular, shows that there are 
gains to be reaped from the consolidation of banking assets. However, partly as a result 
of an openly hostile environment to cross-border bank M&A in many European coun- 
tries, few banks have established retail networks across the EU. This is an important 
issue because it is widely believed consumers would benefit from the creation of a pan- 
European clearing and settlement system through substantially reduced fees for cross- 
border transactions. 
Second, the negative market assessment of bank merger activity targeted at high 
investor protection economies (such as the US & UK) raises questions about the effi- 
28 For example, German law bars mergers between private sector and public sector banks and complex 
voting rights in Italy prevent the demutualisation and consolidation of the sizable mutual sector (branche 
populari). 
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ciency of internal governance mechanisms. If bank mergers, on average, are to the det- 
riment of shareholders, why are shareholders unable to prevent them? Chapter 7 of this 
thesis seeks to examine explanations for this paradox by concentrating on bank-specific 
forms of investor protection rather than on regulatory regimes at country-level. So far, 
research on the governance of banking firms and its value implications for M&A activi- 
ties has only been able to identify executive compensation as a facilitator of value creat- 
ing bank mergers (see Cornett et al., 2003; Hagendorff et al., 2007b), leaving the role of 
other important governance mechanisms, such as ownership structure and board com- 
position, largely unexplored. 
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Acquiring Bank Performance in Europe and 
the US: Do Cost Reductions and Revenue 
Enhancements Materialise? 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has found different market reactions to bank M&A in Europe and 
the US. It remains to be seen whether differences in expectations of merger outcomes at 
the time of the acquisition announcement will actually translate into differences in the 
long-term post-merger performance between banks in Europe and the US. The purpose 
of this chapter is to analyse and contrast the performance implications of bank M&A in 
Europe and the US as they materialise over a time period of up to five years after a deal. 
This chapter analyses the performance of a sample of US and European bank 
mergers while also attempting to make inferences about the motives behind M&A in 
either geographic region. Bidding banks' financial statements are analysed for post- 
merger strategies consistent with two of the most frequently-cited reasons behind M&A: 
the ability to cut costs (e. g. by economising on labour costs or branch networks) and the 
ability to increase revenue (e. g. by selling different types of financial products or by in- 
creasing lending). Overall, the performance effects of bank M&A are studied at three 
levels. 
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(i) The overall performance implications of different types of deals (e. g. European 
versus US, cross-border versus domestic M&A), 
(ü) the underlying drivers of performance changes (i. e. cost rationalisations versus 
revenue enhancements), and 
(iii) the time scale over which performance changes materialise. 
Overall, the results point to European credit institutions realising profitability 
gains that are particularly pronounced for product diversifying and cross-border mergers. 
Also, there is some evidence consistent with European banks pursuing a cost-cutting 
strategy during the three years following a merger. Specifically, banks in Europe manage 
to reduce non-interest expenses and, to some extent, retreat from lending activities in 
the post-merger period. US banks, by contrast, manage to increase their on- and off- 
balance sheet activities, thus, pointing towards revenue-enhancement as a motivation 
behind M&A. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, the findings of the 
extant literature that gauges the post-merger performance of banks are discussed and 
specific hypotheses developed. The sample and research strategy are introduced in a 
separate section, before the findings of univariate tests are discussed. This is followed by 
multivariate tests which analyse the drivers of M&A performance in different post- 
merger years. The final section concludes. 
6.2 Bank Merger Performance in Europe and the US 
Table 6-1 provides an overview of previous studies that examine the operating perform- 
ance following bank M&A in the US and Europe over the last two decades. While the 
studies listed use various metrics, they tend to employ either profitability or cash-flow 
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based data. 29 The results of much of the empirical research on the financial performance 
of bank M&A are highly sceptical about any performance gains following bank mergers. 
There is no systematic evidence of merger-related profitability improvements as meas- 
ured by ROA (Zollo and Singh, 2004; Houston et al., 2001; Ramaswamy, 1997; DeLong, 
2003b), ROE (Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004; Akhavein et al., 1997) or operating income 
profitability (Lindner and Crane, 1993). On the other hand, both declines in operating 
performance following bank mergers (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1999; Knapp et al., 2005) as 
well as performance gains (Houston et al., 2001; Cornett et al., 2006; Cornett and Te- 
hranian, 1992; Knapp et al., 2006) are only rarely reported. Thus, a frequent conclusion 
drawn from the literature is that bank mergers are, at best, performance neutral (Lindner 
and Crane, 1993; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1999; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007). 
Only four studies listed in Table 6-1 analyse the performance effects of bank 
M&A in an European context (Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004; Vander Vennet, 1996; 
Campa and Hernando, 2006; Focarelli et al., 2002). While two of these studies docu- 
ment profitability gains for merged banks (Vander Vennet, 1996; Campa and Hernando, 
2006), Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) cannot find any merger-related improvements in op- 
erating performance for a sample of European credit institutions. Further, the literature 
falls short of making any direct comparisons between the performance implications of 
bank M&A in Europe and the US. 
There are two general issues concerning the studies presented in Table 6-1. 
(1) The myriad of financial indicators employed makes it difficult to reach general 
conclusions about the post-acquisition performance effects of bank mergers. 
29 Healy et al (1992) argue that only cash-flow performance measures control for merger finance (i. e. debt 
or equity), while Ramaswamy (1997) and Knapp et al. (2005) point to profitability metrics (e. g. ROA, 
ROE) having greater relevance of to market investors. 
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The use of various performance measures is even more concerning, given that, 
in some cases, findings vary with different performance indicators. Cornett and 
Tehranian (1992), for example, find evidence of increases in post-merger cash 
flows, but are unable to find improvements in profitability over the same time 
period. Similarly, Srinivasan and Wall (1992) observe that non-interest expenses 
decreased relative to an industry-wide control group, however, the authors can- 
not detect any operating efficiency gains. 
(2) Performance data (which tend to be presented on an adjusted basis to distin- 
guish between industry-wide and merger-specific effects on bank performance) 
are compared to different control groups. Data are either compared to historic 
performance (Altunbas and Ibanez, 2004; Houston et al., 2001), to average in- 
dustry performance (Lindner and Crane, 1993; Zollo and Singh, 2004; DeLong 
and DeYoung, 2007), or to a portfolio of individually-matched banking firms 
(Knapp et al., 2006). Clearly, the choice of benchmark will affect any conclu- 
sions drawn of merger-induced performance changes. For example, when con- 
trolling for mean reversion, Knapp et al. (2006) find strong performance gains 
in most of the five years following M&A, but not if performance changes are 
reported vis-ä-vis a general industry benchmark. 
Another strand of the post-merger performance literature that is related to the 
studies listed in Table 6-1 measures changes in efficiency instead of changes in account- 
ing performance. These studies examine efficiency as the difference between optimal 
and observed values in outputs, inputs or input-output combinations. Studies of merger- 
induced changes in output efficiency measure so-called X-efficiency, while studies of 
input efficiency are often referred to as measuring economic efficiency (for an overview, 
see Berger and Humphrey, 1997). The results of efficiency studies are broadly consistent 
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with those of the accounting studies presented in Table 6-1. Thus, Berger and Hum- 
phrey (1992) find no significant gains in X-efficiency for a sample of large US bank 
mergers between 1981 and 1989. Altunbas et al. (1997) examine the cost implications of 
a hypothetical sample of cross-border mergers between large European banks. Based on 
simulations of cost functions for more than 7,000 combinations of banks, the authors 
caution that cost inefficiencies following European cross-border M&A are more likely 
than post-merger increases in cost efficiency. Similarly, DeYoung (1997) employs cost 
frontier methodology to estimate the post-merger X-efficiency effects of a sample of 
300 US bank mergers in the late 1980s and finds no statistically significant efficiency 
gains after bank mergers. Peristiani (1997), using a translog cost function, documents a 
1.40% decline in X-efficiencies for US bank mergers between two and four years after a 
merger. 
The next section presents expectations about bank merger outcomes in Europe 
and the US in the form of testable hypotheses. 
120 
c 
w 
w 
Ö` 
au 
is 
0 Ls` 
v 
Ä 
u 
'' 
JO 
o 
ý+ 
°Ö 
a tý G 
7 
wu 
ý 93 
2 u "S 
EL 
5 
p 
o, 
z 
^ M ii ý ä 5 E V 0 E 5 ý w 
öC 
V 
Lea . 
E" 
3eo;, 
a; u 
Y, 
v ý°" 
üö 
cAu u 
5 ý. S"a yo E c E> 
a 
CC1 W .y w 
.ý OgyL 'ö 
2 py 
G 
ö 
5 
" 
u 
°p r U q F C 
w 
;ý7 
Öä V vC c "4 
Öv 
p 2 e }; b "p 
ö pS s 0 ö 
 
'ö 
a 
.y 
FA ü 
Uä °g 
~ u 0 C 
y.. 0p 
0g 
CV ü 
u 
u 
r- 
ýÖ 
C 
0 
, Lä 
Ov 
C 
g 
i 
w 
Gu 
*5 
21 
'S 
5 Eu G 
° 
ü 
aý 
4 
E Ow ü 
° 
p V 
= 
. OA 
°r 7c 0 ý 
°- 
ýv 
° ö0 
'9 
A 8 
g 
o 
° aOG 
° y C 
u 5 
d v 
4ý 
du 
FFSrr u e 
o° Zö a° 08 
°' eoý FL . 5'u o Z Oäbv 
v: ý 
: uN 
ä oc 2r aä x 
CSü iw 
, , 
>S 
WS M vi N M M N 
W Q, " O 
ööä 
w5 0 71 v"k t 
ýs, ý, 
.ý ü c 
ý+ u 
7 
7 ý y 
7 
q ý } 
E 
+ 
äW N 
^0 H 
I 
L oo O 
N 
rGr - 
CI 
.aDý 
ü 
r y" S ä 6d "$ 7 
wg 
u , l ° ý V 
ý 
a 
° 
E tx t 
OV 
w E Ou 
Wý 
« p Q 
a Cý 
ýp 
CJ 
ý 
C 
, 
Lý' w > Mä vi 
v. Ä ý E O O 
a 
a x 
.2 le % 04 ä zu zD a 
Oöä 
v ý* 
ß, wu 
r ö . `) r') Z: ) A A A . ') O f r, o 
'O 
{ 
(7 
' 
.90v 
ö 
M 
cam, 
ac u 
Co 
O 
Co w 00 
ä 05 
p 
G. 
am am 
pp > 'C I 1 I I I I I 
c . 
1 
c . 
ö"r H. 
000 
05 
00 ono 0000 
01 
CO Oro 
a. ýn 
vp 
A3S 
i^ 
ES G; 
C 
O Cwu 
° 
-a E 
m 
p 
CT 
cl 
iz 
u 
0, r0C 
ný 
u iý 
v 
q 
v ü 
V 
fz, -J 
v 
C F ý+ 
>' 
ý. 
Ü 
'Di a0C 0 L y ii >. 
C w 
.Z I 
Iý 5 
W4 
0 e '0 
wý 
üx 
Äq ý 
ö 
ýC 
vý 
aý 
v 
UU 
0 
All 
ÄN 
u «3 Hä 
0 x 
d 
w u"v0 S 
> 
o 
0 
E pv om" E GE S 
E 
'Sw Gý°m 
v ä ý° 
W , 0" 0 ' 
°° ö c 
$ °a rý 
.S 
EE 
o p aý. .S p4 
" v y°.. 
ý 
vu 
y 
" .S 
ä 
S 
0 
g yeo 
v vw 
° Gö 
g 
Ea ,n 
a E v 
E- 
a 
0M c 9i 
` 
r 
E> ý E 
r IL .o 
fl ö 
oa 
c, 11 2A' ; nýn ä -9 c 
X 
. 
ýuý E . dS 
id -V E 
öM0 EE 
0 ý6 2 w u c'ä .S 
ä '^ .Sva > _" .Saä E 
-.. 4 vcy 
c ° ° ° 
ö G 
'ý 
wem" 
°o 
°W ° 
ce > 
E$ v 
ü 
. -. 'C 
> 
ZvuO 
p 
, 
7. w Zw 
E 
yr ä0 L° P+ ý. r, P:. 
ý 'C c ý.. u. 
äc 
WHR . °J. 
' 
If) In Ln In 
r 
N N 
, 
C 
t, 
r 
t 
>>,, " v-i 
8 G" 
O L ýy 
r, 7. ,y 6 S 
ti ~ 
fqi rCi 
Q 
V 
ýl 
y 
y 
V i 
3 v 3 
w YG 
w 
n O n' ' z ' ý w 0 a' 0 
L 
Ln 
ö 
N 
oNp 
N co I N 
P 
C p Cniý C' 
Np 
Gý 
cl 
O+ G1 
N N 
P_ CT 
N 
I 
O 
N 
I 
Oý Oý 
I 
o 
I I 
c 
I 
o 
I 
n r n 
o o c' cl oo a 
o cl o o o o 
fj y 
p 
ü 
O 
A 
v 
ö 
v 
"ý 
8888 
+ 
g 
y OJ v 
L7 
r'' L 
ÄÜ0 
"m 
Vu E2 
CW 
D. 0 
20C 
G 
eAa 
ÖM0 
5+ 
9j0 
o 
G 
0 '^ O 
vrýE voý pO 
M 41 
. w. 
y/ý 
GGG 
WM 
Ew 
ü 
,öo 
II ö 
Ö 
.5 
Eä .0 
IL «G 
511 ý+ 
vp GC C+ý 
Luqu 
Chapter 6: Acquiring Bank Performance 
6.3 Related Literature and Hypotheses Development 
6.3.1 Performance Changes Following Bank Mergers 
The literature surveyed in Table 6-1 includes studies that analyse the performance impli- 
cations of bank M&A in both a US and a European market context. Collectively, the 
European evidence on merger-induced performance gains appears to be more optimis- 
tic than US-based studies. Vander Vennet (1996), Focarelli et al. (2002), and Campa and 
Hernando (2006) report improvements in corporate performance. Most US studies, by 
contrast, find that M&A has either no effect or a negative effect on post-merger profit- 
ability. While no direct comparison between the financial performance implications of 
bank M&A in Europe and the US can be found in the extant literature, the main hy- 
pothesis put forward in this chapter is that European deals outperform deals in the US. 
The hypothesis that banks in Europe outperform their US competitors after 
M&A is based on two observations. 
(1) European banks are more experienced in completing large and operationally 
complex deals owing to the existence of a more liberal regulatory environment 
for a longer period (Vander Vennet, 1996; Goddard et al., 2007). In large parts 
of Europe, the established practice of universal banking means that consolida- 
tion between different types of banks (e. g. investment and retail banks) as well 
as between banks and non-bank financial firms (e. g. insurers) have been a reality 
for many years. In the US, by contrast, integrated financial services firms have 
only been permitted following the passing of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 
1999 (see Section 4.4). It may well be that European banks benefit from learn- 
ing effects. For example, Delong and DeYoung (2007) demonstrate the effects 
of `learning-by-observing' on merger performance in the US banking industry. 
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The authors proffer evidence consistent with spillover effects from completed 
bank mergers improving the long-run performance of combined banks. Specifi- 
cally, the financial performance of deals improves if a substantial number of 
similar mergers have been completed in the preceding three years. Similarly, 
Zollo and Singh (2004) show that merger performance is partly determined by 
learning processes inside the bidding bank. European acquirers that actively in- 
crease their capability to learn from past M&A (e. g. through due diligence 
checklists and integration manuals) generate stronger post-merger performance. 
(2) European deals may be expected to fare better than US merger activity owing to 
efficiency differences between banks in both geographic regions. Bos and Ko- 
lari (2005) show, in a comparison between large3° European and US banking 
firms from 1995 to 1999, that European institutions exhibit lower cost effi- 
ciency and profit efficiency levels than their US competitors. While there is no 
clear evidence that these differences are due to non-listed (i. e. public, coopera- 
tive and mutual) banks in Europe being less efficient (Altunbas et al., 2001), 
there is some evidence that suggests that the presence of public banks decreases 
competition (Barth et al., 2004). In any case, banks in Europe have a higher po- 
tential to reap performance gains in the post-merger period compared with US 
banking firms which already operate at relatively high efficiency levels (Focarelli 
et al., 2002). 
30 Assets valued at more than 1 billion in constant 1995 US$. 
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The arguments above can be summarised in the following hypothesis. 
Hl: European bidders will, on average, generate higher financial performance gains 
in the years following M&A than US-chartered bidders. 
Geographic Diversification. While economic theory predicts that multinational banks 
hold advantages in factor, product and capital markets (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001), 
cross-border deals a priori offer less scope for cost savings than domestically-oriented 
merger activity (Amihud et al., 2002). However, recent advances in IT and telecommu- 
nications technology (Berger and DeYoung, 2001) as well as various policy initiatives at 
EU-level designed to stimulate cross-border bank mergers (see CEPR, 2005) may well 
have reduced the inefficiencies associated with managing banking assets across borders. 
In Europe, Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) find that cross-border bank mergers generate 
higher performance improvements than domestic M&A. Similarly, Vander Ven- 
net (1996) finds post-merger performance improvements following cross-border M&A 
in Europe. One further attraction of cross-border M&A is that it could give acquirers 
access to favourable regulatory regimes. This may be particularly beneficial to banks 
domiciled in European countries with rigid labour laws (e. g., Germany and Italy) which 
may gain access to more lightly regulated environments such as the US and the UK 
(Focarelli et al., 2002). Since the sample does not contain any cross-border deals initiated 
by US banks, the following hypothesis is made with respect to European cross-border 
deals. 
H2: European cross-border deals outperform domestically-oriented mergers. 
Activity Diverrication. Cornett et al. (2006), Ramaswamy (1997), and Amihud and 
Lev (1981) find that performance improvements following product diversifying A1&A 
are lower than those of activity focusing deals. When there is limited overlap between 
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the activities that both merging parties engage in, merger-related cost savings are mark- 
edly lower (Hughes et al., 2003) and the costs of integration disproportionately high 
(Berger and Mester, 1997). However, recent empirical work is challenging the view that 
diversification inevitably has detrimental performance effects (Campa and Kedia, 2002). 
Vander Vennet (1996) finds that financial conglomerate mergers in Europe display 
higher profit efficiency in the post-merger period than activity focussing mergers. For 
the US, Klein and Saidenberg (2005) argue that diversified BHCs are able to engage in 
more lending and pay lower capital charges as a result of internal capital market advan- 
tages. More specifically, diversified banking firms may deploy resources to subsidiaries 
with capital requirements or access to attractive lending opportunities based on informa- 
tion flows unavailable to external market participants (see Williamson, 1975, pg. 155- 
75 ). Thus, 
H3: Activity diversifying mergers, on average, outperform activity focusing mergers. 
63.2 Cost Synergies v Revenue Enhancements 
While the rationale behind bank mergers varies for individual deals, motivations include 
raising market power (Berger et al., 1998; Bikker and Haaf, 2002), an optimal response 
to industry deregulation or technological progress (Group of Ten, 2001), executive hu- 
bris (Anderson et al., 2004; Hughes et al., 2003), or averting bank failure (Heffernan, 
2005), the reason most frequently-cited by managers is to cut costs and to increase reve- 
nues in the post-merger period (Amel et al., 2004; Berger et al., 1999). Cost cutting will 
be targeted at interest and non-interest expenses and revenue enhancements tend to in- 
volve an expansion in lending as well as in off-balance sheet activities. Cornett et al. 
(2006) show that both revenue enhancement and cost reduction strategies improve 
banks' post-merger performance in the US. Although it is difficult to pinpoint either 
cost or revenue efficiencies as the dominant motivation behind individual bank mergers, 
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previous research findings make it possible to form general expectations about the im- 
portance of cost-oriented and revenue-oriented acquisition strategies in Europe and the 
Us. 
For the US market, it seems that while cost savings are a very important motiva- 
tion behind bank consolidation, viable cost efficiencies resulting from M&A often turn 
out to be illusory. Houston et al. (2001) examine managements' a priori estimates of 
merger-related gains for a sample of US bank and find that cost savings are the primary 
source of projected gains. Market investors also deem cost savings a reliable source of 
performance gains, since the authors find that anticipated cost savings explain a larger 
share of the market reaction to M&A than anticipated revenue enhancements. However, 
in an analysis of nine case studies of large US bank mergers, Rhoades (1998) finds that 
cost efficiencies are realised in only four cases. Large reductions in non-interest cost 
were only achieved in the case of substantial branch overlap and mergers of equals. 
Similarly, Ramaswamy (1997) presents evidence that cost efficiencies only improve if 
merging banks follow similar strategies before a merger-as reflected in similar resource 
allocation patterns on banks' balance sheets. Using an analysis of profit efficiency for 
large US bank mergers in the 1980s, Akhavein et al. (1997) find that post-merger per- 
formance improvements are not linked to increases in cost efficiency, but to enhance- 
ments in revenue. Similarly, Cornett et al. (2006) observe a sharp increase in off-balance 
sheet activities, mainly due to an increase in derivatives underwriting. Akhavein et al. 
(1997) and Klein and Saidenberg (2005) find that M&A in the US are followed by sharp 
increases in lending activities as larger and more diversified BHCs hold advantages over 
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geographically-focused institutions in the form of, inter alia, lower regulatory capital 
charges and improved geographic risk diversification. " 
While there are no systematic comparisons of revenue versus cost efficiencies in a 
European market context, some observations can be drawn from European banking 
studies. First, credit institutions in Europe tend to realise cost efficiencies following 
M&A. Consistent with this, Campa and Hernando (2006) and Vander Vennet (1996) 
show that the profitability gains of European bank M&A activities are driven by cost 
efficiency gains. This is further underpinned by studies that show relatively low levels of 
cost efficiency in Europe (Bos and Kolari, 2005), and, hence, more potential to increase 
efficiency in the post-merger period. Second, as regards revenue enhancements follow- 
ing bank mergers in Europe, only Altunbas and Ibanez (2004) examine the effects of 
M&A on off-balance sheet activities, but cannot find any increases. 
Whilst this chapter does not analyse data on the motivation behind individual 
transactions (see for example Houston et al., 2001, who collect this information from 
the press coverage of M&A deals), inferences about ex-ante motivations behind M&A 
are made using ex post merger results. Consequently, it is argued that differences in aver- 
age post-merger performance between banks in the US and Europe, reflect different 
pre-merger motivations behind M&A deals. In this context, the results of previous re- 
search on the motivation behind M&A in Europe and the US (in particular on efficiency 
differences between US and European credit institutions) lead to the following expecta- 
tion regarding the motivation behind M&A. Banks in Europe are more likely to seek 
efficiency improvements from M&A. US banks, on the other hand, are more likely to 
31 Increases in lending may also lead to performance losses should there be a loosening of lending stan- 
dards and a deterioration in credit quality. Pilloff (1996) and Knapp et al. (2005) report increases in loan 
loss provisions in the years following M&A. The authors find loan losses are the most important source 
of weak post-merger performance for US banks. 
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engage in revenue-enhancing strategies that let them benefit from regulatory changes 
during the nineties, and in particular from the opening up of cross-industry consolida- 
tion following the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. This may summarised in the final hypothe- 
sis. 
H4: Following bank M&-A, US banks increase revenue and European banks realise 
cost efficiencies. 
6.4 Data & Research Design 
6.4.1 Sample Composition 
This chapter examines the long-term performance effects of bank mergers on acquiring 
banks in Europe and the US. The sample of bank acquisitions was obtained from 
Thomson Financial following the data collection and filtering procedure outlined in Sec- 
tion 3.3 (pg. 47). Additionally, three data restrictions were made in this chapter. 
(1) Acquiring banks have complete accounting data available on the Worldscope and 
Bankscope databases for the fiscal years -1 and +3 surrounding the completion 
year of a merger. 32 
(2) Accounting data are in local GAAP only. Two European banks for which data 
are only available in International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are omit- 
ted from the sample to avoid confounding effects when credit institutions that 
have previously reported according to local GAAP start to report according to 
IFRS after 2004. 
32 For two cases, where the fiscal year-end is before 31 December and after the merger completion date 
supplied by Thomson Financial, the following fiscal year is employed as year 0. 
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Table 6-2 Number of Bank Acquisitions by Country and Year 
M&A by Geographic Origin of the Acquiring Bank 
Acquirer Frequency % of Sample 
country 
Number of M&A by Merger Completion Years 
Year Frequency % of Sample 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United 
Kingdom 
United 
States 
Total 
6 5.31 1996 1 0.88 
1 0.88 1997 14 12.39 
4 3.54 1998 11 9.73 
2 1.77 1999 12 10.62 
5 4.42 2000 19 16.81 
2 1.77 2001 15 13.27 
3 2.65 2002 15 13.27 
1 0.88 2003 5 4.42 
1 0.88 2004 17 15.04 
8 7.08 2005 4 3.54 
80 70.8 
113 100 Total 113 100 
(3) Cases where acquirers completed more than one merger per fiscal year have been 
deleted. Serial acquisitions over different fiscal years, however, remain in the 
sample. 33 Serial acquirers account for a large part of bank M&A, especially in the 
US. Omitting these observations from the sample will, consequently, eliminate a 
sizable share of M&A activity and may even lead to biased findings if, say, serial 
acquirers have a different performance track record than the rest of the sample. 
Table 6-2 reports the number of bank acquisitions by geographic origin of the ac- 
quiring bank and by merger completion year. Overall, 70% of deals have been initiated 
by banks in the US. The UK, Belgium and Italy each make a sizable contribution to the 
European bank merger sample. A high number of M&A deals were completed in the 
period 2000 - 2002 with a noticeable slowdown in 2003 that was subsequently followed 
by increases in merger activity. 
33 Collectively, 65% of sample deals involve banks that will act again as an acquirer during the sample 
period. One particular US institution, Washington Mutual, contributes a total of five deals to the M&A 
sample. The performance effects of merger programs are discussed in Section 6.6. 
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6.4.2 Bank Performance Data 
To examine the performance implications of bank merger activities, cash flow profit- 
ability as well as various accounting ratios are analysed to study the components driving 
financial performance in the post-merger period. The cash flow measure used is operat- 
ing cash flow return on assets (OPCFROA). Following Healy et al. (1992), Cornett et al. 
(1998), and Cornett et al. (2006), this metric is calculated as pre-tax operating cash flows 
divided by the book value of assets where pre-tax operating cash flows are income be- 
fore taxes and extraordinary items plus debt expenses. Accounting data are obtained 
from the Worldscope database (data item numbers are in brackets). 
OPCFROA=(income before taxes and extraodinary items [WC01401] (6.1) 
+ interest expense on debt[WC0125]) / total assets[WC02999] 
OPCFROA distinguishes between two types of interest expenses for banks: inter- 
est expenses resulting from (i) the financing decision and from (ii) financial intermedia- 
tion (i. e. interest payments to depositors). By contrast, accounting measures that rely on 
earnings data (e. g. ROA and ROE) include general interest expenses which are influ- 
enced by both the method of takeover accounting (pooling versus purchasing) and take- 
over finance (cash versus equity)" and, thus, only allow limited inferences about changes 
in economic performance (Cornett et al., 2006) 35 
34 Debt finance-due to post-merger increases in interest expenses-lowers net income following M&A 
and the purchase method of accounting is associated with higher depreciation and goodwill expenses 
(Healy et al., 1992). 
35Rhoades (1994) demonstrates the importance of including some interest expenses in performance met- 
rics. For US banks, he shows that, while mergers lead to reductions in non-interest expenses as a result of 
branch closure programmes, interest expenses often increase in the post-merger period because financial 
institutions substitute low-interest retail deposits with higher-interest money market deposits. 
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Table 6-3 Performance Ratios around Bank M&A 
The list of ratios below are used to analyse the financial components of acquiring bank's operating performance. The 
Bankscope Codes refer to the codes used for balance sheet and income statement items in Fitrrh''s Bankscope database. 
AVG denotes averages per accounting year. 
Data Item Bankscope Code Explanation 
Profitability 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 
Net Interest Margin 
Net Int. Rev / Avg. Assets 
non-interest income / tot assets 
non-interest income / op income 
other operat. income / assets 
Cost Efciency 
Cost to Income Ratio 
Employment cost / operating expenses 
Employment cost / non interest expenses 
Employment cost per employee 
Non-interest expenses / no of employees 
Non-interest expense / operat. income 
Asset Quality 
2115 / 2025AVG 
2115 / 2055AVG 
2080 / 2010AVG net interest income/ 
int. earning assets 
4019 
(6540+6570+6600+6630)/5670 
(6540+6570+6600+6630)/6640 
2085 / 2025AVG 
2090 / (2080 + 2085) overheads / net income 
6650 / 6710 
6650 / (6540+6570+6600+6630) 
6650 / 7180 
(6550+6580+6610+6650+6660+6670) /7180 
(6550+6580+6610+6650+6660+6670)/7470 non interest income= 
trading, commission, 
other operat. income 
Net Loans / Total Assets 2000 / 2025 
Deposits / assets 2030 / 2025 
Loan loss prov. / net loans 6690 / 5330 
Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans 2070 / (2000 + 2070) 
Loan Loss Prov. / Net Int. Income 2095 / 2080 
Tier I Capital Ratio 7040 
Total Capital Ratio 7050 
Equity / Total Assets 4009 
This study also analyses financial performance in more detail using a number of 
accounting ratios. These ratios which cover the categories profitability, efficiency and 
asset quality are defined in Table 6-3. The data are from Fitch's Bankscope a database 
which contains balance sheet and income statement data for individual banks compiled 
from bank regulatory bodies (many of these items are unavailable on Worldscope). 
Three simple filters are applied to the raw data to ensure results are not driven by 
missing or extreme values. (Selected summary statistics for the resulting performance 
data variables are given in Table 6-4. ) 
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Table 6-4 Summary Statistics for Bank Acquirers during Year -1,1996-2005 
The data are obtained from Fitch's Bankscope database. Values are expressed in %, apart from employment cost, non- 
interest expenses and operating expenses, and non-interest expenses (all in USD per employee). Currency conver- 
sions from non-USD values are based on end-of-year exchange rates obtained from IMME International Financial Slatrs- 
tics The first and 99th percentiles of the distribution of ROA, loan to equity, non-interest income to operating in- 
come, and loan loss provisions over net interest revenue have been winsorised. 
Variables (%) N Mean P25 Median P75 Min Max 
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) 113 1.14 0.70 1.15 1.49 -0.01 3.38 
Return on Average Equity (ROAE) 113 14.51 11.19 14.83 17.77 -0.35 36.23 
Net Interest Margin 113 3.40 2.64 3.46 4.31 0.22 6.88 
Net Int Rev / Avg Assets 113 3.05 2.35 3.15 3.83 0.20 6.31 
non-interest income / tot assets 113 1.67 0.94 1.39 2.28 0.18 5.35 
non-interest income / operating income 113 36.61 23.91 34.39 46.72 6.29 79.89 
Oth Op Inc / Avg Assets 113 1.84 0.98 1.51 2.53 0.17 6.06 
Cost to Income Ratio 113 60.89 55.56 60.59 66.70 11.68 97.37 
Employment cost / operating expenses 113 45.43 40.60 47.15 52.08 12.12 78.31 
Employment cost / non interest expense 113 48.48 43.92 51.36 54.82 11.93 78.31 
Employment cost per employee (mill USD) 100 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.27 
Non-interest expenses / no of employees (mill USD) 100 0.13 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.05 1.00 
Non Int Exp / Avg Assets 113 3.24 2.51 3.07 3.73 0.33 8.68 
Net Loans / Total Assets 113 57.32 48.15 59.81 68.52 0.04 80.46 
Deposits / assets 113 76.90 71.70 79.95 85.42 2.35 92.22 
Loan Loss Reserve / Gross Loans 113 1.82 1.25 1.52 2.21 0.00 6.54 
Loan loss prov / net loans 113 0.48 0.27 0.44 0.63 -0.01 1.78 
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 96 9.76 7.80 8.95 11.10 5.80 25.30 
Total Capital Ratio 100 12.42 10.90 11.80 13.30 8.20 26.60 
Equity / Total Assets 113 8.48 5.84 7.83 9.64 2.32 84.97 
(i) The consistency of the data obtained from Worldscope and Bankscope 
was examined. For each bidding bank, the value of total assets (Bankscope 
data item: 2025; Worldscope data item: WC02999) was compared and 
bidders omitted from the sample if there were marked differences be- 
tween the values of this variable in years -2 to +3 
36 
(ii) For ratio variables, zero values were inspected and replaced with missing 
values if any of the underlying ratio components were missing and a value 
of zero was not justified. 
(iii) To reduce the impact of outliers, the first and 99`h percentiles of the dis- 
tribution of the following variables have been winsorised: ROA, loan to 
36 In total, two Austrian and two Italian acquirers were omitted from the sample due to inconsistencies 
between the data available on Worldscope and Bankscope. 
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equity, non-interest income to operating income, and loan loss provisions 
over net interest revenue. 
To isolate merger- and bank-specific effects on financial performance from phe- 
nomena that affect the entire industry or economy, bidding bank performance needs to 
be compared against an appropriate benchmark of expected performance. As discussed 
in Section 3.2.2, two benchmarks will be used for this purpose. First, financial perform- 
ance data are measured against asset-weighted mean values of all non-merging banks 
listed on Worldscope in the bidder's country. This yields market-adjusted returns. 37 The 
market control group is restricted to listed banks, because non-US banking industries 
exhibit sizable non-listed sectors which tend to be characterised by lower efficiency and 
profitability levels than shareholder-controlled institutions (Barth et al., 2004). The sec- 
ond benchmark contains banks which have been matched on the basis of size and pre- 
merger performance. The matching procedure employed to assemble pe jormance-adjusted 
returns is based on the following algorithm as used in Barber and Lyon (1996) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1997): 
(i) geography (sample and control bank are listed on the same exchange), 
(ii) industry (defined at the 2-digit SIC level), 
(iii) size (control firms have 25% to 200% of the acquiring bank's assets dur- 
ing year 0), and 
(iv) pre-merger profitability. The portfolio of control firms resulting from 
steps (i)-(iii) is ranked by OPCFROA in year 0. For every sample bank i, 
37 Weighting industry returns by the assets of constituent banks means that larger banks have a bigger 
impact on the benchmark return. This is appropriate given the sample of relatively large bank acquirers. 
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the credit institution closest in terms of its OPCFROA is selected as the 
matched institution. 
(v) Finally, control banks must not have acted as acquirers themselves in any 
M&A deals valued at more than $100 mill up to five years before the focal 
transaction. 38 
6.5 The Performance Results of Bank M&A 
6.5.1 Bank Merger Performance in Europe & the US 
Table 6-5 presents evidence on the long-term operating performance of acquiring banks 
following bank mergers in Europe and the US. The returns associated with M&A are 
reported in market-adjusted form as well as in performance-adjusted form. In year -2, 
US bidders realise OPCFROA of 1.99% equalling 0.56% on an industry-adjusted basis 
(Panel A). Performance-adjusted OPCFROA are positive and statistically significant 
throughout the examination period. 39 Further, abnormal returns remain fairly constant 
over the examination period with no statistically significant differences between year -1 
and year 3. Thus, the market-adjusted results in the US are consistent with earlier studies 
that show that bidders outperform the market control group in the years leading up to a 
merger, but there is no evidence of further improvements in financial performance three 
years after M&A (Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; Knapp et al., 2005). 
38 Eliminating all banks that have acted as acquirers, regardless of the value of the underlying transaction, 
is likely to introduce a survival bias because of the scale of bank consolidation, especially in the US. 
39 The Wilcoxon signed rank test is not statistically significant for year +3. 
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Table 6-5 Post-merger Performance of European and US Banks 
The sample consists of 113 publicly traded banking firms in Europe (GU-15) and the US that completed majority acquisitions 
worth at least $100 mill (in constant 2004 USD) between 1996 and 2005. Performance data are presented relative to the year of 
merger completion and measured against performance-matched banks and against asset-weighted industry averages. The per- 
formance metric is operating cash flows returns on assets (OPCFROA) which is pre-tax operating cash flows divided by the 
book value of assets (where pre-tax operating cash flows are income before taxes and extraordinary items plus debt expenses. 
Data are from the Worldscope database. Reported values are mean values. 
A performance 
-2 -1 123 -1 to+3 
PancIA: AOPCFROA US Banks (n=80) 
performance 1.99% 2.08% 2.04% 2.26% 2.33% 
Market control 1.42% 1.55% 1.67% 1.61% 1.79% 0.01% 
adjusted abnormal 0.56% "~. t 0.53% "". t 0.37% '~"t 0.65% '"'. t 0.54% " 
Performance control 2.21% 2.18% 2.29% 2.27% 2.25% 0.19% 
adjusted abnormal -0.22% - -0.25% ". 
t 
-0.01% 0.09% 
0.10% 
Panel B: AOPCFROA European Banks (n=33) 
performance 2.08% 2.07% 1.94% 1.75% 1.59% 
Market control 3.88% 3.58% 2.97% 2.76% 2.84% 1.23% "t 
adjusted abnormal -1.80% »"tt - "t -1.03% -1.01% - 
2.51% 1.28% 
Performance control 3.22% 3.67% 2.37% 2.33% 2.20% 1.01%'"t 
adjusted abnormal -1.15% ". t - ». t -0.43% -0.58% - 
1.60% 0.60% 
°, and' denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, according to a two-tailed t-test. 
1 denotes statistical significance at least at 5% based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Examining changes in performance-adjusted returns instead of market-adjusted 
data does not alter the finding that US bank mergers, on average, are performance- 
neutral. Consistent with acquirers being superior pre-merger performers (Section 3.2.2, 
pg. 41), market-adjusted performance data point to bidders outperforming their peers in 
the pre-merger period, while the same is not true for performance-adjusted data. For 
instance, in year -1 merging banks' OPCFROA is 2.08% compared with 2.18% for the 
performance-matched control group (difference not statistically significant for years -2 
and -1). 
Panel B of Table 6-5 presents OPCFROA for European banks. There is evidence 
that European bidders display weak pre-merger performance vis-ä-vis non-merging in- 
stitutions. Performance-adjusted returns are -1.15% in year -2 (significant at 8% [t-test] 
and 4% [Wilcoxon rank test]) and industry-adjusted returns are -1.80% in the same year 
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(significant below 5% according to both test statistics). Although adjusted returns re- 
main negative throughout the examination period, they lose their statistical significance 
in year 1 and thereafter, implying an improvement in financial performance following 
bi&A. A t-test confirms H1 (European bank mergers exhibit higher post-merger profit- 
ability) by showing that both performance-adjusted and market-adjusted returns experi- 
ence a statistically significant improvement between years -1 to 3. 
It is interesting to note that, European banks owe reported post-merger perform- 
ance gains to improvements from weak performance levels before they engage in M&A. 
While weak pre-merger performance of European banks is at odds with US-based find- 
ings, some studies present evidence consistent with European acquirers as weak pre- 
merger performers. Campa and Hernando (2006) find that bidders underperform non- 
bidding institutions in terms of efficiency and that bidders experience improvements in 
these measures in the post-merger period. Similarly, Vander Vennet (1996) does not 
find any evidence that European bidding banks are stronger performers than their in- 
dustry peers in up to three years leading to a deal. 
Finally, there is no evidence of a mean reversion trend in the market-adjusted re- 
turn data of European banks. Bidding banks outperform on an industry-adjusted basis; 
however, market-adjusted returns do not revert to zero in the years following M&A. 
Consequently, while the use of performance-adjusted data is useful in determining that 
industry averages may not be entirely representative of bidding bank performance, the 
use of industry-adjusted data does not bias the conclusions for European M&A re- 
ported in Table 6-5. 
6.5.2 Geographic Diversification and Bank Merger Performance 
The long-term profitability implications of domestic and cross-border mergers are pre- 
rented in Table 6-6. Panel A lists changes in financial performance following domestic 
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M&A in the US. Since all US deals were domestic, 40 the results replicate earlier findings 
about merger activities in the US (Panel A of Table 6-5). Accordingly, industry-adjusted 
returns point to bidders outperforming non-bidding banks before a merger, but there is 
no evidence of performance increases upon completion of M&A. Panel B of Table 6-6 
presents performance data associated with domestic consolidation in Europe. While 
bidding banks' OPCFROA are lower than that of either the market or the perform- 
ance-matched control group in all examination years, adjusted returns are not statisti- 
cally different from zero at customary levels 41 Further, comparing OPCFROA between 
year -1 and year 3 in Europe indicates there are no performance changes associated with 
domestic M&A. Thus, industry-adjusted return differences remain virtually identical 
over the examination period and performance-adjusted returns increase by a mere 
0.19% (not significant at customary levels). 
Panel C of Table 6-6 examines the effects of cross-border mergers on acquiring 
banks in Europe. Prior to cross-border deals, bidders display very noticeable levels of 
underperformance. For instance, in year -2, performance-adjusted and industry-adjusted 
returns are -1.03% (statistically significant at 5%) and -3.41% (statistically significant at 
1%), respectively. Similar results apply to year -1, but not to the three years following a 
merger when adjusted returns are not statistically different from zero. Between years -1 
and 3, European acquirers, on average, experience an increase of 1.68% in performance- 
adjusted OPCFROA (Wilcoxon-rank statistic significant at 5%, t-statistic at 8%) and of 
1.31% in market-adjusted OPCFROA (Wilcoxon rank statistic significant below 5%). 
40 Again, the sample does not contain cross-border M&A initiated by US banks. As noted in Section 4.4, 
the lack of US cross-border M&A points to continued levels of overcapacity in the US banking industry; 
consequently, the consolidation of the domestic banking system for most US banks takes priority over 
foreign acquisitions. 
41 One exception is year -2 where performance-adjusted OPCFROA are significant at the 10% level. 
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Consistent with H2, it can, thus, be argued that the profitability effects of Euro- 
pean cross-border deals are more positive than those of domestic bank M&A. However, 
Table 6-6 also shows that the reported performance increases of cross-border M&A are 
due to European institutions reducing pre-merger levels of underperformance relative to 
the control groups. As highlighted in Section 6.5.1, this points to European banks (in 
contrasts to banks in the US) exhibiting weak pre-merger performance that subse- 
quently reverses. This is consistent with Vander Vennet (1996) who also finds that 
European cross-border M&A lead to a convergence in profitability between bidding 
banks and the industry, but not to bidders outperforming non-merging banks. Altunbas 
and Ibanez (2004) show that European bidding banks which engage in cross-border 
M&A are less cost-efficient in the pre-merger period than domestically-oriented bidders. 
In summary, bidders in European cross-border deals underperform before a 
transaction, but not in the years following M&A. Since performance gains cannot be 
observed for domestic M&A in Europe (Panel B), it appears that the performance gains 
for European bank mergers reported in the previous section (Section 6.5.1) are largely 
driven by the positive effects of cross-border activity. 
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Table 6-6 Post-Merger Performance of Cross-border and Domestic Bank Mergers 
The sample consists of 113 publicly traded banking firms in Europe (GU-15) and the US that completed majority acquisitions 
worth at least $100 mill (n constant 2004 USD) between 1996 and 2005. Performance data are presented relative to the year of 
merger completion and measured against performance-matched banks and against asset-weighted industry averages. The perform- 
ance metric is operating cash flows returns on assets (OPCFROA) which is pre-tax operating cash flows divided by the book value 
of assets (where pre-tax operating cash flows are income before taxes and extraordinary items plus debt expenses. Cross-border 
mergers involve bidders and targets being chartered in different countries. Data are from the Worldscope database. Reported 
values are mean values. 
GOPCFROA: 
Years to Bidding Control Group bidder-control AOPCFROA : -1 to +3 merger Banks 
performance market performance market performance market 
Panel A: OPCFROA for domestic mergers in the US (n=80) 
-2 1.99% 2.21% 1.42% -0.22% 0.57%-, t 0.19% 0.01% 
-1 2.08% 2.18% 1.55% -0.10% 0.53%--t 
1 2.04% 2.29% 1.67% -0.25%°" t 0.37%"'. t 
2 2.26% 2.27% 1.61% -0.01% 0.65% .t 
3 2.33% 2.25% 1.79% 0.09% 0.54% 
Panel B: OPCFROA for domestic mergers in Europe (n=12) 
-2 1.79% 3.09% 3.12% -1.30% -1.30% -0.01% 0.00% 
-1 1.87% 3.09% 3.08% -1.22% -1.22% 
1 1.89% 2.40% 2.971/o -0.50% -0.51% 
2 1.78% 2.45% 2.63% -0.67% -0.65% 
3 1.54% 2.76% 2.12% -1.23% -1.22% 
Panel C. " OPCFROA for cross-border mergers (n=21, all European Acquirers) 
-2 2.29% 3.32% 5.70% -1.03%^ -3.41%"" 1.68/o-t 1.31% 
-1 2.22% 4.08% 5.27% -1.86%""t -3.05%" 
1 1.96% 2.35% 2.90% -0.39% -0.94% 
2 1.73% 1.92% 2.85% -0.19% -1.12% 
3 1.63% 1.81% 3.36% -0.18% -1.73% 
", and' denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, according to a two-tailed Mest. 
1 denotes statistical significance at least at 5% based on a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
6.5.3 The Performance Effects ofProduct Di versifica tion 
Financial conglomeration through M&A (e. g., when retail banks purchase institutions 
that underwrite debt, equity or insurance) has become more popular strategic move, not 
least as a result of the recent deregulation of such activities in most EU member states 
as well as in the US (see Chapter 4). Following Campa and Hernando (2004) and Dou- 
kas and Kan (2006), Table 6-7 divides transactions in the US and Europe depending on 
whether the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of the institutions involved in a 
transaction are identical. 
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The expectation expressed in H3 is that product diversifying bank mergers will 
outperform focusing mergers as a result of internal capital markets efficiencies and ad- 
vantages from cross-selling different financial products. The financial performance data 
for US banks (Panel A), however, are not in line with this expectation. The results indi- 
cate that US acquirers engaging in both product focusing and product diversifying deals 
exhibit positive and statistically significant market-adjusted returns, but insignificant per- 
formance-adjusted returns. US bidders systematically outperform national banking sec- 
tors, but not the portfolio of performance-matched credit institutions. However, be- 
cause market-adjusted returns remain positive over the entire examination period (i. e. 
there is no mean reversion trend), conclusions about the performance effects of finan- 
cial conglomeration are not contingent on a particular control group. Most importantly, 
there is no evidence of a post-merger increase in OPCFROA between years -1 and 3 in 
the US, irrespective of whether performance data are measured against national industry 
sectors or performance-matched institutions. 
European acquirers, by contrast, experience performance gains following product 
diversifying bank mergers that are in line with H3. Thus, the performance-adjusted 
OPCFROA associated with diversifying M&A increase by 2.11% (t-statistic and Wil- 
coxon rank statistic significant at 5%) and industry-adjusted OPCFROA by 1.25% (t- 
statistic significant at 7%). Again, it appears that European banks engage in financial 
conglomeration after a period of sustained underperformance (in year -1, performance- 
adjusted OPCFROA are -4.41% and industry-adjusted OPCFROA are -3.61%). Ac- 
cordingly, one of the reasons behind the performance gains following diversification in 
Europe is that banks manage to close the profitability gap to non-merging institutions in 
the post-merger period. 
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Table 6-7 Performance Implications of Product Focussing and Diversifying Bank M&A 
The sample consists of 113 publicly traded banking firms in Europe (EU-15) and the US that completed majority acquisitions 
worth at least $100 mill (in constant 2004 USD) between 1996 and 2005. Performance data are presented relative to the year of 
merger completion and measured against performance-matched banks and against asset-weighted industry averages. The per- 
formance metric is operating cash flows returns on assets (OPCFROA) which is pre-tax operating cash flows divided by the 
book value of assets (where pre-tax operating cash flows are income before taxes and extraordinary items plus dcbt expenses. 
Product-focusing mergers involve banks where the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code of the main product fine are identi- 
cal. Data are from the Worldscope database. Reported values are mean values. 
-2 -1 12 
AOPCFROA 
years -1 to +3 
Panel A. OPCFROA US Banks (n=80) 
focusing Market-adjusted 0.60%'°, t 0.48%'"'"t 0.47%'°. t 0.64%"'. t 0.520/6--t 0.06% 
(n=69) Performance-adjusted -0.25% -0.06% -0.27% -0.06% 0.01% 0.07% 
diversifying Market-adjusted 0.33°/d 0.76% .t 0.590/6--t 0.78%o .t 0.42W -0.33% 
(n=11) Performance-adjusted -0.07% -0.34% -0.10% 0.28% 0.42% 0.76% 
Pane/B. " OPCFROA European Banks (n=-U) 
focusing Market-adjusted -2.04%` -1.83%" 0.83% -0.95W -0.79% 1.04% 
(n=21) Performance-adjusted -1.26% -2.039/6"-t -1.34% -0.82% -1.96% 0.07% 
diversifying Market-adjusted -2.88%" -3.61%" -1.30% -1.13% -2.35% 1.25% 
(n=12) Performance adjusted -228%" -4.41% -0.25% 2.86% -0.17% 4.24% 
"', and' denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, according to a two-tailed 1-test. 
t denotes statistical significance at least at 5% based on a VG'ilcoxon signed-rank test. 
As previously noted, one possible explanation for why H3 can be confirmed for 
European banks, but not for credit institutions in the US is provided by Vander Ven- 
net (1996) who argues that the' established practice of universal banking in parts of 
Europe means acquiring banks are more experienced, and consequently more successful, 
in complex deals involving banks with different activity portfolios. After all, the chal- 
lenges in integrating different types of financial firms are well-documented in the ap- 
plied literature (see for example, Berger et al., 1999; DeLong, 2001). 
6.6 Do Serial Acquirers Perform Differently? 
So far, this chapter has not distinguished between single-M&A transactions and higher 
order deals that are part of the type of merger program which has been quite common 
in the banking industry. Serial acquisitions pose more complex challenges to bidding 
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banks, especially when it comes to integrating targets into the context of the acquiring 
bank's existing resources and operations in a value-creating manner. 
Fuller et al. (2002) report market scepticism about the performance of higher or- 
der deals. In a sample of US multi-industry bids between 1990 and 2000, the authors 
show that serial acquirers realise lower announcement returns than acquirers that engage 
in M&A for the first time. Similar results are found by Song and Walkling (2006) who 
suggest that serial bidder's market valuation may partly reflect investor anticipation of 
future bidding activity before any announcements are made. Further, serial acquisitions 
are often referred to in the context of manifestation of managerial opportunism. For 
instance, Doukas and Petmezas (2007) find evidence consistent with CEOs being over- 
confident when initiating higher-order M&A deals. In a sample of 5,334 UK acquisi- 
tions in the period 1980 - 2004, successful deals tend to be followed by underperform- 
ing acquisitions. The authors attribute this to CEOs suffering from a self-attribution 
bias. Hence, for the purposes of this study, it is expected that first-order deals outper- 
form serial acquirers as well as higher order deals. 
Table 6-8 reports little evidence pointing to serial acquisitions having performance 
effects that are different from those of single bids. Only multiple acquisitions by Euro- 
pean banks attract a significantly smaller increase in market-adjusted OPCFROA than 
single acquirers (statistically significant at the 5%-level). Similar results apply to Panel B 
where first bids by European banks lead to significantly higher profitability increases 
than higher order (i. e. five or more) deals (significant at 10%). While serial acquisitions 
have inferior performance implications compared with single or first order deals for 
most merger types, reported differences are not statistically significant at customary lev- 
els. 
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Table 6-8 Changes in Industry-adjusted Performance between Years -1 and 3 for Single vMultiple 
Acquirers, by Deal Characteristics 
The table presents changes in industry-adjusted OPCFROA between years -1 and 3 relative to the completion year of a merger. Deals are 
classified by the country of the bidder, diversification is based on the first two digits of the four-digit SIC code between bidder and cross- 
border deals are transactions where bidders and targets are chartered in different countries. Differences in means are tested using a /-test 
assuming unequal variances. 
US Europe 
Product 
diversification 
Product 
focus Cross-border Domestic 
PanedA: Single vmultiple acquirers 
single acquirers 0.62% 2.11% -0.90% -0.19% 4.46% 0.15% 
18 10 5 26 4 33 
multiple acquirers 0.861% 1.261% -3.11% -0.39% 0.92% 0.19% 
52 22 20 64 17 59 
D: single - multiple -0.251% 0.85%"' 2.151% 0.201% 3.54% -0.041% 
Panel B: Ist deals v 5th or more deals 
ist deal 0.741% 3.21% -1.961% -0.231% 5.651% 0.271% 
31 18 13 37 8 42 
5th or more deals 1.151% 1.671% -2.201% -0.31% 0.901% -0.171% 
7 2 3 6 1 8 
A: ja - 5th or more deals -0.41% 1.54%` 0.24% 0.08% 4.75% 0.44% 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
6.7 What Drives Post-merger Performance Changes of European 
and US Banks? Cost Savings v Revenue Enhancements 
The preceding analysis of OPCFROA has shown that European bank mergers, in par- 
ticular cross-border as well as activity-diversifying M&A, are associated with small 
post-merger performance improvements. This section analyses a wider range of ac- 
counting measures to gain a more thorough understanding of the specific effects of and, 
somewhat relatedly, the different motivations behind M&A. 
The accounting ratios employed for this analysis are defined in Table 6-3 (pg. 132). 
In order to ensure that findings may be compared across a large cross-section of previ- 
ous studies, Table 6-9 reports market-adjusted returns with t-tests and Wilcoxon signed 
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rank tests determining the level of statistical significance associated with performance 
changes between year -1 and year 3 for European and US deals. 
Table 6-9 shows that European bidders underperform national banking sectors in 
terms of pre-merger profitability in year -1. Market-adjusted values for ROAA, net in- 
terest margin and non-interest income are negative and statistically significant at 1%. Yet, 
European banks display above-industry levels of efficiency in year -1-pre-merger em- 
ployment cost (scaled by operating expenses, non-interest expenses or the number of 
employees) are below the market control group. The fact that bidding banks, despite 
high cost efficiency levels, exhibit below-industry profitability suggests that bidding 
banks underperform their peers in terms of the revenue they generate prior to a merger. 
The negative market-adjusted non-interest income to assets ratio (significant at 1%) and 
the negative market-adjusted net loans to total assets ratio42 (significant at 5%) is sugges- 
tive of a pre-merger weakness that affects European bidders' lending and non-lending 
activities. 
In the years following M&A, ROAA and ROAE of European banks increase 
from -0.85% to -0.42% and from -0.59% to 4.10%, respectively 
(all performance 
changes are significant at least at 5% according to the t-statistic and Wilcoxon rank sta- 
tistic). This is in line with H4 which posits that one of the primary motivations of Euro- 
pean banks to engage in M&A is to cut costs following M&A. Unlike US institutions 
which have only recently been permitted to engage in universal banking, European 
banks have traditionally had more possibilities to diversify their earnings. Consistent 
with H4, European bidders manage to further widen the efficiency gap vis-ä-vis their 
42 Lending at below-industry levels is also reflected in a negative market-adjusted loan-loss-reserves-to- 
loans ratio. However, the loan-loss-reserves-to-loans ratio, next to the scale of lending activities, also re- 
flects the default risk (i. e. quality) of a bidder's loan portfolio with more risky portfolios attracting higher 
loss reserves. 
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peers in the post-merger period. Both employment cost and non-interest expenses are 
further reduced between years -1 and 3 (t-test significant at 5%). Additionally, while all 
other market-adjusted efficiency measures improve, changes in these measures are not 
significant at customary levels of statistical significance. Finally, European bidders fur- 
ther retreat from lending activities as reflected in a market-adjusted reduction in the 
loans-to-assets ratio of 3.17% (t-statistic significant at 8%). 
In contrast to banks in Europe, there is no indication of US institutions underper- 
forming in terms of pre-merger profitability. ROAA are not significantly different from 
the industry benchmark and industry-adjusted ROAE are even positive and significant 
at 1% before a deal. On the other hand, US bidders appear to display below-industry 
levels of cost efficiency prior to M&A (the industry-adjusted cost-to-income ratio and 
employment cost to operating expenses are positive and different from zero at low lev- 
els of statistical significance). Following bank M&A, US bidders increase their loans to 
assets ratio to a market-adjusted 2.89% (difference significant at 5% according to both a 
t-test and a Wilcoxon rank statistic). Despite the sizeable boost in lending activities, the 
market-adjusted increases in capital ratios following M&A remain relatively small 
(0.44% of Tier 1 capital and 0.22% of total capital). This suggests that the risk profile of 
bidding banks is not materially changed by M&A. Next to lending, non-interest activi- 
ties also increase in the post-merger period. The latter is reflected in rising market- 
adjusted values for non-interest income and other operating income (changes significant 
at 7% and 8%, respectively). There is also some evidence consistent with US banks ex- 
periencing a deterioration in cost efficiency after completion of a merger. For instance, 
employment costs per employee increase to above-industry levels in the post-merger 
period (difference statistically significant at 5%). 
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In summary, the analysis of accounting ratios permits the following conclusions. 
As previously noted when examining merger-related changes in OPCFROA, the results 
of this section confirm that European banks experience post-merger profitability im- 
provements, while no changes in profitability are reported for US institutions. The 
analysis in this section further reveals that European banks appear to pursue a cost- 
cutting strategy when they increase their cost efficiency levels and decrease post-merger 
lending vis-a-vis non-merging banks. US banks, on the other hand, expand both on- and 
off-balance sheet activities following M&A, but experience a deterioration in post- 
merger efficiency levels. 
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6.8 Regression Analysis: The Timing of Performance Changes 
A final set of post-merger performance tests examines the relation between changes in 
market-adjusted OPCFROA and deal- as well as country-specific variables in a linear 
regression framework. Regressions coefficients are estimated for each of the five years 
following a deal to analyse annual performance changes, while controlling for the effects 
of different post-merger performance drivers. Also, the multivariate analysis will ensure 
that the drivers of post-merger success which have been identified using univariate tests 
in Sections 6.5 and 6.6 are robust when their effects are jointly estimated. Specifically, 
the following model is proposed. 
DOPCFROA, =a+/1 loans +/2 employment cost + /13 rel. size +ß4non-int. inc. 
+A dealvalue + ß6 loss provisions + Acash dummy 
+ß8 cross-border dummy + ß9 US dummy +A, target profit. (6.1) 
+A, product focus + ß1z sector concentration 
+313 sector int. margin+314 pooling+c 
The dependent variable is the mean difference in performance-adjusted 
OPCFROA between the base year -1 and year t (the post-M&A years 1 to 5). On the 
right-hand side of (6.1), a cross-border dummy takes the value of 1 for acquisitions 
where target and acquirers are located in different countries (and 0 otherwise), and a US 
dummy is 1 for acquisitions by US banks (and 0 for deals by European bidders). Prod- 
uct focus is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the first two digits of the SIC 
code of the companies involved in a merger are identical and 0 otherwise. Further, con- 
trol variables are estimated for t-1 and include the following (deal-specific variables 
[value, SIC code, etc. ] are from Thomson Financial and bank as well as bank sector data 
[non-interest income, sector concentration, etc] are from Fitch's Bankscope database): 
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" Loans-to-assets ratio. Post-merger performance may vary with the type of strategies 
employed by bidders. The higher the share of loans of a bank's assets, the heav- 
ier its reliance on more traditional forms of banking business rather than on off- 
balance sheet activities. 
" Employment cost. Total cost of employment is scaled by operating costs. It is con- 
ceivable that M&A activity leads to a temporary increase in employment cost. 
For example, during the integration period, there may be a merger-induced ex- 
pansion in the newly-merged bank's workforce that will subsequently be scaled 
down. 
" Relative . rile 
is measured as the ratio of target to bidder assets. Post-merger per- 
formance may be weaker in the case of `mergers of equals' as a result of internal 
wrangling over which merger party is in control of the integration process. Al- 
ternatively, relatively larger targets may offer more opportunities to realise 
post-merger cost efficiencies. 
" Non-interest income. The ratio of non-interest income to total operating income 
indicates the importance of fee-generating activities versus more traditional lend- 
ing activities for a bank (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). 
" Deal value. Post-merger performance may be weaker for larger deals as a result of 
the increased complexity of higher value M&A deals (Akhavein et al., 1997). 
Deal value is measured as the logarithm of the dollar value of the A1&A transac- 
tion 43 
43 The correlation coefficient between deal value and relative size is 0.30 (significant at 7%). Consequently, 
spurious regression results when both variables are included in the specification should be a negligible 
issue. 
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" Loan lost provisions. Lack of due diligence prior a deal as well as a post-merger ex- 
pansion in lending activities may cause increased loan loss provisions to depress 
post-merger performance. This variable is expressed as a percentage of net in- 
terest revenue. 
" Cash-only. This dummy variable is 1 if a merger is financed by 100% cash rather 
than by a mix of cash and equity (in which case the variable is 0). The use of eq- 
uity as a transaction currency is believed to signal to investors that the acquiring 
party deems its equity to be overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Conse- 
quently, equity-only deals tend to be associated with non-performing M&A 
(Lubatkin, 1983; Kiymaz, 2004). 
" With sector concentration and net interest margin, the regressions in (6.1) also control 
for two indicators of target market attractiveness. Market concentration captures 
the share of assets owned by the largest three banks. More concentrated markets 
are likely to lower bank profitability for most institutions (Bikker and Haaf, 
2002). Net interest margin is the average net interest revenue that local credit in- 
stitutions realise expressed as a percentage of total earning assets. It is expected 
that more profitable markets offer more opportunities for bank acquirers to 
generate above-market returns (Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2001). 
" TaFgetprofitability is measured in terms of year -1 ROA. It is conceivable that ac- 
quiring more profitable targets leads to increased post-merger performance. 
" Pooling. This binary variable takes the value 1 if acquirers use the pooling method 
of merger accounting and 0 if the purchase method is employed. Post-merger 
performance may vary with the type of merger accounting method that acquirers 
use (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1989; DeLong, 2003a). Specifically, under the pur- 
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chase method, any difference between the purchase price and the market value 
of an asset is recorded as goodwill. No marking to market occurs and, conse- 
quently, no goodwill is recorded under the pooling method. As a result, merger- 
related expenses are likely to be lower under the pooling method. 44.45 
Table 6-10 presents the results of the regression specifications for years 1 to 5. 
The results show that, consistent with prior expectations, more concentrated markets 
are associated with lower post-merger performance and more profitable banking sectors 
lead to gains in market-adjusted OPCFROA. The coefficients on both variables remain 
significant at the 1% level for each of the five years following M&A. Similarly, the US 
dummy enters the regressions with a negative sign in year 1 as well as in each of the fol- 
lowing years (significant at 1%), thereby, lending further support to H1 that European 
bank mergers outperform US M&A activities in the post-merger period. 
In contrast to the country-specific variables whose effect on market-adjusted 
OPCFROA becomes observable in year 1 and persists for all five years following M&A, 
the profitability effect of variables that control for the outcome of the post-merger inte- 
gration process varies during post-merger years. For example, Table 6-10 shows that 
44 Starting from 2001, all acquisitions under US GAAP must be accounted for using the purchase method 
of accounting. Similar rules apply under IFRS since 2005. However, even before 2005, pooling was very 
rarely applied outside the US and the conditions for its application were restricted. In Germany and the 
UK, for example, pooling was generally restricted to mergers where acquirers could not be dearly identi- 
fied. 
as Out of the 80 US transactions, 19 US institutions chose pooling accounting. The correlation coefficient 
between the pooling dummy and the US dummy is 0.35 (significant at 5%) and multicollinearity between 
the two variables, hence, a negligible issue. 
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Table 6-10 Regression Results: Performance Changes of Bidding Banks 
around Bank Mergers, Years 1 to 5 
The dependent variable is mean market-adjusted OPCFROA (pre-tax operating cash flows divided by the book value of 
assets, where pre-tax operating cash flows are income before taxes and extraordinary items plus debt expenses). Unless 
stated otherwise, variables refer to bidding banks or the country of the bidder in the year before a deals was announced 
(61). Accounting data for banks are from Fileb's Bankscope database. Deal specifics are from Thomson Financial. Relative 
size is defined as target over acquirer assets (in t-1). Deal value is the logarithm of the dollar value of the M&A transaction 
and cash finance is a dummy which is 1 if a transaction is 100% cash-financed and 0 otherwise. Cross-border is a binary 
variable that takes the value of 1 for acquisitions where target and acquirers are located in different countries; target prof- 
itability is ROA in 1-1; product focus is measured by a binary variable that takes the value of I if the first two digits of the 
four-digit SIC code of the companies in a merger are identical and 0 otherwise. Concentration and is share of assets of the 
three largest credit institutions and net interest margin the average value of net interest revenue over total earning assets 
(both in the target country). The first and 99th percentiles of the distribution of ROA, loan to equity, non-interest income 
to operating income, and loan loss provisions over net interest revenue have been winsorised. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net Loans / Total Assets 0.039** 0.040** 0.012 -0.016 -0.040 
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.087) 
Employment cost / operating expenses -0.022** -0.029* -0.024 -0.011 -0.012 
(0.011) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.033) 
Rel. Size -0.512 -0.400 -0.624 -0.770 -0.947 
(0.446) (0.443) (0.432) (0.604) (0.907) 
non-interest income / operating income -0.003 -0.007 -0.006 0.009 0.012 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.027) 
Deal Value 0.211* 0.199 0.181 -0.105 -0.145 
(0.114) (0.170) (0.166) (0.244) (0.517) 
Loan Loss Provisions / Net Inc Rev -0.047** -0.040** -0.042* -0.034 0.040 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.095) 
Cash finance -0.660 -0.859* -0.999** -1.413** 0.009 
(0.422) (0.456) (0.453) (0.685) (1.342) 
Cross-border dummy 1.136* 0.295 0.161 2.160** 7.036** 
(0.598) (0.739) (0.708) (1.091) (2.766) 
US dummy -3.953*** -3.163*** -3.225*** -4.964*** -3.210*** 
(0.883) (0.948) (0.967) (1.614) (1.302) 
Target Profitability (t roa) -8.196 -4.072 -6.539 -14.344* -14.178 
(6.690) (6.584) (6.353) (7.515) (14.259) 
Product Focus 0.105 0.164 0.274 -0.107 -0.313 
(0.400) (0.430) (0.415) (0.563) (0.954) 
Bank Sector Concentration -11.892*** -11.562*** -9.964*** -11.643*** -7.686*** 
(2.089) (2.297) (2.206) (2.878) (2.625) 
Sector Net Interest Margin 256.228*** 269.152*** 284.591*** 219.409*** 252.533*** 
(48.396) (49.639) (48.605) (60.085) (65.211) 
Pooling of interests dummy -0.081 -0.111 -0.185 -0.137 -0.204 
(0.398) (0.395) (0.385) (0.480) (1.029) 
Constant -5.032* -3.342 -5.107* 2.780 2.317 
(2.596) (2.839) (2.810) (3.756) (8.093) 
Observations 104 94 90 87 51 
R-squared 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.70 
Standard errors are heteroscedasncity-robust according to White (1980) and reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
low loan-loss provisions are associated with improvements in market-adjusted 
OPCFROA in years 1 and 2 (statistically significant at 5%) and, to a smaller extent, in 
year 3 (significant at 10%). This is consistent with banks experiencing difficulties when 
adopting to post-merger increases in lending which often follow M&A (see Knapp et al., 
2005). These lending increases appear to lead to higher loan loss reserves and lower per- 
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formance for some banks. However, in the years after a deal has been completed (once 
banks' loan approval procedures have adapted to increased lending activities) the nega- 
tive influence of the loan loss variable on performance is no longer statistically signifi- 
cant. Similarly, employment cost exert a negative influence on market-adjusted returns 
only in year 1 (significant at 5%) and year 2 (significant at 10%), implying that merger- 
induced cost inefficiencies tend to be temporary. On the other hand, the coefficients on 
the loans to assets ratio and employment cost imply that it takes up to three years after 
M&A for employment cost to be sharply reduced and loan approval procedures to ad- 
just. 
The cross-border dummy does not enter any of the regressions at a customary 
level of statistical significance until years 4 and 5. The coefficients are positive- 
confirming earlier findings that cross-border M&A outperform domestic bank mergers 
(H2)-and significant at 5%. Accordingly, it takes up to three years for the performance 
gains of cross-border M&A to come into effect. Further, in years 1 to 3 the product fo- 
cus variable has a positive sign. While a positive performance effect of product focus- 
sing mergers is intuitively appealing on the basis that there is a cost cutting potential for 
this type of deal, the result is in contrast to the findings of Section 6.5.3 where evidence 
consistent with the opposite effect of diversification is presented. Finally, the coefficient 
on the pooling method dummy is not statistically significant implying that the perform- 
ance results are not influenced by the method of takeover accounting. 
At more general level, it should be pointed out that the similar regression coeffi- 
cients across the five post-merger years in Table 6-10 lend robustness to the conclusions 
drawn from them. The signs on the coefficients remain identical across years for almost 
all cases. Also, the high adjusted R-squared values indicate that the specifications used 
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explain a high share of the variation in performance-adjusted OPCFROA in the post- 
merger period. 
6.9 Conclusion 
For a sample of 113 bank mergers in Europe and the US, this chapter shows that bank 
M&A lead to performance gains for European banks in the years following a merger. In 
the US, by contrast, there is no evidence of M&A activity affecting the performance of 
acquiring institutions. Performance gains are particularly pronounced for cross-border 
and cross-industry mergers in Europe, albeit it takes up to three years for any gains to 
materialise. Banks in Europe, seek to raise efficiency levels in the post-merger period, 
while scaling back on lending activities. US banks, by contrast, adopt a strategy consis- 
tent with post-merger revenue enhancements by increasing on- and off-balance sheet 
activity and experience lower post-merger cost efficiency. It is argued that European 
banks, by and large, pursue a cost cutting strategy, while banks in the US attempt to 
capitalise on recent regulatory changes that permit the formation of integrated financial 
services providers by following a revenue-enhancement strategy. 
The relatively positive performance effects of European bank mergers and Euro- 
pean cross-border mergers in particular add legitimacy to policy initiatives at EU-level 
that are designed to facilitate the pan-European consolidation of credit institutions. 
These findings are similar to those reported in Chapter 5 where US bidding banks, on 
average, realise value losses, while shareholders in European banks realise positive ab- 
normal returns. The fact that bank mergers in the US do not lead to performance gains 
raises possible governance explanations behind M&A (Morck et al., 1990; Becher and 
Campbell, 2004). If banks that engaged in M&A do not outperform those that did not, 
the question arises as to why shareholders and other stakeholders are exposed to the 
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substantial risk of value destruction or deterioration in corporate performance com- 
monly associated with M&A bids. The next chapter examines one possible answer to 
this paradox by testing governance explanations of M&A. Specifically, the next section 
analyses the corporate governance of bidding banks and its effects on market and finan- 
cial performance following merger announcements in different regulatory regimes. 
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Regulation, Board Monitoring 
and Bidder Performance 
7.1 Introduction" 
It is a widely-held view that regulated firms are not subject to the same contracting costs 
between managers and shareholders as other public companies (Baysinger and Zard- 
koohi, 1986; Kole and Lehn, 1999; Booth et al., 2002). The argument goes that, because 
regulators restrict managerial discretion and the extent to which the actions of managers 
may adversely affect shareholder wealth, regulators act as a substitute for monitoring by 
shareholders. As a result, banks are practically absent from governance research and, 
while it is recognised that banks exert governance over the firms which they finance (La 
Porta et al., 2000; Levine, 1997), the corporate governance of banking firms themselves 
is not well understood (Adams and Mehran, 2003). The purpose of this final empirical 
chapter is to provide new insights into the nature of the relationship between regulation 
and corporate governance using a sample of bank mergers in Europe and the US. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the effectiveness of management monitoring is 
related to the degree to which the interests of managers and shareholders diverge. Con- 
46 Sections of this chapter have been published in Hagendorff, J., Collins, M. & Keasey, K. (2007b). Bank 
Governance and Acquisition Performance. Corporate Governance - An International Review, Vol. 15, No. 5. 
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sequently, the performance and governance of bidding banks form a suitable back- 
ground against which to examine whether certain types of governance structures safe- 
guard shareholders from managerial opportunism. As has been repeatedly demonstrated, 
merger activities, on average, lead to wealth losses for bidding bank shareholders (James 
and Weir, 1987; Houston and Ryngaert, 1994; DeLong and DeYoung, 2007; Hagendorff 
et al., 2008), 4' while managers at the bidding firm are set to benefit from higher prestige 
and increased remuneration packages in the post-merger period (Anderson et al., 2004; 
Masulis et al., 2007; Bliss and Rosen, 2001). 48 
Essentially, the question at hand is whether regulation acts as a substitute or a 
complement to management monitoring by shareholders. If regulation acts as a substi- 
tute to governance, regulators that restrict managerial discretion (e. g. in terms of the ac- 
tivities that banking firms may engage in), will cause board monitoring to play a lesser 
role in reducing the contracting cost between managers and shareholders in listed banks. 
The results reported in this chapter, however, are inconsistent with this view and point 
to a complementary role between bank regulation and governance instead. Accordingly, 
stricter regulation is associated with more effective governance mechanisms at bidding 
banks, possibly, because more stringent bank regulation is accompanied by regulatory 
pressure to adopt effective monitoring mechanisms (see Booth et al., 2002). 
Recent studies such as Adams and Mehran (2003) or Becher and Frye (2007) fo- 
cus their analysis on the relationship between firm governance and industry regulation 
by comparing the prevailing governance mechanisms (such as the composition of com- 
47 The results of previous chapters of this thesis are also consistent with financial sector M&A in the US 
and Europe being frequently associated with wealth losses (Chapter 5) and deteriorating corporate per- 
formance (Chapter 6) for the acquiring party. 
48 Section 1.4 (pg. 9) discusses theories of agency conflict and non-performing M&A activities in more 
detail. 
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pany boards) in regulated versus unregulated industries. It could, thus, be argued that 
these studies examine potential monitoring capabilities. By contrast, this chapter is con- 
cerned with the impact of monitoring in the context of M&A and, hence, with the ac- 
tual effectiveness of bidders' governance arrangements under different regulatory re- 
gimes. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section introduces 
the theoretic background to the analysis by discussing whether monitoring is a substitute 
or a complement to governance. Subsequently, the hypotheses are introduced; and the 
data and methodology are outlined. Section 7.5 presents the results of the empirical 
analysis. The final section briefly draws together the main conclusions. 
7.2 Bank Regulation: Substitute or Complement to Governance? 
Z2.1 The Substitution Hypothesis 
The view that regulation and governance act as substitutes-inter alia, by diminishing 
managerial discretion and its potentially negative effects on shareholder wealth- 
underlies most studies on firm governance. The substitution hypothesis posits that, be- 
cause monitoring is costly for shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Baysinger and 
Zardkoohi, 1986), shareholders will not duplicate efforts by bank regulators when miti- 
gating against agency cost. This assumption has led to the de facto exclusion of banks and 
other closely regulated firms such as utilities from applied governance research (Adams 
and Mehran, 2003). 
While the substitution hypothesis has not been extensively tested, some findings 
appear to back the notion that regulators act as a substitute for shareholder monitoring. 
Joskow et al. (1993) examine a sample of 2,000 US firms between 1970 and 1990 and 
find that CEOs in regulated industries receive smaller pay packages vis-ä-vis unregulated 
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industries. The authors argue that any discount in CEO compensation reflects the ex- 
tent to which regulators limit discretion and, ultimately, CEO productivity. By the same 
token, Kole and Lehn (1999) analyse changes in the governance system of the US airline 
industry over a 22-year period after its deregulation in 1978. The results show shifts in 
board structure and executive remuneration towards those of unregulated firms. 
For the banking industry, Becher et al. (2005) study the executive pay packages of 
14,000 US firms between 1992 and 1999 and find that director remuneration packages 
in the banking industry make less use of incentive compensation (i. e. exhibit a smaller 
share of equity-based pay) than unregulated industries. Adams and Ferreira (2006) find 
that directors in the US banking industry attend fewer board meetings than directors in 
non-financial industries. Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) provide evidence that the monitor- 
ing productivity of bank directors is lower compared with unregulated firms. For a sam- 
ple of US bank bidders, the authors find a negative relationship between the abnormal 
returns accruing to the shareholders of bidding banks at the time of the merger an- 
nouncement and the proportion of independent directors on the board of the same in- 
stitution. This finding also points to directors in regulated industries engaging in func- 
tions other than monitoring. For example, bank directors may be selected on the basis 
of how well they may deal with regulators. The role of bank directors may, thus, involve 
a substantial `public relations' element (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986). 
However, the results of an increasing number of studies are not consistent with 
the substitution hypothesis and, instead, point to a complementary role between regula- 
tion and corporate governance. Booth et al. (2002) analyse the boards of 300 large US 
companies in 1999 and find that regulated firms display more independent boards than 
unregulated firms. In the same vein, Adams and Mehran (2003) find that US BHCs have 
more independent boards, more committees and meet more frequently than the boards 
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of unregulated firms. Becher and Frye (2007) find for a sample of 400 initial public of- 
ferings (IPOs) in the US between 1993 and 1998 that regulated firms have more inde- 
pendent boards and do not use less incentive compensation than firms in non-regulated 
industries. These results clearly run counter to the notion that regulation and govern- 
ance are substitutes-one would not expect regulated industries to exhibit governance 
mechanisms that appear more adept at mitigating agency conflict. 
7.2.2 The Case for Complementarlty 
It can be easily observed that political institutions that support monitoring by share- 
holders (e. g. investor protection laws that promote transparency and disclosure and 
make contracts enforceable) are associated with more effective governance institutions 
(e. g. greater board independence, more active takeover markets). Corporate law theory 
posits that cross-country differences in company governance result from the varying 
degrees to which the legal and regulatory framework protects minority shareholders 
across countries (La Porta et al., 2000,2002; Nenova, 2003). However, stricter laws and 
regulation alone do not necessarily increase the effectiveness of governance arrange- 
ments. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
stock market capitalisations were higher in Germany and France than in the US, even 
though the legal and regulatory framework in the US favoured market-based governance. 
In the same vein, Dyck and Zingales (2004) show that the private benefits of control (a 
measure of contracting cost between managers and shareholders) vary across groups of 
countries with similar corporate disclosure and transparency regulations. 
If laws alone cannot account for differences in governance systems, what ensures 
regulation is a complement to governance? Becher and Frye (2007) argue that even 
when regulators do not stipulate specific governance arrangements, their presence co- 
erces regulated firms into adopting more productive governance structures. Roe (2003; 
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2005) explains that it is the political will behind governance laws (and not their design) 
which acts as the primary determinant of their effectiveness. "' Similarly, Mahoney (2001) 
argues that legal frameworks and regulations should not be understood as a narrow set 
of rules, but, in a wider sense, as governments signalling intent about good practice and 
commitment to intervene (enforce). A complementary role between regulation and firm- 
level governance would, thus, be consistent with governance laws posing a `threat of 
action' (see Booth et al., 2002). It is through this mechanism that stricter regulation may 
increase managerial compliance and, ultimately, the effectiveness of corporate govern- 
ance arrangements at firm-level. 
The `threat-of-action argument' may be applied to conceptualise differences in the 
design and regulation of banking systems across developed countries. Generally, the US 
can be described as having a more stringent regime of bank regulation compared with 
most European economies. This assessment can be illustrated by reference to the fol- 
lowing criteria (a more detailed list of regulatory differences is included in the Appendix 
to this chapter on pg. 191): 
(i) Activities. Banks in the US have traditionally not been allowed to diversify into 
non-depository activities. While most of these restrictions have been repealed 
by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, US banks still face restrictions in 
terms of M&A activities. For example banks are not allowed to take stakes in 
non-financial firms and any acquisition greater than 25% is subject to regula- 
tory approval. Banks in many European counties had enjoyed a more lenient 
49 Roe (2003) outlines that a lack of political will has a serious undermining effect on the enforcement of 
governance laws. In some countries, breaches of insider trading laws are viewed as the wealthy harming 
the wealthy and existing legislation to restrict such activities are, hence, seldom enforced. 
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regime as embodied in the long-established universal banking model in some 
European countries. 
(ii) Discipline. US bank directors face an increased risk of litigation. Following the 
savings and loan crisis in the early nineties, US regulators have introduced a 
`prompt corrective action scheme'. While no study quantitatively compares 
the liability risk that bank directors face across countries, the `duty of care' 
standards in the US appear harsher than anywhere else in the world (Fischer, 
1992). Adams and Ferreira (2006) describe that US regulators can freeze di- 
rectors' assets and impose civil fines of up to $1 million a day without trial or 
hearing. 
(iii) Capital regulation. There is still some uncertainty when and in which form the 
new international capital adequacy standards (Basel II) will be adopted in the 
US. While the EU will adopt Basel II by 2008, the US regulatory authorities 
have delayed its adoption on the grounds that the proposed capital charges 
are too low and the regulatory regime too lenient. 
Whether regulation acts as a substitute or a complement to corporate governance 
can be tested for a sample of bank merger announcements in Europe and the US using 
a simple hypothesis. In this chapter, monitoring productivity is measured as the effec- 
tiveness of bidder board characteristics in securing positive performance results for bid- 
ding shareholders. If regulation and governance are substitutes (complements), one may 
expect more stringent US regulation to be associated with a lower (higher) marginal 
monitoring productivity of boards. Consequently, the basic hypotheses to be tested in 
this chapter are: 
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HN: The productivity of board monitoring is higher in Europe than in the US. 
(Substitution hypothesis) 
HA: The productivity of board monitoring is higher in the US than in Europe. 
(Complementarity hypothesis) 
7.3 Hypotheses Development: 
Board Monitoring and Acquisition Performance 
The board of directors of publicly traded companies is among the most important in- 
ternal control mechanisms for promoting and protecting shareholder interests due to its 
role in providing expertise and monitoring managerial discretion (Fama, 1980). Boards 
have the authority to ratify or obstruct managerial initiatives, to assess the performance 
of top management, and to determine managerial compensation packages as well as ca- 
reer paths at a particular firm. Board monitoring of management could prove particu- 
larly effective in minimising agency cost for M&A activities, because acquisitions require 
board approval (or at least some form of consultation process) by statute in most coun- 
tries (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
The following board characteristics and their role in facilitating effective monitor- 
ing of management in particular of acquisitions undertaken at the expense of share- 
holder wealth-are discussed below: board size, board activity, leadership structure, 
board independence, CEO age and tenure, and board diversity. The resulting hypothe- 
ses are presented null form. 
Z3.1 Board Independence 
One way to increase the monitoring productivity of a board is to maintain a balance be- 
tween a company's own directors and members from outside the bank. In theory, the 
former are involved in the day-to-day running of the firm, while the latter draw on wider 
experience and expertise and may provide an outsider's, more objective evaluation of 
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managerial performance. Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that outside directors are incen- 
tivised to monitor diligently, because they seek to protect their reputation as effective 
monitors of managerial discretion. 
Studies of non-financial firms have shown that a higher proportion of independ- 
ent directors on the board is associated with a higher likelihood of CEO dismissal 
(Weisbach, 1988) and a positive market reaction to merger announcements (Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992). On the other hand, Hayward and Hambrick (1997) cannot find any 
evidence that the share of independent bank directors reduces the risk of CEOs over- 
paying for acquisitions. Consistent with this, Lehn and Zhao (2006) show that more in- 
dependent boards are not more likely to replace CEOs after underperforming takeovers. 
For the banking industry, Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) find a negative relationship 
between board independence and abnormal returns accruing to the shareholders of bid- 
ding banks at the time of the merger announcement. The authors interpret this as evi- 
dence that regulation and firm-level governance act as substitutes. By contrast, Cornett 
et al. (2003) examine the governance arrangements of bidding banks and find that more 
independent bidder boards increase the announcement period returns that bidding 
banks realise. This chapter tests the following hypothesis. 
HE Board independence has no effect on the performance of bank M&A. 
Z3.2 Board Activity 
Are busy boards more effective monitors? The argument posits that if boards meet 
more frequently and directors interact more often, board vigilance will increase and 
value-destroying acquisitions will become less likely. Vafeas (1999) and Fich and 
Shivdasani (2006) report a negative association between board meetings and corporate 
valuations for non-financial firms in the US. However, Vafeas (1999) also proffers evi- 
dence consistent with board activity as a consequence rather the cause of underperfor- 
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mance. The author shows for a sample of 304 US firms between 1990 and 1994 that the 
frequency of board meetings increases sharply following declines in a firm's share price. 
The literature has yet to study the effects of board activity on acquisition per- 
formance in the banking industry. Adams and Mehran (2005) investigate a related ques- 
tion by examining whether active boards increase market valuation, but cannot find any 
evidence consistent with this. Thus, 
H2: There is no relationship between the frequency of BHC board meetings before 
an acquisition and M&A performance. 
7.3.3 Board Size 
While large boards are deemed less effective monitors of managerial discretion, there is 
little empirical evidence in support of this. Jensen (1993) argues that larger boards, by 
hindering communication, coordination and, ultimately, decision-making, can more eas- 
ily fall under control of the CEO and, consequently, are more at risk to be driven by a 
non-value maximising agenda. Yermack (1996) finds for 452 US firms in the 1980s that 
smaller boards are associated with higher corporate values. By contrast, Masulis et 
al. (2007) examine a sample of 3,000 acquisitions between 1990 and 2003 and cannot 
detect that board size affects the returns that bidding bank shareholders realise in the 
announcement period. In the same vein, Lehn and Zhao (2006) find no evidence that 
smaller boards in the US exert more pressure on acquiring CEOs to resign following 
value-destroying acquisitions. 
On the other hand, the special position of banking as a regulated industry may 
mean that size has a positive impact on merger performance. Research in a US-context 
clearly shows that banking firms have larger boards than non-financial firms. This is 
partly due to state-level stipulations on the composition of banks' boards (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003), and partly because board size is a function of organisational complexity 
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(Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). It is conceivable that larger boards, with a larger num- 
ber of outside directors, have more outside links to, say, regulators which can be very 
valuable in the context of merger approvals (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986). 
Examining the effects of board size on the market reaction to bank mergers in the 
US, Subrahmanyam et al. (1997) do not find evidence that board size affects the market 
reaction to bank M&A. However, Adams and Mehran (2005) find a positive association 
between board size and performance (as proxied by Tobin's q) in the US banking indus- 
try. The authors suggest that this result may be caused by an M&A-related endogeneity 
issue. If high q firms are more likely to engage in M&A, more M&A deals may lead to 
an increase in the number of directors in the aftermath of an acquisition. On the basis 
of the above findings, therefore: 
H3: Board size will not affect bank acquisition performance. 
7.3.4 Chairman / CEO Duality 
Another important aspect of effective governance hinges on whether the positions of 
the CEO and the board chairman are separate or, alternatively, duality prevails. Jensen 
(1993) argues that consolidating the two positions in one person leads to a concentra- 
tion of power and impairs effective board monitoring. On the other hand, Brickley et al. 
(1997) suggest that a separate CEO-chairman leadership structure generates agency 
costs based on informational inefficiencies between the two roles. Consequently, moni- 
toring benefits associated with separating the roles of CEO and chairman are partly 
marginalised over the issue of `who monitors the monitor'? 
If keeping the duties of CEO and chairman separate increases the monitoring ef- 
fectiveness of boards, one would expect such a leadership structure to be associated 
with better performance. Rechner and Dalton (1991) and Baliga et al. (1996) find that 
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firms perform better when the leadership structure is separated, while Brickley et al. 
(1997) cannot find any difference. Goyal and Park (2002) show that the CEOs of un- 
derperforming companies are less likely to be dismissed under a unified board leader- 
ship structure. As regards M&A, Masulis et al. (2007) show that separating the positions 
of CEO and chairman of the board leads to higher bidder announcement returns and 
may help thwart empire-building ambitions by CEOs. On the other hand, Hayward and 
Hambrick (1997) find that the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman fails to en- 
sure that CEOs do not overpay for acquisition targets. 
To date, the performance effects of a separated board leadership structure have 
not been examined in the context of banking firms. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
following is hypothesised: 
H4: CEO / Chairman duality has no effect on bank AMA performance. 
Z3.5 CEO Age & Tenure 
Both CEO age as well as CEO tenure reflect the level of expertise accumulated by the 
top executive regarding the organisational as well as the wider economic environment of 
a bank. Longer-tenured and older CEOs have been found to be less likely to harm 
shareholders' interests. For example, Kosnik (1990) finds that older CEOs engage less 
frequently in greenmail transactions where CEOs privately repurchase equity from dis- 
sident shareholders at a premium. 
For the US banking industry, Cornett et al. (2003) show that CEO age is posi- 
tively and significantly related to the announcement period returns that bidding banks 
realise. However, with regards to the long-term performance of banks, Cornett et al. 
(2007) as well as Lehn and Zhao (2006) cannot find any evidence consistent with older 
CEOs improving the industry-adjusted profitability of a sample of US banks. Thus, 
H5: CEO age and CEO tenure are not related to acquisition performance. 
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7.3.6 Board Diversity 
Organisational outcomes are a consequence of fit between various processes within an 
organisation and how these are moderated by factors such as the environment, technol- 
ogy, and culture (Richard, 2000). Claims that more female or ethnic minority directors 
improve corporate performance have led to frequent calls from policymakers for greater 
diversity in the boardroom (see for example, Financial Times, January 6 2006). 50 It is 
commonly argued that, while heterogeneous groups are more prone to conflict (Blau, 
1977), they also benefit from increased creativity and innovation, partly based on supe- 
rior capabilities for learning and self-reflection (Ely and Thomas, 2001). Organisational 
scholars maintain that diverse groups, through interaction between the various group 
members, produce a variety of different perspectives that will ultimately improve the 
quality of decision-making (Maznevski, 1994). In this chapter, it is hypothesised that di- 
verse boards are more activist and will, thus, raise issues that are less likely to be dis- 
cussed by more homogeneous groups. 
While the literature has yet to study the impact of board diversity on M&A per- 
formance, the proposition that diverse boards are more critical of the performance ef- 
fects of bank M&A is based on a number of previous studies. Adams and Ferreira (2004) 
examine gender diversity in the boardroom of Fortune 500 firms and find evidence con- 
sistent with diversity improving the quality of board monitoring. Thus, boards with a 
higher share of female directors are associated with improved director attendance at 
board meetings, more frequent meetings, and executive remuneration that follows cor- 
50 For a sample of US Fortune 1000 firms in 1999, Carter et al. (2003) find that one in four companies do 
not have any female directors on their board and that more than half do not have a member of an ethnic 
minority on the board. For the UK, Conyon and Mallin (1997) examine the boards of FTSE 350 compa- 
nies in 1995 and find that while 2.5% of directors are female, less than 0.5% of directors are female execu- 
tive directors. 
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porate performance more closely. Research on the impact of board diversity by Shrader 
et al. (1997) in a US multi-industry setting finds a positive link between gender diversity 
and firm performance at the middle and upper management level, but not for female 
representation on boards. Erhardt et al. (2003) analyse the performance effects follow- 
ing the appointment of members of ethnic minorities for 137 US firms and find a posi- 
tive relation between the number of board members that are either female or belong to 
an ethnic minority group and profitability measures such as return on investment or re- 
turn on assets. 
As regards the banking industry, Bantel and Jackson (1989) use survey data to ex- 
amine the relationship between top management team diversity and the innovativeness 
of around 200 US banks in the 1980s. The overall results indicate that innovative banks 
are managed by teams that are more diverse with respect to their functional back- 
grounds, but not with respect to age or education. Specifically, culturally diverse teams 
are found to exhibit diversity in ideas and approaches to problem solving. In the same 
vein, Richard (2000) looks at how workforce diversity at banks affects employee pro- 
ductivity and management's self-reported measures of market performance for a sample 
of 574 US banks. The author finds that US bank managers perceive diversity to create 
value. Hence, the final hypothesis is: 
H6: The diversity of the bidding bank's board does not improve bank merger 
performance. 
7.4 Data and Methodology 
74.1 Data Sources and Research Method 
This chapter examines both market reactions and financial performance over three years 
following bank mergers. The sample consists of completed bank M&A announcements 
between 1996 and 2004 in Europe and the US (please refer to Section 3.3 for a discus- 
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sion of how the dataset was compiled). Bidding banks' announcement returns are meas- 
ured by market model-adjusted returns. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calcu- 
lated over an event window of (t-2, t+2) with 0 as the announcement date supplied by 
Thomson Financial. Market model parameters are estimated using 100-day daily return 
observations starting from 121 days to 21 days before the acquisition announcement 
(see Dodd and Warner, 1983). Share price data and value-weighted national bank-sector 
indices are from Datastream. 51 
Long-term performance changes are measured as pre-tax operating cash flows 
(=income before taxes and extraordinary items plus debt expenses) divided by the book 
value of assets. This measure is denoted OPCFROA. As outlined in Section 6.4.2 (pg. 
131), one of the advantages of OPCFROA is that it is not sensitive to the method of 
deal finance (debt finance means lower post-merger profitability), while controlling for 
interest payments to depositors. Also, OPCFROA is a more precise measure of actual 
performance changes than Tobin's q-a metric routinely used in corporate governance 
research. As pointed out by Cornett et al. (2007), because Tobin's q controls for market 
valuation, this measure partly reflects growth opportunities. Consequently, poorly- 
performing firms may still deliver above-market returns to shareholders, for example on 
the back of speculation that a firm might become a takeover target. Financial statement 
data are obtained from the Worldscope database and adjusted by mean industry per- 
formance (based on an asset-weighted index of all banks available on Worldscope in the 
acquirer's country) to control for extraneous effects that affect the entire industry. Fol- 
lowing Berger et al. (1999), who argue it takes three years for merger-related gains to 
fully materialise, performance changes are computed as changes in industry-adjusted 
OPCFROA from one year before the completion of a merger to three years afterwards. 
51 Section 3.2.1 (pg. 35) discusses the method used to calculate announcement returns in more detail. 
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Table 7-1 Variable Definitions: Bidder Boards 
All variables are collected at the BHC-level of bidding banks and, unless stated otherwise, refer to the year of the acquisi- 
tion announcement. In countries, where two-tier board structures prevail, data are collected for the executive board as 
identified in OECD (2004). Governance data on US banks are from proxy statements filed with the Securities and IEx- 
change Commission (SEC). For European bidders, data were extracted from annual reports and other company publica- 
tions such as corporate governance reports and press releases. Filings were collected for the year before a deal was an- 
nounced. 
Variable Name Explanation 
Board size Number of directors. 
Board independence Proportion of the board that consists of independent directors. Directors are independent if 
they arc not employees, former employees, or relatives of employees (see Hermalin and 
Weisbach, 2003). 
Board activeness Number of board meetings per annum (including extraordinary meetings). 
CEO / chair duality Dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the bidding CEO is also the chairman of the 
board and zero otherwise. 
CEO age Age of the CEO. 
Mean age Mean age of the members of the board of directors. 
CEO tenure Tenure of the CEO. 
Mean tenure Mean tenure of the members of the board of directors. 
No. of women Number of female directors on the board. 
Mean outside directorships Average number of outside board memberships held by members of the board. 
Audit, remuneration, and Number of committee meetings per year. 
appointment committee 
activeness 
Occupational diversity Based on Blau's (1977) measure of heterogeneity. Following Hillman et al. (2000), directors 
are categorised as insiders, outsider business experts (e. g., CEO or senior manager of for- 
profit firms), support specialists (such as law and accounting experts), or community leaders 
(e. g. politicians, clergy, academics). The following Herfmdahl-type index is computed: 1- 
Ep?, wherep is the proportion of group members in r different categories. In the presence 
of these four groups, the diversity index varies between 0.75 (maximum diversity) and 0.25 
(minimum diversity) depending on the distribution of group members across the board. 
Finance background Proportion of independent directors with independent directorships in financial services 
companies. 
No. of indep. board com- Number of board committees chaired by an independent director. 
mittees 
Age diversity Mean age of directors on the board divided by the standard deviation of director age across 
the board. 
Tenure diversity Mean tenure of directors on the board divided by the standard deviation of director tenure 
across the board. 
Gender diversity Number of women on board divided by board size. 
Expertise diversity Mean number of outside directorships of directors on the board divided by the standard 
deviation of outside directorships across the board. 
Sowm. SEC, company data 
In order to assess the effectiveness of board monitoring variables in improving 
acquisition outcomes, a unique dataset on the size, composition and diversity of acquir- 
ing banks' boards was manually collected. Governance data on US bidding banks were 
obtained from proxy statements filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC). For European bidders, data were extracted from annual reports and other com- 
pany publications such as corporate governance reports and press releases that contain 
information about a bank's board and its directors. In all cases, data are compiled using 
the last filing or publication before a deal was announced so as to analyse the board 
characteristics prevailing at the time of the deal announcement. Definitions of the board 
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variables that have been collected for the purpose of this study are provided in Table 
7-1. 
Z4.2 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7-2 presents summary statistics on the board characteristics of bidding banks in 
Europe and the US. Board structure is a costly input into the monitoring of manage- 
ment. If regulation were a substitute to governance, one would expect to observe fewer 
board characteristics that are commonly associated with improved monitoring by share- 
holders in the US than in a European market context. However, the univariate tests re- 
ported in Table 7-2 for US and European banking firms are not consistent with our ex- 
pectation 52 
US boards are more independent than the boards of European banks. The aver- 
age (median) percentage of independent directors on US boards is 81% (82%) com- 
pared with 70% (67%) in Europe (both t-statistic and z-statistic significant at 1%). 53 Fur- 
ther, US bank boards have significantly fewer members than European boards. For 
European boards, mean board size is 17.25 compared with 14.93 in the US, while me- 
dian board sizes are 18 and 14 in Europe and the US, respectively (again, both t-statistic 
52 Arguably, recent regulatory changes such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US in 2002 may well mean 
that some board ratios presented for the US have become outdated. As a result of these regulatory 
changes, one may expect an increase in the share of independent board directors (see Wintoki, 2007). 
53 The relatively greater board independence in the US may also be due to labour market regulations in 
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden that reserve a certain number of directorships 
for insiders such as employee representatives. According to the co-determination law in Germany, seats 
on supervisory boards of publicly-traded companies with more than 2,000 employees must be equally 
divided between the representatives of shareholders and employees. 
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and z-statistic significant at 1%). 54 Also, US bank directors are slightly older, longer- 
tenured and serve under a CEO who is also longer-tenured. The mean (median) number 
of outside directorships that bank directors hold is 0.89 (0.67) in the US compared with 
1.69 (1.54) in Europe 55 With respect to the computed diversity indices, European bank 
boards are more diverse in terms of director expertise (i. e. the number of outside direc- 
torships across the board). For US bank acquirers, mean (median) expertise diversity is 
0.75 (0.92) and 1.05 (1.08) in Europe (differences significant at 1%). US boards, on the 
other hand, are more heterogeneous in terms of the gender and occupational back- 
ground of directors (differences significant below 1%-level according to the t- and z- 
statistic). Interestingly, the already lower number of female directors on European 
boards is almost exclusively made up of union representatives. Not a single independent 
female director could be identified in Italy, Spain or Germany. 
Boards can delegate some of their authority to committees which are responsible 
to the board in separate and narrowly-defined areas. Thus, if boards have many commit- 
tees, committees become the main mechanism through which directors carry out their 
oversight duties (Klein, 1998). US banks have a significantly higher number of board 
committees, more of which are independent (i. e. chaired by an independent director), 
but which, with the exception of the remuneration committee, do not hold more meet- 
ings that board committees in Europe. The frequency at which acquiring bank's CEOs 
also serve as chairman of the board is significantly lower in the US than in Europe 
54 The data on board size are comparable to Adams and Mehran (2003) who report an average board size 
of 18 in the US banking industry for a sample of 35 BHCs between 1986 and 1999. 
55It could be argued that the higher number of outside directorships of European directors is reflective of 
the practice of cross-holdings whereby groups of companies maintain sizable equity holdings of each 
group member in order to gain representation on each others' boards. 
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Chapter 7: Regulation and Performance 
which is surprising given the statutory requirement to establish a two-tier board struc- 
ture in some European countries (e. g. Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden). 
Again, the findings that US bank boards are more independent, with more inde- 
pendent board committees and, by most measures, more diverse directors, are not con- 
sistent with the substitution hypothesis. If regulation were a substitute to monitoring by 
shareholders, one would expect shareholders in the US, where bank regulation has been 
more stringent over the sample period than in most European countries, to place less 
emphasis on board independence and diversity than their more lightly regulated com- 
petitors in Europe. 
The next section examines the marginal monitoring effectiveness of the various 
board characteristics in the context of merger announcements-a corporate event fre- 
quently linked to managerial opportunism (Morck et al., 1990; Masulis et al., 2007). 
7.5 Empirical Analysis 
75.1 Corporate Governance and BidderAnnouncement Returns 
Table 7-3 presents preliminary tests of the monitoring effectiveness of bank boards in 
Europe and the US. The table presents expected performance gains (5-day CAR) and 
the board characteristics of bidding banks prevalent in the highest and lowest an- 
nouncement return tercile. sb In Europe (Panel A), there is only limited evidence pointing 
towards the governance of bidding banks as partly determining the market reaction to 
bank M&A. The only exceptions are board size and board activity (albeit differences are 
only significant at the 10%-level according to both t-tests and z-tests). First, for board 
size, the low return tercile is associated with a mean (median) number of directors of 
56 This test was also performed using longer event window specifications. The results are not markedly 
different for other narrow event-windows (up to [t-1, t+10]) surrounding the acquisition announcement. 
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17.45 (16), while the corresponding value in the portfolio of high returns is 15.3 (15.5). 
Second, more active boards are linked to higher announcement returns. European 
boards in the high return tercile, on average, have three more meetings per fiscal year 
than boards in the low return tercile. 
Panel B compares governance arrangements in the highest and the lowest return 
portfolio of US banks. Older CEOs as well as boards with older directors are associated 
with higher announcement returns (all significant at 1% according to both the t-test and 
the z-test). Also, there is a positive association between occupational heterogeneity (t- 
statistic significant at 5%, insignificant z-statistic) as well as between age heterogeneity 
and announcement returns. There is also an indication that more independent boards 
are associated with higher 5-day CAR, albeit, this result is significant at 5% according to 
the t-test yet insignificant according to the z-test. By and large, the results for US bid- 
ding banks show that older CEOs and board members as well as, possibly, more inde- 
pendent boards exhibit a higher monitoring productivity. Also, the positive sign on the 
coefficients of the two diversity indices may be interpreted as pointing towards en- 
hanced performance effects for decisions undertaken by more heterogeneous boards. 
Collectively, the results of Table 7-3 provide a first indication that board monitor- 
ing has a role to play in preventing managerial opportunism at bank acquirers and, most 
importantly, that the productivity of board monitoring appears to be higher in the US. 
The results for US bidding banks show that older CEOs and board members as well as, 
possibly, more independent boards exhibit a higher monitoring productivity. Also, the 
positive sign on the coefficients of two diversity indices may be interpreted as market 
investors expecting enhanced performance effects for decisions undertaken by more 
heterogeneous boards. The next section analyses the market reaction to bank M&A an- 
nouncements using regression analysis. 
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Table 7-3 Corporate Governance Variables by Terciles, Ranked by CAR<r-2; t+2) For a sample of 137 completed bank mergers between 1996 and 2004 in Europe and the US, the table presents descriptive statistics for 
board variables for the highest and the lowest one third of observations based on five-day abnormal returns (market model) around 
acquisition announcements. t-Statistics test for differences in means and z-statistics test for differences in medians (based in a two-sample 
Wilcoxon test). 
Lowest One Third Highest One Third A(Lo w-High) 
N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max Mean Median 
Panel A. European Banks 
Board Size 11 17.45 16 8 25 10 15.3 15.5 9 21 2.15 0.50 
No. of Indep. Directors 11 12.45 12 5 18 10 9.8 10.5 6 13 2.65 1.50 
Board Independence 11 0.72 0.71 0.45 0.92 10 0.66 0.63 0.55 0.91 0.06 0.08 
Board Activeness 10 9.71 9 6 14 10 12.75 14.5 7 15 -3.04 -5.50 
CEO / Chair Duality? (I =yes) 11 0.91 1 0 1 10 0.8 10 1 0.11 0 
CEO Age (years) 10 53.6 53 49 60 9 57.44 59 46 65 -3.84 -6 
CEO Tenure (years) 10 5.4 5 1 13 9 4.71 31 10 0.69 2 
Mean Director Age (years) 11 57.36 57.02 53.3 60.38 10 57.37 58.74 51.09 60.91 -0.01 -1.72 
Mean Director Tenure (years) 8 4.88 5.22 2.2 6.78 10 5.38 5.14 4.36 6.64 -0.5 0.08 
No. of Women Directors 10 1.1 1 0 2 10 0.8 00 4 0.3 1 
Occupational Diversity 10 0.56 0.54 0.46 0.69 10 0.53 0.5 0.37 0.68 0.03 0.04 
Audit Comm. Activeness 11 4.6 4 3 8 10 4 42 6 0.6 0 
Remunerat. Comm. Activeness 10 2.2 3 0 4 10 7 77 7 -4.8 -4 
No. of Board Committees 11 3.36 4 1 5 93 31 5 0.36 1 
No. of Indep. Committees 10 2.6 2.5 0 5 9 1.67 1.5 0 4 0.93 1 
Share of Indep. Committees 10 0.7 0.9 0 1 9 0.47 0.5 0 0.8 0.23 0.40 
Age Diversity 11 8.87 8.75 5.78 12.4 10 10.04 9.98 5.26 14.94 -1.17 -1.23 
Tenure Diversity 11 1.32 1.44 0.73 2 11 1.52 1.31 1.22 2.01 -0.2 0.13 
Expertise Diversity 11 0.99 1.05 0.47 1.61 10 0.96 0.87 0.84 1.16 0.03 0.18 
Gender Diversity 10 0.06 0.06 0 0.09 10 0.05 00 0.2 0.01 0.06 
Panel B: US Banks 
Board Size 31 14.55 14 6 31 30 14.7 13.5 8 26 -0.15 0.50 
No. of Indep. Directors 31 11.87 11 5 27 30 12.3 11 6 23 -0.43 0 
Board Independence 31 0.80 0.79 0.56 0.94 30 0.83 0.84 0.55 0.94 -0.03 -0.05 
Board Activeness 31 9.77 10 4 16 30 9.37 9.5 4 15 0.4 0.50 
CEO / Chair Duality? (I =yes) 31 0.26 0 0 1 30 0.37 00 1 -0.11 0 
CEO Age (years) 31 53.03 53 42 61 30 56.23 57 46 66 -3.2 "" -4 "' 
CEO Tenure (years) 31 12.29 12 2 28 30 12.3 13 1 25 -0.01 -1 
Mean Director Age (years) 31 58.34 58.33 53.75 61.89 30 60.54 60.07 52.25 71.88 -2.2- -1.74 
Mean Director Tenure (years) 31 9.55 9.33 4.5 16.5 30 9.84 9.43 4 17 -0.29 -0.10 
No. of Women Directors 31 1.26 1 0 4 30 1.2 10 4 0.06 0 
Occupational Diversity 31 0.54 0.56 0.28 0.72 30 0.57 0.59 0.20 0.76 -0.03 - -0.03 
Audit Comm. Activeness 28 3.89 4 1 11 28 4.75 40 13 -0.86 0 
Remunerat. Comm. Activeness 27 4.04 4 0 9 28 4 40 7 0.04 0 
No. of Board Committees 31 3.9 3 2 8 30 4.4 42 7 -0.5 
No. of Indep. Committees 24 3.71 3 2 7 27 3.52 31 5 0.19 0 
Share of Indep. Committees 24 0.9 1 0.33 1 27 0.8 0.83 0.17 1 0.1 0.17 
Age Diversity 31 7.62 7.45 4.51 13.49 30 8.54 7.60 4.51 13.49 -0.92" -0.15' 
Tenure Diversity 31 1.46 1.24 0.92 4.35 30 1.45 1.24 0.79 4.69 0.01 0 
Expertise Diversity 27 0.69 0.71 0.2 1.59 30 0.76 0.65 0.26 1.9 -0.07 0.06 
Gender Diversity 31 0.09 0.08 0 0.25 30 0.07 0.07 0 0.21 0.02 0.01 
* significant at 10"/0; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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7.5.2 Regression Results: 
Bidding Bank Board Characteristics and Bidder Returns 
Table 7-4 presents regression results examining whether board characteristics of the 
bidding bank impact expected merger gains as reflected in cumulative abnormal returns 
over a five-day event window, (t-2, t+2). The table shows that there are systematic differ- 
ences in the effectiveness of board monitoring when it comes to preventing adverse an- 
nouncement effects on shareholder wealth for US and European bidders. 
Regression 1 reports few indications that board characteristics drive bank merger 
announcement returns for the sample of European bank mergers. The only variables 
that exert a statistically significant influence on bidder wealth are the log transformation 
of CEO age and age diversity (both at the 10%-level). The association between CEO 
age and 5-day CAR is positive suggesting that acquisitions made by more experienced 
CEOs carry higher credibility in terms of their value-creating potential. The negative 
coefficient on age diversity shows that boards which are homogeneous in terms of di- 
rector age are associated with higher expected gains from a proposed deal (significant at 
10%-level). However, age is the only diversity variable that enters Regression 1 signifi- 
candy. Otherwise, there is no evidence that the diversity of the bidding bank's board 
impacts expected gains from bank mergers in Europe. Collectively, Table 7-4 indicates 
that, if any, board monitoring has only a negligible role to play in preventing value- 
destroying acquisition strategies in European banking. Section 7.5.4 explores some ex- 
planations for the apparent ineffectiveness of European governance mechanisms to in- 
crease post-merger performance. 
The results for US banks (Regression 2), by contrast, identify a number of board 
characteristics which are related to bidder returns. Both the coefficients on board ac- 
tiveness and board independence have positive and significant signs and are significantly 
different from zero at the 5%-level. This indicates that boards that hold meetings more 
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Table 7-4 CAR(,. 2; t+2) and Board Characteristics at the Time of 
M&A Announcements 
The table provides results of general least squares regressions based on a sample of Euro- 
pean and US bidding banks. The dependent variable is five-day abnormal bidder returns 
(market model) from 2 days before to 2 days after the acquisition announcement. Govern- 
ance variables are defined in Table 7-1. 
(1) 
European Banks 
(2) 
US Banks 
ln(Board size) 0.320 -0.063 
(2.687) (0.258) 
ln(Board Activity) -0.033 3.788** 
(0.220) (1.202) 
Chair / CEO duality 1.537 0.028 
(1.150) (0.174) 
% independent directors -0.606 8.462** 
(0.372) (2.839) 
In(CEO age) 9.441* 1.713* 
(4.957) (0.948) 
In(CEO tenure) -0.535 -0.040 
(0.663) (0.105) 
Occupational diversity -1.949 1.366** 
(4.584) (0.655) 
Age diversity -0.748* 0.010 
(0.402) (0.038) 
Gender diversity 0.074 -0.701 
(8.391) (1.402) 
Expertise diversity 0.199 0.897*** 
(0.727) (0.245) 
Constant -31.955 -7.184* 
(22.475) (3.877) 
Observations 31 94 
R-squared (%) 2.20 9.52 
Heteroscedasuuty-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
frequently as well as boards that exhibit a higher share of independent directors inspire 
investor confidence in the value-creating potential of a deal. There is also evidence con- 
sistent with more heterogeneous boards generating higher announcement returns in the 
US banking industry. Thus, there is a positive association between occupational diversity 
and five-day CAR (significant at 5%) as well between expertise diversity and five-day 
CAR (significant at 1%). Expectations about merger-related gains following a deal are, 
consequently, greater if directors come from diverse backgrounds regarding their skills 
and links to other companies. Again, the positive sign on the diversity index reflects 
trust that market investors have in the quality of decisions made by heterogeneous 
groups. 
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The reported results show that far from substituting for governance, the US, de- 
spite its stricter form of regulatory supervision, exhibits boards that are more productive 
in monitoring manager's AMA strategies. The regression results, thus, point to a com- 
plementary role between bank regulation and bank governance. 
7.5.3 Performance Results of Board Characteristics 
Following the assessment of the value effects of board characteristics at the time of the 
acquisition announcement, this section examines whether board monitoring impacts 
upon changes in financial performance over a three-year period following the comple- 
tion of a deal in Europe and the US. Table 7-5 presents regressions of board characteris- 
tics on changes in market-adjusted OPCFROA between years -1 and 3. The results are 
broadly in line with the findings above on the market reaction to bank merger an- 
nouncements. Thus, monitoring plays virtually no role in determining the long-term 
performance of bank mergers in Europe, while various board characteristics impact 
upon post-merger performance changes. These results add further weight to regulation 
and board monitoring acting as complements. One would not expect the monitoring 
productivity to be relatively greater in the US if stricter bank regulation acted as a substi- 
tute to vigilance by shareholders. 
Specifically, Regression 1 of Table 7-5 shows that, for the subsection of European 
deals, board characteristics such as size and activeness are not remotely significant. Fur- 
ther, heterogeneity measures such as tenure diversity and occupational diversity exhibit 
positive signs on their coefficients, but are not statistically significant either. In Regres- 
sion 2, the effects of board monitoring on the post-merger performance of US deals are 
analysed. Board activeness enters the specification with a positive coefficient (significant 
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Table 7-5 Board Characteristics and Industry-adjusted 
Performance 
The table provides results of general least squares regressions based on a sample of 
European and US bidding banks. The dependent variable is bidder's industry-adjusted 
OPFCROA from year -1 to year 2 relative to deal completion. Governance variables 
are defined in Table 7-1 
(1) 
European Banks 
(2) 
US Banks 
In(Board size) -0.201 0.037 
(0.380) (0.296) 
In(Board activity) -0.084 0.313* 
(0.228) (0.178) 
Chair / CEO duality (I =yes) -0.026 -0.146 
(0.168) (0.124) 
% independent directors -0.195 -0.053 
(0.396) (0.306) 
In(CEO age) -1.040 -2.469*** 
(0.955) (0.713) 
]n(CEO tenure) -0.060 0.110 
(0.119) (0.109) 
Occupational diversity 1.117 1.354** 
(0.832) (0.614) 
Age diversity 0.710 0.586 
(0.764) (0.624) 
Gender diversity -5.241 -6.191 
(6.405) (5.112) 
Expertise diversity 0.745 1.216*** 
(0.62) (0275) 
Constant 4.806 8.745*** 
(4.077) (3.026) 
Observations 31 94 
R-squared (%) 6.41 14.51 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
at 8%) confirming boards that meet more frequently-and are, presumably, more scru- 
tineous-improve post-merger performance. The coefficient on the log of CEO age is 
negative and significant (at 1%) which suggests that younger CEOs are associated with 
stronger post-merger financial performance. Board size, board independence and lead- 
ership structure, on the other hand, have no significant bearing on industry-adjusted 
performance in the post-merger period. 
For the performance effects of board diversity in the US, the results of Regres- 
lion 2 echo earlier findings on the announcement returns of bank M&A. Thus, occupa- 
tional heterogeneity enters the specification with a positive sign (significant at 5%). Fur- 
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ther, there is a positive association between expertise diversity and performance- 
adjusted OPCFROA. This result confirms that diverse groups of board members, pos- 
sibly by improving the overall quality of decision making, have a positive bearing on 
post-merger performance. Yet, not all measures of board heterogeneity are associated 
with performance improvements. Age diversity enters Regression 2 with the expected 
positive sign, but is not statistically significant at customary levels. Gender diversity, 
which is not statistically significant either, exhibits a negative sign on the corresponding 
coefficient indicating more female directors are associated with weaker performance in 
the post-merger years. 
7.5.4 Can Shareholders Forecast Post-merger Performance? 
Since management monitoring by boards is found to partly determine both the 
short-term valuation effects as well as the long-term financial performance of US bank 
M&A, the question arises as to what extent can shareholders forecast the financial per- 
formance of M&A in Europe and the US at the time a deal is announced. The central 
proposition behind such an investigation is to test whether shareholders are able to dis- 
tinguish ex-ante between bank mergers with favourable and unfavourable performance 
implications. 
A number of US studies have examined whether the initial market reaction to 
merger announcements is a good indicator of performance changes associated with 
bi&A. Cornett and Tehranian (1992) discover a positive correlation between an- 
nouncement returns and financial performance. Pilloff (1996) and DeLong (2003b), by 
contrast, find initial market reactions are unreliable predictors of post-merger perform- 
ance. More specifically, DeLong (2003b) observes that investors' initial reaction form a 
credible assessment of the eventual performance implications of a deal only when the 
sources of post-merger performance improvements are rather obvious (e. g. geographic 
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or activity overlap). DeLong and DeYoung (2007) show that shareholders' ability to 
forecast financial performance increases with the number of completed deals in the 
three-years preceding a deal. This suggests the presence of information spillovers from 
completed D7&A into the public domain which help investors to evaluate the 
value-creating potential of bank mergers more accurately at the time of their announce- 
ment. 
As aforementioned, visual inspection of Table 7-4 and Table 7-5 reveals that a 
number of variables enter both the regressions on (t-2, t+2) as well as on industry- 
adjusted OPCFROA with similar coefficients. This is the case for the log transformation 
of board meetings, occupational diversity, and expertise diversity. If some of the drivers 
of short-term and long-term performance of M&A are identical, this supports the no- 
tion that shareholders, at least in part, may forecast post-merger at the time of an acqui- 
sition announcement. 
For other variables, the signs on the coefficients vary depending on whether 
5-day CAR or industry-adjusted OPCFROA is employed as dependent variable. For in- 
stance, younger CEOs in the US are associated with stronger financial performance 
(significant at 1%), while the initial market reaction is more favourable to US bank 
mergers announced by older CEOs (significant at 9%). Similarly, board independence 
(i. e. the share of outside board directors) has a positive bearing on announcement re- 
turns (significant at 5%), but no effect on long-term performance is reported. Appar- 
ently, investors misinterpret the performance implications of both age and board inde- 
pendence when a deal is announced. 
Table 7-6 tests the predictability-of-performance argument for European and US 
banks directly by including the market reaction (CAR) as well as interaction terms be- 
tween the different heterogeneity indices and CAR in regressions on industry-adjusted 
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OPCFROA. Including CAR provides a test of the ability of shareholders to forecast 
post-merger performance, while the interaction terms between CAR and the heteroge- 
neity indices hint at whether board diversity makes it easier or more difficult for inves- 
tors to anticipate the long-term financial implications of bank M&A. 
Table 7-6 reports broad evidence consistent with shareholders' ability to forecast 
the performance of bank mergers in the US, but not in a European market context. For 
US banks (Regressions 2,4 and 6), the coefficient on the market reaction to M&A is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5%-level indicating that the initial market reac- 
tion to US bank merger announcements is, indeed, a good indicator of eventual per- 
formance changes. Further, the interaction term between occupational diversity and 
5-day CAR in Regression 2 is -141.053 (statistically significant at the 1%-level). In con- 
junction with the positive coefficient on the market reaction variable, the negative coef- 
ficient on the interaction term indicates that, while market investors may identify per- 
formance-enhancing bank mergers a priori, they find it more difficult to do so in the 
presence of boards that exhibit a high degree of occupational background diversity. 
Similar results apply to the interaction effect between expertise diversity and announce- 
ment returns (Regression 4) which enters the specification with a negative sign as well 
(significant at 5%). By contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term between CAR 
and age diversity (Regression 6) is not statistically significant at customary levels (albeit 
the sign is negative as well). It is conceivable that age diversity does not affect the pre- 
dictability of bank merger outcomes in the same way as expertise or occupational diver- 
sity, because, out of the heterogeneity measures examined, age diversity is the metric 
most readily observable by outside investors. Consequently, the relatively higher ob- 
servability of age characteristics may leave investors less uncertain about the perform- 
ance effects associated with this form of diversity. 
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Table 7-6 Regressions on Industry-adjusted Performance with Interaction Terms 
The table provides results of general least squares regressions based on a sample of European and US bidding banks. The 
dependent variable is bidder's industry-adjusted OPFCROA from year -1 to year 2 following the bank merger completion 
years. Market reaction data (CAR) are based on (t-2, t+2) around the announcement date of deal (market model). 
Divenig index Occupational diversity Expertise diversity Age diversity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EUR US EUR US EUR US 
ln(Board size) -0.213 -0.220 -0.490 -0.180 -0.328 -0.050 
(0.394) (0.283) (0.385) (0.302) (0.367) (0.307) 
In(Board activity) -0.075 0.305* 0.109 0.308* 0.006 0.293 
(0.244) (0.163) (0.226) (0.172) (0.226) (0.190) 
Chair / CEO duality (I =yes) -0.030 -0.169 -0.056 -0.150 -0.074 -0.135 
(0.173) (0.115) (0.163) (0.121) (0.162) (0.125) 
% independent directors -0.180 -0.121 -0.405 -0.142 -0.354 -0.092 
(0.414) (0.282) (0.393) (0.299) (0.385) (0.310) 
In(CEO age) -1.041 -1.844** -0.630 -1.878** -0.792 -2.096*** 
(1.042) (0.700) (0.999) (0.744) (0.983) (0.763) 
ln(CEO tenure) -0.062 0.050 -0.096 0.076 -0.104 0.098 
(0.124) (0.112) (0.117) (0.106) (0.117) (0.109) 
Occupational diversity 1.179 1.582** 0.971 1.290** 0.671 -1.177* 
(0.914) (0.592) (0.804) (0.610) (0.813) (0.629) 
Age diversity 0.706 0.765 0.875 0.744 0.416 0.871 
(0.800) (0.575) (0.647) (0.574) (0.247) (0.607) 
Gender diversity 5.133 -7.083 9.298 -7.971 6.840 -6.884 
(6.723) (4.711) (6.535) (4.999) (6.311) (5.152) 
Expertise diversity 0.742 1234*** 0.856 1.265*** 0.630* 1.166*** 
(0.60) (0.252) (0.552) (0.268) (0.350) (0.288) 
Market reaction, CAR 0.059 0.619** 0.491 0.355** 0.710 0.311 *** 
(0.333) (0.257) (0.310) (0.267) (0.375) (0.161) 
Diversity index x CAR -9.689 -141.053*** 34.832 -55.301** -1.682 -10.427 
(54.057) (48.265) (19.209) (22.166) (4.455) (5.905) 
Constant 4.891 7.435** 3.967 7.025** 4.367 7.496** 
(4.399) (2.900) (4.158) (3.069) (4.116) (3.170) 
Observations 31 94 31 94 31 94 
R-squared (%) 5.81 24.62 5.24 23.50 4.84 24.77 
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980) are reported in parentheses. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
For European banks (Regressions 1,3, and 5), neither the market reaction (CAR), 
nor the interaction terms between the diversity measures and CAR enter the specifica- 
tions with a statistically significant coefficient. Thus, in the European banking industry, 
there is no evidence of either shareholders forecasting financial performance or, alterna- 
tively, shareholders' ability to forecast being moderated by board diversity. 
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7.6 Robustness 
The virtual absence of effective board monitoring in Europe in the context of AMA 
raises questions about whether alternative governance mechanisms that have not been 
controlled for in this chapter drive the reported results. For example, product market 
competition is a principal monitoring mechanism (Masulis et al., 2007; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Roe, 2003). With the exception of Germany and, perhaps, Italy, most 
European markets for retail banking services are considerably more concentrated than 
the US market (CEPR, 2005). Consequently, it is conceivable that in the face of in- 
creased competitive forces, European banks choose their governance optimally such 
that more vigilant boards have no marginal effect on merger outcomes. In order to test 
the argument that market concentration acts as a substitute to shareholder monitoring, a 
Herfindahl index" for each country is calculated and the regressions in Table 7-4 and 
Table 7-5 are run separately for the tercile of high and low market concentration. There 
are no statistically meaningful differences in the monitoring effectiveness of board vari- 
ables between the resulting portfolios. Consequently, the results reported are not driven 
by cross-country differences in market concentration levels. 
Do the reported results hold over time? Following the passing of the Gramm- 
Leach Bliley (GLBA) Act in 1999, one of the differences in bank regulation between 
Europe and the US-the activities that banking firms are permitted to engage in-has 
become less pronounced. Consequently, it may be the case that the results are weaker 
for the period that follows the deregulation of banking activities in the US. Conse- 
quently, the regressions in Table 7-4 and Table 7-5 are run separately for US bank merg- 
ers completed before 2000 (pre-GLB) and afterwards (post-GLB). There are only mar- 
57 Herfmdahl indices are computed as the sum of squares of the market shares of all banks available on 
Worlscope for a given country. Market shares are based on total assets. 
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ginal differences between the regression results in separate time periods and results for 
the complete sample period. In this context, it is important to bear in mind that there 
are other dimensions across which the regulatory environments in Europe and the US 
differ. For example, US regulators still impose higher libel risks on directors and that 
any company stake exceeding 25% is subject to regulatory approval. 
Serial acquisitions form a sizable share of M&A activities in the banking industry. 
For transactions that are part of a merger program, there may be an anticipation effect 
that potentially depresses the announcement returns that serial acquirers earn vis-ä-vis 
first-time bidders (see Song and Walkling, 2006). Alternatively, the long-term perform- 
ance effects of frequent acquirers may also be different. To account for this, a binary 
variable (zero for first bids and one for second or higher order bids) is added to the re- 
gressions on 5-day CAR and industry-adjusted OPCFROA. The merger program 
dummy does not enter the regressions at customary significance levels indicating that 
serial acquirers do not have different performance implications. 
7.7 Concluding Remarks 
Questions over the relationship between regulation and governance are linked to the 
wider debate of causality between regulation and the emergence of economic institu- 
tions that promote shareholder value. The scale of value-destroying bank M&A in 
Europe and the US suggests an analysis of bank merger activities in an agency cost-type 
framework. For a sample of large bank mergers in Europe and the US, this chapter 
analyses the marginal monitoring productivity of bidding boards in preventing value- 
destroying M&A under different bank regulatory regimes. The results presented point to 
a number of linkages between US bidding bank governance at the time of an acquisition 
announcement and the value effects as well as the profitability effects of M&A. For the 
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subset of European deals, however, there is a virtual absence of observable empirical 
relationships between the governance mechanisms examined and bidding bank per- 
formance. Thus, monitoring by shareholders has little effect on the returns that bidding 
banks realise in the market for corporate control, and practically no effect on the profit- 
ability outcomes of bank M&A in Europe. 
On the basis that the US exhibits and, by most measures, continues to exhibit the 
more stringent regulatory regime for banks compared with most European countries, 
these results are not consistent with the view that regulation and firm governance are 
substitutes. Rather, the findings reported in this chapter hint at a complementary rela- 
tionship between regulation and governance. This is an important issue since the view 
that regulation is a substitute to shareholder monitoring underlies most applied govern- 
ance research and has led to the de facto exclusion of banking firms from most govern- 
ance studies. While banks are different from non-financial firms on many accounts, the 
findings of this chapter suggest that the empirical basis for excluding banks from gov- 
ernance research, on the basis that regulators substitute for shareholder monitoring, is 
not well-founded. Fiore research that examines the effectiveness of established monitor- 
ing mechanisms in regulated and unregulated industries is clearly needed. Should future 
studies confirm the result of a complementary role between shareholder monitoring and 
corporate governance, there is a strong case for including banks and other highly regu- 
lated industries into multi-industry governance research. 
This chapter has not examined executive pay as a device to mitigate against con- 
tracting cost in the context of M&A. Accurate data on incentive pay (including stock 
options) for executives are not available for a number of European countries over the 
sample period. However, following recent corporate governance initiatives in countries 
such as Italy and Germany, research into the effectiveness of board monitoring across 
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regulatory regimes should be able to incorporate the effects of executive pay in the fu- 
ture. In the light of the main findings of this chapter, one would expect incentive pay to 
be less effective in curbing value-destroying bank mergers in Europe vis-ä-vis the US. 
7.8 Appendix 
See next page. 
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Conclusions 
8.1 Background to the Thesis 
In recent years, the value M&A activities have continually reached new heights. This is 
particularly true for banking firms which have been consolidating at a faster pace than 
any other economic sector. While rising M&A levels can be observed worldwide, the 
acquisition activities of banks were particularly pronounced in the US and Europe over 
the last decade. This follows a series of stimuli including industry deregulation, techno- 
logical advances, increasing competition from non-bank financial institutions and, relat- 
edly, overcapacity in many national banking sectors. 
A large and increasing body of empirical literature examines the performance ef- 
fects of bank mergers. The focus of these studies on a single industry is justified given 
the importance of banking for the wider economy and the fact that the sheer scale of 
bank M&A lets researchers analyse a sizable share of M&A activity while controlling for 
industry-specific factors. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that banking is dif- 
ferent from the provision of other goods and services, and that the M&A activities of 
banks warrant a related but separate discussion. Differences between banking and non- 
banking firms are rooted in (i) the role of informational efficiencies between borrowers 
and lenders as well as (ii) interference by regulatory authorities which, among othcr 
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things, restrict bank ownership. Both aspects have implications for the performance of 
M&A activities. 
Further, the extant literature on the performance of bank mergers is largely based 
on US evidence with few studies examining the performance effects of M&A in a dif- 
ferent market context. However, given differences in the structure of the banking sys- 
tems between Europe and the US as well as differences in the regulation of banking ac- 
tivities in both geographic regions, there are good reasons to believe that the perform- 
ance implications of M&A may be different outside the US. 
By examining the performance implications of bank M&A in different market 
contexts, it is possible to study the following questions: Are the performance implica- 
tions of bank M&A different for Europe and the US? Are there different motives be- 
hind bank mergers in Europe and the US? How do the legal and regulatory environ- 
ments impact on the returns that bidding banks realise? In this context, do differences 
in regulatory practises across countries raise issues about the nature of the relationship 
between governance and regulation? It is with these issues that this thesis has engaged 
and, in doing so, it is suggested that the study has deepened the understanding of bank 
M&A. 
8.2 Summary of Findings 
8.2.1 A Comparison of Bidder Performance in a US and non-US Context 
Chapters 5 and 6 offer a direct comparison between the performance implications of 
bank mergers in Europe and the US. Specifically, Chapter 5 examines the market reac- 
tion to bank merger announcements. The main finding of this chapter are negative mar- 
ket announcement returns to US bidders, while European bidders realise positive ab- 
normal returns. Also, the results show that bidding bank losses in the context of activ- 
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ity-diversifying bank mergers are more prevalent when targeted at European rather than 
at US institutions. Further, cash-financed deals in Europe receive a particularly positive 
market reaction and cross-border 1M1&A creates bidder wealth if acquisition targets arc 
located in less sophisticated investor protection environments than their acquirers. 
The findings regarding the market reaction to T7&A overlap to a great extent with 
results on the long-term performance of bidding banks as reported in Chapter 6. Spe- 
cifically, Chapter 6 finds that European bank mergers produce small performance gains 
for acquiring banks in the post-merger period, while US banking firms do not experi- 
ence any changes in performance as a result of M&A. The results also show that gains 
from operationally more complex deals such as cross-border mergers take more than 
three years to materialise. The profitability gains of European credit institutions are par- 
ticularly pronounced for product diversifying and cross-border mergers. Also, the re- 
sults show that European banks underperform their peers in the year before an acquisi- 
tion. This result is in stark contrast to findings on US institutions which documents that 
bidders are strong pre-merger performers. 
8.2.2 Motivations behind Bank Mergers in Europe and the US 
Chapter 6 also examines the motivation behind M&A. Thus, financial statements are 
analysed for, what possibly are, the two reasons most frequently-cited by bank managers 
for engagement in M&A: the ability to cut costs, and the ability to increase revenue in 
the post-merger period. Chapter 6 finds some evidence consistent with European banks 
pursuing a cost-cutting strategy during the three years following a merger. Specifically, 
banks in Europe manage to reduce non-interest expenses and, to some extent, retreat 
from lending activities in the post-merger period. US banks, by contrast, manage to in- 
crease their on- and off-balance sheet activities, thus, pointing towards revenue- 
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enhancement as a motivation behind M&-A. However, US banks experience a slight de- 
terioration in cost efficiency in the post-merger period. 
Since the results of Chapter 6 point to slightly negative performance implications 
for US bank M&A, the following question arises. If banks that engaged in M&A do not 
outperform those that did not, why are shareholders exposed to the substantial risk of 
value losses associated with M&A? Such a question fundamentally concerns the nature 
and effectiveness of the governance structures of bidding banks, and implies that better 
monitoring by shareholders could have a positive impact on the post-merger perform- 
ance of bank M&A. It is with regard to such governance issues that this thesis also seeks 
to make a contribution as detailed below. 
8.23 The Role of the Legal and RegulatoryEnvironment 
Some of the most important findings of this thesis are presented in Chapters 4,5, and 7 
which examine the role of laws and regulations-some applicable to banking, others to 
the wider financial industry-in facilitating bank mergers and explaining differences in 
the performance implications. 
Chapter 4 presents a survey of the banking sectors in Germany, Japan, the US and 
the UK. It is argued that the deregulation of banking activities, and of acquisition activi- 
ties in particular, have led to a sharp increase in M&A. The link between deregulation of 
banking and M&A is clearest for the US, while Germany's banking sector has been left 
largely unreformed with many dividing lines between public sector and private sector 
institutions still in tact. The UK, which may offer some policy lessons for Germany in 
terms of how to privatise a sizable savings bank sector, has largely exhausted its poten- 
tial for large-scale domestic M&A and should, hence, play in important role in the 
cross-border consolidation of bank assets. Regulators in japan are set to introduce addi- 
tional competition, and possible pressures for banks to further consolidate, into the 
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banking sector due to the eventual privatisation of Japan Post-the world's largest bank 
by assets. 
Chapter 5 offers evidence that the laws and regulations governing shareholder 
protection rights in the target's country partly explain bidder announcement returns in 
Europe and the US. The main finding of this chapter is of a negative market reaction to 
bidders in acquisitions valued at more than $100 million that target high investor protec- 
tion regimes (i. e. the US and UK), while bidders targeting low protection environments 
(i. e. most European economies) realise positive abnormal returns. One may interpret 
negative bidder announcement returns to deals where targets operate under a high in- 
vestor protection regime as evidence of acquirers finding it difficult to capture acquisi- 
tion-related gains from a target in the liquid (and, hence, competitive) takeover markets 
associated with this type of corporate governance system (see La Porta et al., 2002; 
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Also, bidding bank losses in the context of activity- 
diversifying bank mergers are more prevalent when mergers are targeted at European 
rather than at US institutions. It is suggested that this is because financial conglomera- 
tion increases investor concerns over their ability to assess the true value of a target and 
the synergistic benefits of a proposed transaction if the target's disclosure practices are 
weak. Further, investor preference for cash-financed bank mergers is particularly strong 
in Europe, thus, reflecting the higher risk of expropriation associated with equity in a 
low investor protection environment. Also, this chapter finds evidence that European 
cross-border M&A creates shareholder wealth for bidders if acquisition targets are lo- 
cated in a less a sophisticated protection environment than the acquirer. 
Chapter 7 examines the regulatory environment in the bidder's country and its ef- 
fects on governance and post-merger performance. Specifically, the effectiveness of 
bidding bank governance is examined under bank regulatory regimes of different strin- 
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gency. Effectively, this addresses the question of whether bank regulation acts as a sub- 
stitute or a complement to corporate governance. The main findings of Chapter 7 are as 
follows. Evidence is presented that shows that improved board monitoring increases 
both the announcement returns and the long-term financial performance of bidding 
banks in the US, but not in Europe. Similarly, US boards that meet more frequently, are 
more independent, and employ directors who are more diverse in terms of their occupa- 
tional backgrounds receive higher announcement period returns. However, the same 
does not hold for Europe where board monitoring is practically irrelevant in bringing 
about better performing M&A. 
Since bank regulation in the US market, by many measures, may be viewed as 
more restrictive vis-ä-vis most European economies (e. g. US authorities restrict mergers 
between financial and non-financial companies, impose high libel risks on directors and, 
until recently, have not allowed universal banking), the near irrelevance of board moni- 
toring is not consistent with bank regulation substituting for shareholder monitoring. 
Instead, the results presented in Chapter 7 points to a complementary role between in- 
ternal governance mechanisms and exogenous industry regulation. 
8.3 Policy Implications 
Because of banks' importance to economic growth and development and the negative 
externalities associated with their failure, the stability of a country's banking system is 
viewed as a public good and, as such, of considerable interest to policymakers. At a gen- 
eral level, the special role of banks is demonstrated by the fact that banking is a regu- 
lated industry. More specifically, policymakers' interest in bank M&A is evident in, 
among other things, stipulations that require regulatory approval for takeover ap- 
proaches of banks in many countries. 
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While a degree of regulatory intervention is justified, there are examples of bank 
regulators unduly inhibiting the market for corporate control relative to non-banking 
firms. In the US, non-financial firms cannot hold interests in banks; German law bars 
mergers between private sector and public sector banks; and recently, the Bank of Italy 
engaged in outright protectionism when thwarting two foreign takeovers of Italian 
credit institutions in 2005. The results reported in this thesis (Chapter 5) as well as evi- 
dence involving non-financial firms (Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Starks and Wei, 2004) im- 
ply that the development of the market for corporate control has value effects for 
shareholders. For example, it is conceivable that restrictions on a freely-functioning 
market for corporate control shield managers from market discipline when hostile take- 
overs involve complex bargaining with regulators or, in some cases, are vetoed from the 
start. In particular, the evidence reported in this thesis shows that, at least from a per- 
formance perspective, attempts to discourage European bank M&A appear unjustified. 
On average, bidding shareholders in European bank mergers realise positive and statisti- 
cally significant abnormal returns (Chapter 5) as well as long-term profitability gains 
(Chapter 6). Consequently, based on the findings reported in this thesis, the first policy 
conclusion is that regulators should take a more favourable view of bank consolidation 
provided competition levels are high enough not to hurt consumer interests. 
Relatedly, this thesis finds positive value effects and long-term performance gains 
for product diversifying bank mergers. It could, thus, be argued that the results point to 
benefits associated with financial conglomeration. Events in the money markets in 
2007/2008 (the so-called `credit crunch') support this view. Banks that failed as a result 
of either investments in US asset-backed securities (IKB and SachsenLB in Germany) or 
because of liquidity problems (Northern Rock in the UK) were small to medium-sized 
and undiversified institutions. Diversified large banks, by contrast, proved to be in a bet- 
ter position to absorb investment losses and to deal with increasing funding costs in the 
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money markets. Hence, while regulators ought to be concerned about the threats that 
large financial conglomerates pose to financial stability as well as about moral hazard 
problems when these institutions become too big too fail, the results presented in this 
thesis support the notion that diversifying bank mergers and financial conglomeration 
have net benefits to the stability of the financial system as a whole. 
The results of Chapter 7 document a potential role of US bank boards (and, ar- 
guably, a smaller role for boards in Europe) in preventing value losses and financial un- 
derperformance in the context of bank mergers. It may, thus, be an opportune time for 
regulators to strengthen board monitoring of acquisition strategies by incorporating 
M&A committees (along the lines of, say, remuneration and audit committees) into na- 
tional corporate governance codes. Details would have to be worked out, but it is con- 
ceivable that M&A committees are part of banks' boards and are made up of independ- 
ent directors. These committees could oversee the due diligence process, approve po- 
tential transactions and report on the post-acquisition performance of deals at regular 
intervals. It is likely that such M&A committees would put additional pressure on senior 
management to consider the value effects of acquisitions more carefully. While this sug- 
gestion might, arguably, be applied to any economic sector, it has particular appeal in 
the banking industry where mergers have been more widespread than in any other sec- 
tor. 
Finally, Chapter 7 also presents evidence consistent with industry regulation and 
bank governance acting as complements. An important policy implication resulting 
from this finding is that for corporate governance initiatives aimed at improving Euro- 
pean bank governance to be effective, they ought to be accompanied by stricter bank 
regulation in general. It is, thus, conceivable that, say, stipulations separating the posi- 
tions of the chairman and CEO will only be effective in curbing managerial opportun- 
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ism in Europe, if bank regulation became more stringent. While no conclusions regard- 
ing the desirability of stricter bank regulation (e. g. by restricting banking activities or by 
increasing the libel risks that bank directors face) can be drawn from the results pre- 
sented in this thesis, the findings of Chapter 7 imply that governance rules per se will be 
ineffective in increasing the monitoring effectiveness of boards. 
8.4 Constraints of the Thesis 
Based on the analyses conducted in four empirical chapters, a number of shortcomings 
of this thesis can be identified. 
The conclusions of Chapters 5 and 7 rely extensively on the accuracy and rele- 
vance of the event study method. While this methodology is one of the `workhorses in 
empirical finance' (Khotari and Warner, 2005) which has been intensively used in hun- 
dreds of studies, it is important to bear a few caveats in mind. On a fundamental level, 
event studies, due to their high degree of standardisation, have a tendency to oversim- 
plify underlying economic relationships (see for example, Frankfurter and McGoun, 
1993). More specifically, cross-country event studies do not control for differences in 
the way markets react to news. The analysis in Chapters 5 and 7 implicitly assumes that 
that capital markets in the US have a similar sensitivity to news than European markets. 
However, differences in the sensitivity to news could, at least in part, explain some of 
the variations in market reactions reported across countries. It may, thus, be more ap- 
propriate to use an event study model that, next to changes in national indexes, also 
controls for changes in a `world market index' (see Park, 2004). On the other hand, 
there is some uncertainty as to whether world market models lead to results that are 
more robust than standard market models for short event windows such as the ones 
employed in this thesis (Fama, 1998). 
200 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
Many of the variables used in Chapter 7 to depict board characteristics are, indeed, 
crude. For example, CEO age and tenure (quantitative variables) are used to capture ex- 
perience (a qualitative variable). Whilst such simple proxies are ubiquitous in the corpo- 
rate governance literature, it is important to point out that they do not necessarily con- 
vey an accurate description of the complexities of board characteristics and the proc- 
esses that facilitate monitoring effectiveness. By the same token, director independence 
in the banking industry may be impaired by the presence of loan relationships between 
outside directors and banks. Regulatory stipulations in the US ensure disclosure of these 
relationships only above a certain threshold. 5S Hence, more sophisticated measures of 
director independence as well as other director qualities would greatly enhance the 
analysis. 
Further, board characteristics and performance changes are examined at the BHC- 
level and not at the level of individual subsidiaries. The reason for this is that perform- 
ance and governance data tend to be less readily available for lower organisational tiers. 
However, when relying on BHC-level data, variables such as board activity may under- 
state the true level of interaction between bank directors. For example, members of the 
BHC board may also be present at board meetings of subsidiaries. 
This thesis examines the impact of laws and regulation on performance (Chapter 
5) and monitoring effectiveness (Chapter 7). On a general level, the question arises as to 
what extent do the indices of investor protection developed by La Porta et al. (1998) 
apply to corporate governance systems that are substantially different from the share- 
holder-oriented US/UK model? Many Continental European companies (and compa- 
nies in emerging markets) operate in governance systems with concentrated ownership 
58 In the US, Regulation 0 of the Federal Reserve Board stipulates that credit extensions to insiders must 
be disclosed if they, in aggregate, equal or exceed $500,000 or 5% of bank's capital, whichever is less. 
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(by founding families, banks or governments) and weakly-functioning markets for cor- 
porate control. Yet, the assumptions that La Porta et al. (1998) base their indices on de- 
rive from the Berle-Means-type corporation that is diffusely-held and traded in competi- 
tive capital markets. Consequently, while La Porta et al. (1998) assume the main conflict 
of interest lies between management and shareholders (because investor protection indi- 
ces measure how well the latter are protection from expropriation by managers), outside 
the US and the UK, the main conflict of interest may well he between different groups 
of stakeholders (e. g. between the controlling shareholder and minority shareholders 
(Goergen, 2007)). While La Porta et al. 's (1998) indices are likely to impact expectations 
that investors hold about the value-creating potential of N1&A of deal announcements 
across countries and governance systems, it is worth bearing in mind that that these in- 
dices capture difference in investor protection regimes that are not applicable to all sam- 
ple countries in the same way. 
Also, many changes occurred during the eight-year sample period over which data 
are collected. Thus, some of La Porta et al. 's (1998) investor protection indices have 
changed slightly. While it can be argued that these changes (e. g. the passing of SOX in 
2002) may only have strengthened the position of the US as a high investor protection 
regime vis-ä-vis Europe, specific changes in bank regulation in Europe and the US (e. g., 
the passing of GLBA, the Second European Banking Directive) are more difficult to 
account for in this thesis. While steps have been taken to control for regulatory changes 
over the sample period, it is not always possible to make meaningful inferences when 
the resulting subsamples (before and after changes were implemented) become very 
small. Thus, whether or not the reported results hold over time cannot always be com- 
pletely resolved in this thesis. 
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Finally, diversification in banking is more difficult to measure than in general in- 
dustry studies. Chapters 5,6 and 7 control for diversification in banking on the basis of 
SIC codes. However, SIC codes do not always accurately reflect the activities of finan- 
cial firms. In the US, for example, SIC codes for banking firms partly reflect regulatory 
responsibilities and are, thus, to some extent, a matter of choice for regional banks. Fur- 
ther, Citigroup and Bank of America are more than commercial banks, and yet both 
share the SIC code 6021 with pure retail banks. As outlined in footnote 23 (pg. 98), one 
may control for this by examining the number of SIC codes shared between bidder and 
target (as opposed to examining whether the industry classifications of the main industry 
of bidders and targets are identical). However, different diversification measures intro- 
duce different kinds of issues. For example, if one were to gauge the relatedness of ac- 
tivities between bidder and target banks from their balance sheets (e. g. through the 
share of non-interest to interest income for bidders and acquirers), this would lead to a 
reduction in the number of observations. Thus, if this method were used, 25% of ob- 
servations in Chapter 5 and 20% of observations in Chapter 6 would be lost due to 
missing or non-sensual values. 
8.5 Directions for Further Research 
The constraints identified above indicate that further research in the area of bank 
merger performance would benefit from changes in research methods and, to a lesser 
degree, some advances in theory development. 
More research needs to be directed at the non-listed sector. In Europe in particu- 
lar, non-listed banks (savings banks, cooperatives and mutuals) play a large role and, in 
several countries, are the market leaders in retail banking. In the same vein, most Euro- 
pean bank M&A is expected to involve non-listed banks in the near future. Germany's 
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banking sector, for example, exhibits thousands of small public sector banks, most of 
which only operate within the boundaries of small municipalities. Yet, the bulk of bank 
merger research continues to examine the performance and stability implications of 
M&A on listed banks. Differences in ownership and corporate governance structures 
my well mean that important differences exist between listed and non-listed banks. Fur- 
ther, regulatory interest in the performance and, above all, the stability effects of con- 
solidation is particularly strong when it comes to the non-listed sector. 
Also, as more data become available in the period following changes in bank regu- 
lation (e. g. GLBA) or investor protection laws (e. g. SOX), it should be examined 
whether the results reported in this thesis regarding the effects of law and regulations 
and on bidding bank performance hold over time. 
This thesis makes valuable contributions by showing that the performance impli- 
cations of M&A differ outside the US, owing partly to legal and regulatory differences 
(applicable to both the target and bidding bank's country). Future research should at- 
tempt to gain a better understanding of differences in the performance effects of M&A 
between banking and the non-financial sector. To date, no detailed comparison exists 
that could show whether banking is more prone to value-destroying (underperforming) 
M&A than other industries. If shareholders in the banking industry are more likely to 
see their wealth diminished following M&A, this in turn could lead to interesting ad- 
vances in theory development. Despite the general acknowledgement that `banks are 
special', theories of M&A in banking do not differ markedly from those used for M&A 
in other industries. Thus, the notion of synergy continues to play very a large role in de- 
scribing what motivates mergers. Even though the results presented in this thesis partly 
back synergetic explanations behind M&A (i. e. European banks tend to engage in cost 
cutting after M&A and there are, indeed, some performance gains in the post-merger 
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period), the findings also hint at non-value maximising motives behind M&A. In future 
research, the notion that overcapacity in the banking industry is one of the main motiva- 
tors behind Di&A should play a more important role. Given the considerable external- 
ities associated with banks' failure, b1&A provides what often is the only viable alterna- 
tive to reduce capacity in `over-banked' markets. 
This thesis examines the relationship between industry regulation and firm gov- 
ernance for the banking sector. However, if the main finding that governance is a com- 
plement to regulation holds, the same empirical relationship should also exist in regu- 
lated non-financial industries such as utilities. Hence, future research should examine 
the effectiveness of board monitoring for regulated firms other than banks across regu- 
latory regimes that vary in terms of how stringent they are. Relatedly, there is still uncer- 
tainty as to what causes regulation and governance to be complements. More should be 
done to understand the linkage between what in Chapter 7 is referred to as `political will' 
to enforce best practice corporate governance and the productivity of governance de- 
vices in curbing managerial opportunism. 
Finally, following the comment above that some of the quantitative measures are 
relatively simplistic and do not necessarily capture the complexities of the board charac- 
teristics they mean to proxy, future research should turn to qualitative data to comple- 
ment the vast body of quantitative studies. It would, thus, be advisable for future studies 
to collect more primary data or, alternatively, to combine different performance metrics. 
Such data may be collected through interviews or questionnaires. If collected and inter- 
preted carefully (see Section 3.2.3, pg. 44), the resulting data may enable a more 
fine-grained analysis of the motivation behind M&A and benefits of a merger, especially 
with regards to complex processes such as due diligence or post-merger integration. 
Another benefit of collecting data of a more qualitative nature is that board member 
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characteristics such as experience and independence may be more accurately described. 
In this context, a criticism sometimes rightfully levelled against research in finance is 
that data relevance is soemtimes sacrificed over data availability. Q 
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